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Abstract 
 
Networks are used by millions of people and have become an integral part of daily 
life. Network managers strive to achieve 99.9% uptime for their networks. A suite of 
monitoring and maintenance tools that are used by network managers make up the 
primary method for managing the network. Networks have been constantly evolving over 
the past decades. Recent trends demand heterogeneous networks consisting of a variety 
of devices from various manufacturers. The devices in these heterogeneous networks may 
consist of traditional wired devices, ad hoc devices or Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 
devices. Combined into a single network infrastructure, each of these device types forms 
a tier within the network resulting in a multi-tier network. If all device types are present, 
the network will consist of three-tiers, one each for wired devices, ad hoc devices, and 
WSN devices. Network management of Heterogeneous Multi-tier Networks (HMNs) is 
both a necessary and complex task for the seamless interoperability of managing the 
diversities of device types. 
One aspect of network management that is of particular interest in today’s climate of 
increasing attacks and security threats is security management. There are many 
components to security management, including virus protection, firewalls, and intrusion 
detection. Attacks are constantly evolving as they adapt to existing security measures 
making intrusion detection more difficult. Adding to this complexity is the volume of 
data on networks making any non-automated data analysis task to identify intrusions 
nearly impossible.  
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The primary goal of this research is two-fold. The first goal is to provide a Network 
Management System (NMS) for HMNs. One contribution toward this goal is to address 
this arduous task by providing descriptions of the devices in the form of a knowledge-
based ontology. This integrated Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network Management System 
(HMNMS) allows a network manager to manage devices of all tiers in a HMN 
seamlessly and enables automating the data analysis process. A framework was designed 
and developed for managing HMNs based on ontological descriptions and related 
algorithms and a prototype HMNMS was built to prove the feasibility of this goal. 
Another contribution of this goal is the development and verification of an analytical 
model based on queuing theory that is used to conduct a performance analysis of a HMN. 
The performance analysis using the analytical model showed the bottleneck to be a 
gateway node and not the HMNMS in a representative HMN. 
The second goal is to develop a formal representation of complex attacks using 
ontology. This will automate some of the data analysis allowing for the detection of more 
complex attacks as well as attack attempts. The development of a formal representation 
using ontology based on generalized attack trees for complex attacks, which provided 
flexibility and extendibility, is one contribution toward this goal. Furthermore, utilizing 
network traffic data in the formal representation and detection process provided a way to 
analyze all traffic data and not just data exploiting existing vulnerabilities. A result of this 
process led to the detection of additional complex attacks and attack attempts. A set of 
heuristics was designed and developed based on the formal ontological representation as 
a second contribution of this goal. A prototype system was constructed to validate the 
feasibility of using the formal representation and heuristics to detect complex attacks and 
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attack attempts. The new system detected more complex attacks as well as attack 
attempts than a current state-of-the-art system.  
In summary, as networks evolve in complexity and sophistication, a greater need 
emerges to develop new protocols and mechanisms to manage and protect them. 
Ontology is utilized in a NMS to manage HMNs, particularly in configuration and 
security management. Through the use of ontology, interoperability and inference can be 
leveraged to provide a common management system for a network consisting of 
heterogeneous nodes and multiple node types, such as wired networks, ad hoc networks, 
and Wireless Sensor Networks. The main contribution of this work is taking advantage of 
ontology in the network management domain to add reasoning to management tasks, 
specifically configuration and security management, consequently reducing the amount 
of manual analysis required to complete these tasks. The use of this technology will 
provide additional data analysis to network managers in simplifying management tasks in 
order to achieve the goal of 99.9% uptime. 
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 Introduction Chapter 1
 
 
There are many types of networks, from wired to wireless, wide-area to local, 
unsecured to strictly secured, static to dynamic, and others. The most common network 
type is the wired network, consisting mostly of static nodes, such as desktops, servers and 
printers. These static nodes are interconnected using network devices, such as switches 
and routers. There are many manufacturers of network devices, including Cisco and 
Nortel. The different types and manufacturers of nodes in a wired network, together, 
create a heterogeneous network.  
The wired network and the Internet have evolved with the advancement of 
technology, such as laptops, PDAs, smart phones, e.g. the iPhone, Android and 
Blackberry and computer surfaces, e.g. the iPad and tablet. These devices have increased 
the popularity of mobility with the ability to connect to the Internet. In order for these 
devices to communicate, they must be connected to a network. Often the devices will 
connect to each other forming their own network. This type of a network is an ad hoc 
network (AHN). In order for devices on an AHN to access the vast amounts of 
information available on the Internet, the AHN must be able to connect to the Internet. 
When this type of connection occurs, a heterogeneous two-tier network is created, with 
one tier being a wired network, possibly the Internet, and the other tier being an AHN. 
The network will often be heterogeneous, which, by definition, consists of many different 
types of devices.  
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are a type of AHN but require different protocols 
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and applications than traditional AHNs due to the disparate characteristics and constraints 
of WSNs. The main characteristics of WSNs that make them unique and require the use 
of new protocols and applications are that they consist of many small sensors that are 
densely deployed, have limited resources and often have little human interaction post-
deployment. There are innovative uses of WSNs, including environment sensing, military 
scenarios, habitat monitoring, structure monitoring, and first responder situations.  
Likewise, there are also challenges associated with WSNs. The primary challenge is 
energy consumption. Connecting a WSN to an AHN and/or a wired network creates an 
additional tier within the network, resulting in a contemporary type of two-tier network, 
or possibly a three-tier network. Multi-tier networks, with heterogeneous devices, are 
known as Heterogeneous Multi-tier Networks (HMNs). An example of a HMN is 
depicted in Fig. 1.1. In this figure, a Nortel and Cisco device is either a switch or a router. 
An ad hoc device is any device that is part of an AHN, typically a laptop, tablet device, 
smart phone, or any other ad hoc device.  
 
Figure 1.1: An example of a Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network. 
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Network management is required for all types of networks, including wired, AHN and 
WSN. Network management is an essential aspect of all networks that includes a suite of 
tools, protocols, and frameworks used to assist a network manager with monitoring and 
maintaining networks and all network components. One of the most vital aspects of 
network management is availability; users expect the network to be available seven days 
a week, twenty-four hours a day. This demand by users makes network management 
imperative.  
HMNs, with different management systems, make network management a difficult 
task. Each type of network will typically require its own network management system. 
Even networks of the same type may require multiple network management systems due 
to the heterogeneous devices deployed and their proprietary nature. A network 
management system that can manage devices from various manufacturers and different 
network types would simplify this task.  
To develop one network management system, the existing systems, or models, must 
be merged or mapped into a single model. A single model will ensure only one language 
interpreter with an integrated definition of all network elements and their associated 
behavior. In order to develop one network management system, with one language 
interpreter, it is necessary to understand the syntax and the semantics within each 
management system.  
Ontology [1, 2] is an area of research that can assist in the mapping of all network 
management systems into a single system for easier management of a HMN. This is 
accomplished by using ontology constructs to indicate which elements in one 
management system are equivalent to elements in another management system. Providing 
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descriptions of the subcomponents in the form of a knowledge-based ontology is one way 
to address the arduous task of managing these networks. Our primary goal is to create a 
framework for managing these networks based on ontological descriptions and related 
algorithms. 
To map multiple ontologies into a single domain, mapping rules are developed that 
will translate data from each management system. To develop the mapping rules, it is 
necessary to understand the semantics of data within each domain or model. The 
ontology based management system developed in this research can be used to manage a 
one-tier network, which can be a wired network, AHN, or WSN, or a multi-tier network 
consisting of a combination of these. 
A secondary goal in the management of heterogeneous networks is to recognize and 
act on complex attacks as they may occur. Attacks can take the form of sequences of 
events that result in a complex attack. To date, this problem has only been addressed on a 
limited basis due to the heterogeneous nature of networks and the infinite possibilities of 
sequences that may result in a complex attack. Our ontological representation will use 
collected knowledge about attacks so that a management system can proactively detect 
and act upon complex attacks. We will demonstrate this enhanced complex capability in 
our management system on our data to detect a greater volume of complex attacks as well 
as attempted attacks. Attack detection in this research is based on all network traffic 
rather than just on vulnerability data allowing for the detection of a wider variety of 
complex attacks and attack attempts.  
A security attack against a network device may cause it to work incorrectly or not at 
all. Depending on which device in the network failed, the attack would cause at least a 
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portion of the network to fail. If a network device fails and that device is connected a 
subnet to the network, then the entire subnet would become disconnected from the 
network. If the device attacked was a core network device, it may affect the entire 
network, making the network unusable.  
It is imperative to prevent such failures from occurring so that 100% uptime of all 
network nodes may be maintained. To prevent device failure due to a security attack, a 
system must be deployed that will detect network attacks or intrusions. Such a system is 
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which will create an alarm when an intrusion is 
detected. This is known as a true positive in an IDS, meaning that an alarm is generated 
when an attack is detected, and there is indeed an attack. Many IDSs will detect an 
intrusion in the network by analyzing existing vulnerabilities of the deployed devices, 
primarily deployed hosts (not network devices). Others will scan network traffic and 
identify possible attacks to the network. The attacks identified by these IDSs are simple 
attacks; the IDS will raise an alarm when a single attack type is identified in the network 
traffic. A single attack may in itself be meaningful but this does not necessarily preclude 
the possibility of a larger context for the single attack. 
To be able to provide the best IDS solution, existing vulnerabilities in all deployed 
devices are analyzed, including network devices, and network traffic is scanned to 
identify all types of attacks, including multi-phase attacks. This process is accomplished 
by including all deployed nodes, hosts and network devices, in the vulnerability analysis 
phase, and analyzing simple attack alarms to identify those that are a step in a multi-
phase or complex attack.  
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Another step in the IDS is to identify potential attacks. The network manager should 
not only be concerned with attacks against nodes that are vulnerable, but should also 
monitor for any attack attempt by an intruder. This is vital because a network manager 
cannot predict precisely which applications users on the network may install or deploy. 
For example, if an intruder is attempting to circumvent a web services vulnerability but 
there are no vulnerable systems on the network, then the attack attempt is unsuccessful.  
The same attack may be successful in the future due to a user installing a new web server 
that is vulnerable to that particular attack. To make the network more resistant to 
successful attacks, the network manager should analyze all attack attempts against it.   
The final phase of the IDS is to identify a remedy for the attack. If there was an 
unsuccessful attack, the remedy would simply be the identification of the reason it was 
not successful so this attack type will continue to be unsuccessful, even with the 
deployment of new devices or additional services on the network. For a successful attack, 
the remedy will ensure failure in the future. This may require a patch to a host or a 
reconfiguration of a service or node. The reconfiguration may be dynamic, performed by 
the IDS, or it may require manual intervention based on remedy information included in 
the alarm to the network manager. In both cases, the application of the remedy will make 
the network less susceptible to future attacks. Along with the remedy, it may be desirable 
to place the source of the attack on a blacklist, which is a list containing addresses that 
are forbidden from sending data to the network. 
By ensuring that network devices are secure and resilient, the network will remain 
operational for a longer period of time, helping to meet the goal of maximizing network 
availability. This requires the ability to detect when a network node fails and possibly 
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perform a reconfiguration to minimize the failure. This may be a reconfiguration of the 
failed node to correct the problem and restore its functionality in the network, or the 
reconfiguration of the network or subnet to bypass the failed node. The ability to identify 
a possible failure or a cause of a failure, and then a possible remedy, will ensure 
continued operation of the network, regardless of the network type. 
In the event that the attack cannot be detected in real time, an IDS can still provide 
valuable information. As demonstrated by the information security life cycle illustrated in 
Fig. 1.2, security is an on-going process. The steps in the information security life cycle 
are risk analysis, risk assessment, cost/benefit analysis, implementation, and vulnerability 
assessment. The cycle begins with risk analysis, which involves identification of the 
organization’s assets and the vulnerabilities present in each asset. The next step, risk 
assessment, determines the threats against the identified assets, the probability that those 
threats will occur, and the consequences of each threat occurring. Cost/benefit analysis is 
the third step. It is used to determine the best controls to implement based on the ones 
that address the identified threats at an appropriate cost. The appropriate cost depends on 
the organization and its goals. The implementation step, which is the fourth step, is the 
deployment of the identified controls during the cost/benefit analysis. The vulnerability 
assessment is the final step. It is used to determine if the implemented controls are 
working appropriately. At this point, the risk assessment is completed again and the cycle 
begins once again. Due to the fact that the assets, threats and controls are constantly 
being evaluated, even if an attack is detected post-success, the information about the 
attack can still be very useful in future security detection and intervention. 
 
 11 
 
Figure 1.2: The information security life cycle [3]. 
  
1.1 Contributions 
The goal of this research is to provide a method to manage Heterogeneous Multi-tier 
Networks, which currently does not exist, by designing and developing a framework 
based on ontological representations. The contributions are: 
1. The design and development of an ontology based Network Management 
System (NMS) consisting of an adaptable knowledge base structure that 
significantly enhances the ability to manage HMNs as they evolve in number 
and complexity.  
2. The development and verification of the first analytical model for conducting 
performance analysis of a HMN.  
3. The design and development of an ontological representation for simple and 
complex attack types based on generalized attack trees facilitating 
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improvements in attack detection and allowing for augmentation of basic 
attack knowledge. 
4. Improve on the expressivity of complex attack reasoning and recognition by 
augmenting the ontological representation with a set of extensible heuristics 
designed for this purpose. 
The first contribution of this research is the design and development of an ontology 
based Network Management System (NMS) consisting of an adaptable knowledge 
base structure that significantly enhances the ability to manage HMNs as they evolve in 
number and complexity. This NMS addresses the challenges new technologies and 
dynamic components present to heterogeneous network managers. It provides seamless 
integration of support to manage Heterogeneous Multi-tier Networks, even as they 
evolve. An ontology based approach to network management is designed and developed 
so it can be implemented by others and demonstrated in our prototype system. The 
rational and advantages of the ontology based approach are outlined. A prototype 
ontology based NMS is built and an existence proof is provided that shows the feasibility 
and performance goals are achievable. An example is provided that shows this approach 
to network management is an n:1 improvement in the toolset required for management of 
a HMN, where n is the number of different device types in the network. 
The second contribution is the development and verification of the first analytical 
model for conducting performance analysis of a HMN. The analytical model for a 
HMN is developed based on queuing theory. A performance analysis of a HMN is 
conducted to verify the model and identify bottlenecks. The analytical model is then 
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utilized to prove that the bottleneck in a Heterogeneous Two-tier Network is the ad hoc 
gateway and not the Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network Management System (HMNMS).  
The third contribution is the design and development of an ontological 
representation for simple and complex attack types based on generalized attack trees 
facilitating improvements in attack detection and allowing for augmentation of basic 
attack knowledge. The ontological representation provides more flexibility because its 
declarative representation allows for augmentation without impacting other aspects of the 
system. This allows it to be extended by others doing related research therefore extending 
the knowledge and enabling the detection of evolving attack strategies. Generalized 
attack trees are defined for complex attacks based on the analysis of attack patterns. The 
utilization of traffic data in developing the formal representation and its advantages are 
described. The formal representation of the complex attacks based on traffic data is 
developed using ontology, which provides flexibility over a programmatic approach. This 
representation enables the knowledge to be extended by others doing related research 
therefore extending the knowledge and surviving the evolution of complex attacks.  
The fourth and final contribution of this research is to improve on the expressivity 
of complex attack reasoning and recognition by augmenting the ontological 
representation with a set of extensible heuristics designed for this purpose. There is a 
trade-off between the expressivity in knowledge representation languages and the 
computational complexity. A highly expressive language is used for the ontological 
representation but some expressive limitations exist that prevent the representation of all 
complex attacks. The heuristics are developed to add the necessary expressivity using the 
ontological representation. These heuristics are expressed as queries in SPARQL, a 
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standard query language, enabling easy modification and addition of rules to detect 
additional complex attacks. The ontology based set of heuristics is developed to allow for 
implementation. A flexible prototype system is developed to show the viability of using 
the heuristics to detect complex attacks and attack attempts. In the analysis of data, 
results showed the prototype system detected more complex attacks and attack attempts 
than a current state-of-the-art system used for comparison.  
1.2 Dissertation Roadmap 
The dissertation is written to provide the reader with a progressive flow of this 
research. Chapter 2 provides background information on the technology used in the 
research. Related works for the various aspects of the research is provided in Chapter 3. 
The next four chapters provide details for each of the four contributions. Chapter 4 
describes the developed HMNMS, including the theoretical basis and ontology based 
approach. This chapter includes preliminary results for the prototype HMNMS deployed 
in experimental and live networks. The analytical model for performance analysis of a 
HMN and results of an analysis of an experimental network are explained in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 explains the design and development of a formal representation for complex 
attacks and attack attempts. The approach and development of the formal representation 
are also described in this chapter. Chapter 7 describes the design and development of a 
set of heuristics based on the formal ontological representation. As such, the definition of 
a set of heuristics and the development of a prototype system using the set of heuristics 
are explained. Chapter 8 includes conclusions and future work for this research. 
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 Background Information Chapter 2
 
2.1 Network Management 
The key elements of network management are a management station, management 
agent, an information base, and a protocol. The management station is typically a desktop 
or laptop that collects the data from the managed devices. In order for devices to be 
managed, there must be software installed on each device to communicate with the 
management station. This software is the management agent. The information base is the 
data that is to be collected by the various types of managed devices. The communication 
between the management station and the management agents is through a management 
protocol. The management protocol will ensure that the management station and agents 
are using the same syntax and semantics for exchanging messages.   
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) created a network 
management model to aid in understanding the functionality of network management. 
This network management model consists of five functional areas: 1) fault management, 
2) configuration management, 3) performance management, 4) security management and 
5) accounting management.   
The ability to identify problems in the network is the primary goal of fault 
management. The steps in fault management include: a) determining a problem exists, 2) 
isolating the problem, and 3) fixing the problem, if possible. When a fault occurs, the 
network manager receives an alarm, which may be in the form of a log file entry, an E-
mail message, an SMS message, a page, or an entry in the network management system.  
 16 
The number of faults occurring in a network are usually too numerous for the network 
manager to address individually. In order for the network manager to successfully address 
the faults in a systematic manner, a prioritization of the faults is crucial.  
Configuration management includes setting up, monitoring and controlling network 
devices. To assist with many of the other network management tasks, an inventory of all 
network devices must be maintained. This inventory should include the devices deployed 
and their characteristics, such as the name, network address, location, both physical and 
logical, and the current configuration. The inventory and collection tasks are often 
referred to as topology management. It may also include a physical or logical map of the 
network. The information for the inventory should be collected on a periodic basis, either 
manually or automatically. A common collection method is called autodiscovery. 
Autodiscovery is a process that runs on a network management system and periodically 
detects all installed network devices. It reports back to the management station each 
device found and some of the device’s characteristics. While this process is an effective 
automated tool for collecting network inventory information, it is bandwidth-intensive 
and is not recommended for bandwidth-constrained networks, such as WSNs. 
A critical aspect of network management is procuring the utilization of the network 
devices and links. This is the job of performance management. Having this information 
about the network components will assist the network manager in troubleshooting, 
identifying bottlenecks and capacity planning. The type of the component will indicate 
the utilization information that is important and may include utilization of the CPU or 
network card. Some of the specific items of interest in performance management are 
packet forwarding rate, error rate, and packets queued.   
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Security management is often a challenging task to complete and is distinct from 
operating system, physical, and application security. Security management requires 
restricting access to information on the network and the network components to those 
entitled to it. The primary function of security management is controlling access points to 
data that is stored on devices attached to the network.   
While performance management tracks the utilization of network components, 
accounting management tracks the utilization for each user. This includes the utilization 
by each user for the various network resources, including network devices, links, servers 
and storage devices. The original reason for the inclusion of this functional area by ISO 
was to allow organizations to bill users for their usage of the network and its resources. 
While this is no longer a common practice within organizations, the information gathered 
about users is still useful to a network manager, particularly to aid in establishing metrics 
and quotas. It is also helpful to allow proper allocation of network resources. User 
utilization may also overlap with security management. This process allows the network 
manager to understand typical user behavior; if atypical behavior is detected, then it may 
indicate a security breach or intrusion.  
Network management of AHNs and WSNs is more difficult in general due to their 
dynamic nature and the limited resources of the devices. The five functional areas 
identified by ISO are a part of the network management of AHNs and WSNs. These areas 
may be modified or augmented for proper management of these network types. For 
instance, network coverage and connectivity are a part of performance management. The 
nature of ad hoc networks makes security management in AHNs and WSNs more 
difficult. This is a result of the use of wireless communication, which is more difficult to 
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secure, and the resource limitations of the devices.  
An important aspect of AHNs and WSNs, which is not part of wired network 
management, is energy management. Energy management may be regarded as a separate 
functional area or encompassed in several of the functional areas. Including energy 
management as a part of some of the other functional areas is often done because of the 
overlap with the different areas and energy management. Energy management is often 
included within the areas of configuration management, fault management and 
performance management. It is considered part of these areas, instead of its own area, 
because of its close connection to these tasks. When nodes run low on or out of energy, it 
impacts these other areas. For example, in topology management, which is a part of 
configuration management, if a node runs out of energy, it is no longer a part of the 
network. If this node was a part of the routing protocol or a gateway node, then the 
network topology will change. This may also generate a fault or impact the performance 
of the network, thus demonstrating the reason to include energy management with fault 
and performance management.  
2.1.1 SNMP 
 
The standard network management protocol for wired networks is Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) [4]. SNMP is considered simple because it is based on 
two commands, fetch and store. All operations are implemented using these two 
commands. The basic operation of SNMP is the management station requesting data from 
managed devices via the fetch command. The devices will return stored data to the 
management station in response to these requests. The store command is used by the 
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management station to set values by saving a specified value to an attribute in the device. 
The device attributes are called objects. 
All the objects SNMP can access require a definition, including a unique name. The 
management station and management agent must agree on the object names so there is a 
common vocabulary for communication. The set of all objects that SNMP can access is 
defined by the Management Information Base (MIB). By separating the object definitions 
from the management software, new items can be added to the MIB while maintaining 
the same software.  
Along with the object specification, the MIB also defines any object groupings and 
relationships between managed objects. The object definitions are specified using the 
Structure of Management Information (SMI). SMI is a subset of the Abstract Syntax 
Notation One (ASN.1), which is a standard for describing data structures.  
The names specified for all managed objects are taken from the Object Identifier 
Namespace [5], which is administered by ISO (International Organization of Standards) 
and ITU. The Object Identifier Namespace describes a namespace for arbitrary objects 
and is not dedicated to network management. Examples of objects that can be referenced 
using the Object Identifier Namespace are a company, a project, an encryption algorithm, 
a file format, and a SNMP MIB.  
The Object Identifier Namespace is a hierarchical structure with each node specified 
with a unique name and number. The Object Identifier (OID) is the sequence of the 
numeric labels of the nodes in the path from the root to the object. A part of the 
namespace is provided in Fig. 2.1, which is the subtree for internet management. 
Following the nodes from the root to the internet management node produces an OID of 
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1.3.6.1.2. As illustrated in Fig. 2.1, mib is the node below the internet management node. 
Below the mib node is a node for each MIB category. These categories are system, 
interfaces, at (this one is deprecated and only remains for compatibility), ip, icmp, tcp, 
udp, egp, transmission, and snmp.  
 
Figure 2.1: The Internet management subtree of the Object Identifier Namespace (OID). 
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The MIB specifies the data each network device type, such as switches and routers, 
must maintain. The unique names for each object are defined in the MIB, as well as the 
meanings of each and the operations allowed on each. An example of an object definition 
is provided in Fig. 2.2. This example defines an object called sysName, which stores a 
name assigned by the network manager for the managed device. The notation defines the 
syntax, access permissions, status and a brief description of the object. The {system 5} 
notation indicates that it is a child node of the system node and the node has a numeric 
value of 5. This value is used to specify the object’s OID. Since it is a child of the system 
node, which has an OID of 1.3.6.1.2.1.1, the OID for sysName is 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: An example of an object definition in the MIB for SNMP. 
2.2 Ontology 
Originating in the field of philosophy, ontology is now being used and researched in 
many other fields, including computer science. In computer science, ontology is a data 
model representing the knowledge in the specified domain, as well as the relationships 
between this knowledge. Ontologies define “a set of concepts, its taxonomy, interrelation, 
and the rules that govern these concepts” [6]. Two fields in computer science that benefit 
from ontology are Artificial Intelligence and the Semantic Web. There has also been 
sysName OBJECT-TYPE 
    SYNTAX      DisplayString (SIZE (0..255)) 
    MAX-ACCESS  read-write 
    STATUS      current 
    DESCRIPTION 
            "An administratively-assigned name for this managed 
            node.  By convention, this is the node's  
fully-qualified domain name.  If the name is unknown, 
the value is the zero-length string." 
    ::= { system 5 } 
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research in using ontology in the network field. 
The primary benefits of ontology are interoperability and inference. Interoperability 
provides a way to share knowledge in a domain, which overcomes differences in 
terminology for the same concept and meaning for the same term. Interoperability of 
multiple domains is accomplished with ontology mapping. This will map an item in one 
domain with an item in another domain.  Inference allows new knowledge to be learned 
from existing knowledge. For instance, if it is known that Jordan is Jack’s parent and that 
Jordan is female, then it can be inferred that Jordan is Jack’s mother.  
Ontology is a declarative approach, which is typically more flexible than a procedural 
approach. This makes the system more adaptable. Other benefits from ontology are 
reusability, reliability, shareability, portability, and interoperability [1]. There are also a 
large set of tools available for ontology, making it easy to define and use.  
Ontology can be classified according to various characteristics. One of the possible 
classifications of ontology is lightweight or heavyweight. This classification depends on 
the expressiveness of the language used to describe the ontology. A lightweight ontology 
is represented with a simple taxonomy or hierarchy of the domain concepts. A lightweight 
ontology can describe concepts, concept relationships, concept properties, and concept 
taxonomies. A heavyweight ontology attempts to fully describe the domain concepts by 
including rules, axioms and constraints.  
Another classification of ontology is the generalization of the domain concepts. The 
different types of ontology in this classification are upper, middle, and lower. An upper or 
foundational ontology [7] defines general concepts for a domain. It would be used to 
provide a common foundation to be leveraged by other, more specific domain ontologies. 
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A middle ontology extends an upper ontology and is more specialized in the domain. An 
ontology for concepts that are very specific in the domain, often for a specific application 
in the domain, is a lower or application-specific ontology.  
2.2.1 Knowledge Representation Languages 
To formally represent domain knowledge, a knowledge representation language may 
be used. There are various knowledge representation languages, including XML, RDF, 
RDF Schema and the Web Ontology Language (OWL). The languages differ in syntax 
and expressiveness. Fig. 2.3 illustrates the knowledge representation languages and how 
they relate to each other. This image is known as the Semantic Web Stack and was created 
by Tim Berners-Lee. Tim Berners-Lee is the inventor of the World Wide Web, the 
Director of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [8], and the Director of the World 
Wide Web Foundation [9].  
 
Figure 2.3: Knowledge representation languages [10]. 
 
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [11] is a language developed to provide a 
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structure of information. This allows information to be represented that is accessible by 
humans and machines. Relationships among the information can be defined by nesting 
XML tags. XML provides a structure or syntax to the information but provides no 
semantics to the information.  
A universal language that uses XML-based syntax is the Resource Description 
Language (RDF) [12]. It allows users to describe resources using their own vocabulary. 
Resources are described by a set of triples called statements. Each statement consists of a 
subject, a predicate or property, and an object. The object is the subject’s value for the 
specified property. RDF allows the specification of resources but implies no meaning 
about them.  
One method to make semantic information accessible by a machine is to use RDF 
Schema (RDFS) [13] by defining the structure of the data. This is also a knowledge 
representation language that organizes objects into hierarchies. It defines the vocabulary 
used in RDF data models, specifies the properties that apply to each kind of object, 
specifies the values for each property, and defines the relationships between objects. The 
benefit of RDFS is the ability to provide semantic information to machines, but it is 
limited to the subclass and property hierarchies.  
There are several specific limitations of RDFS [14]. First, properties only have local 
scope so there is no way to specify restrictions that apply to some classes only. Second, it 
does not provide a way to specify that classes are disjoint. If there are instances that can 
belong to one class but not another, this is done by saying that classes are disjoint. For 
instance, mother and father would be disjoint classes because an individual could not be a 
member of both. Third, new classes cannot be created using Boolean combinations of 
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classes, such as union and intersection. For example, if a class exists for mother and 
father, then parents would be the intersection of these two classes. Fourth, RDFS does not 
allow cardinality restrictions. It may be necessary to state that a person can have exactly 
two parents, which is not possible in RDFS. The last limitation of RDFS is the inability to 
define special characteristics of properties, such as transitive and inverse. For example, it 
would not be possible to specify that the “is child of” property is the inverse of the “is 
parent of” property (if Jack is the child of Jordan, then Jordan is the parent of Jack).  
2.2.2 OWL 
The most popular ontology language is OWL [15, 16]. OWL is a general purpose 
ontology language that represents knowledge using RDF triples. It provides a way to 
express semantic information about resources. OWL allows the user to provide the 
definition of important domain concepts and the relationships between the concepts 
through a class hierarchy.  
There are three different variants of OWL, OWL Lite, OWL DL, and OWL Full [16]. 
The differences in these variants are in their expressiveness. OWL Lite is a subset of 
OWL constructs and also includes restrictions on the use of some of the allowed OWL 
constructs. For instance, cardinality values can only be 0 or 1 and there is support for 
intersection only in class definitions. OWL DL is based on description logics and 
provides computational completeness and decidability. OWL DL supports all OWL 
constructs but places restrictions on the use of some of the constructs. For example, if a 
property is declared to be transitive, then it cannot have numeric restrictions placed on it. 
As another example, classes cannot be individuals of other classes. OWL Full provides 
the maximum expressiveness and is a superset of RDF. It is the complete OWL language 
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including all OWL constructs with no restrictions on their use. For example, cardinality 
values can be any value greater than or equal to 0, there is support for intersection, union, 
complement, and enumeration, and classes can be instances and properties at the same 
time.  
OWL uses a class hierarchy similar to object-oriented programming languages. 
Members of the class are known as individuals. Individuals may also be referred to as 
instances. Classes define a way to categorize similar individuals. A subclassOf property is 
used to create the hierarchy. A class that is a sub class of another class will inherit the 
parent class’s properties and will also infer that an individual that is a member of the 
subclass will also be a member of the parent class. Individuals of a class can be defined 
using enumeration with all the individuals of that class being defined using oneOf. If an 
individual cannot be a member of two specified classes, these classes are said to be 
disjoint. Class can be defined to be disjoint using the property disjointWith.  
Classes can be defined using set operators, including intersectionOf and unionOf. A 
class can be the union of two other classes, which results in a class containing individuals 
that are members of one of the classes. If a class is the intersection of two classes, then it 
contains all the individuals that are individuals in both classes, but not individuals that are 
in only one of the two classes or not in any of the two classes. Often unionOf and 
intersectionOf are used with property restrictions. For instance, it might be necessary to 
say that the class daughter is the individuals in the class child that have a value of 
“female” for the property named gender (indicating male or female).  
There are two different types of properties in OWL. A datatype property is an 
attribute of the individual that will have a value. The value will be a literal of some 
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datatype, such as a string or integer. An object property will have a value that is an 
individual of another class indicating a relationship between the two individuals. Two 
property restrictions are domain and range. Both of these restrictions are specified on 
object properties and restrict the values of an object property if it relates two individuals. 
If a class is specified as the domain of a property, then the value of individual for the 
subject of the property must be an individual of the specific class. The same is true for 
range except the range is applied to the value of the property, or the object.  
A restriction can be placed on the number of values that can be assigned to a property. 
This restriction is cardinality and it can be a specific cardinality. MaxCardinality and 
minCardinality can be used to specify a maximum or minimum cardinality for a property.  
A few other property restrictions were used in the research in this dissertation. Several 
of these restrictions relate one property value to another one. If one property is a 
subPropertyOf another property, then if a subject is related to an object by the specified 
property, it is also related to the object by the parent property. A property can also be the 
inverse of another property, using inverseOf. For example, hasChild could be the 
inverseOf hasParent, since the child is the inverse of parent. Two properties can also be 
equivalent, using equivalentProperty, which creates a synonym property for another 
property.  
Two restrictions were used to specify limitations on the possible value of specified 
properties. If a property is restricted with allValuesFrom, then the value for that property 
must be an individual from the specified class. This also allows the user to infer 
information; the object of this property would automatically be an individual of the class 
specified in the allValuesFrom restriction. The someValuesFrom simply states that at least 
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one value of that property must be an individual from the specified class.  
2.2.3 SPARQL 
SPARQL [17] is a query language for RDF and is similar to SQL for databases. It is 
used to query the knowledge base at the triple level. A SPARQL query can consist of 
triple patterns, conjunctions, disjunctions, and patterns. There are four forms of a 
SPARQL query (SELECT, CONSTRUCT, DESCRIBE, ASK). The SELECT, 
CONSTRUCT and DESCRIBE queries are all used to extract information from the 
knowledge base with the difference being in how the information is returned. The 
SELECT query returns the information in table form; CONSTRUCT returns RDF triples 
and DESCRIBE returns an RDF graph. The ASK query is used to determine if a solution 
exists and will simply return true or false.  
The two primary SPARQL statements are SELECT and INSERT. A SELECT 
statement will retrieve all information from the knowledge base matching the specific 
criteria. An INSERT statement will add new statements to the knowledge base. A 
WHERE clause can be specified in the query to provide criteria to match with the data in 
the knowledge base. Only data in the knowledge base matching the specified pattern in 
the WHERE clause will be returned.  
To further restrict the solutions returned, the FILTER keyword can be used. This 
keyword will specify additional criteria to be used to eliminate statements from the 
solution returned. The filter pattern can be specified using relational and logical 
operators. Regular expressions can also be specified in the filter pattern using the 
REGEX keyword.  
There are other keywords that can be used to either limit the results returned or 
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specify how the results should be returned. For the purposes of this research, three of 
these other keywords were employed. The DISTINCT keyword will eliminate any 
duplicate statements from the solution. If part of the matching pattern is optional, that 
part of the pattern is restricted with the OPTIONAL keyword. The statements in the 
solution can be ordered according to specified criteria using ORDER BY.  
Aggregates can be used in the solution. Before applying an aggregate the solution set 
must be grouped. This is accomplished using GROUP BY. If the groups in the solution 
should be restricted to specific criteria, such as having more than a specified number of 
statements in each group, the HAVING keyword is used. Some of the aggregates that can 
be used are count, to return the number of statements in each group, and MIN and MAX, 
which will return the minimum or maximum value of a specified property in the solution.  
ARQ is a SPARQL processor for Jena [18]. ARQ includes a function library 
consisting of various functions that can be used in SPARQL queries in Jena. A subset of 
these functions was used in the research in this dissertation. For example, the concat 
function is used to concatenate several property values that were returned together to 
form one value.  
2.3 Queuing Theory 
Queuing theory [19] is used to study the behavior of queues in a system or network 
[20]. A common queue model used for analysis is the M/M/1 model. The first M 
represents the type of arrival process to the queue. In the M/M/1 model, the arrival 
process is a Poisson distribution [21] of arrival requests with a mean rate of λ. A Poisson 
distribution indicates that the arrival times follow an exponential distribution and the 
 30 
probability that n events occur during time t is the Poisson distribution. The second M is 
the service duration of a request, which is exponentially distributed in this model with a 
mean rate of μ. The 1 indicates there is a single server. The last two values in queuing 
systems notation are not specified in the M/M/1 model indicating there are an infinite 
queue length and an infinite number of sources that can produce requests.  
Queuing systems can be characterized by several variables, including the mean 
number of requests, N and the mean wait time or delay, T. The N, T and λ are related by 
a basic formula known as Little’s Theorem [21]. Little’s Theorem uses the equation 
                                          (2.1) 
Little’s Theorem demonstrates the obvious conclusion that systems with more requests 
(large N) will have larger wait times (large T).  
There are several equations that can be used to describe a M/M/1 queuing system 
[22]. The first equation is the traffic intensity, ρ 
                                       (2.2) 
To maintain a stable system and prevent the queues from going to infinity, ρ should be 
less than one. The mean number of requests in the system, N, can be calculated using the 
equation 
                                       (2.3) 
Substituting the Eq. 2.2 gives the equation 
                                       (2.4) 
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The total time spent in the system, T, including the wait and service times, uses the 
equation 
                              (2.5) 
This equation is obtained by applying Little’s Theorem to Eq. 2.4.  
For a network analysis, there is a need to obtain the expected waiting time in the 
network. This time excludes the transmission time. Little’s Theorem provides the 
equation 
                                 (2.6) 
The expected waiting time, W, minus the transmission time, results in the equation  
                                                               (2.7) 
where  is the average transmission time. If NQ is the average number of packets waiting 
in the queue, then applying Little’s Theorem results in  
                              (2.8) 
These equations are all used in queuing theory analysis and were used in the analytical 
model developed for the network performance analysis conducted in this research.  
2.4 Intrusion Detection Systems 
One method used to identify attacks is by using an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
[23]. IDSs can be classified using multiple methods.  One classification method is based 
on what the IDS monitors, a host or a network. A host IDS (HIDS) is deployed on a host, 
or adjacent to a host, to monitor that host for attacks. A Network IDS (NIDS) is deployed 
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on a network and monitors for an attack on the network. It will scan the traffic on the 
network looking for possible intrusions.  
Another classification method for IDSs is how the IDS operates to detect an attack. 
An IDS can be either signature-based or anomaly-based. In a Signature-based Intrusion 
Detection System, the system works much like antivirus software and identifies an attack 
based on whether there is a match against an entry in a signature database.  If Signature-
based Intrusion Detection System is deployed, it is necessary to maintain a current 
signature database.  
An Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System is an IDS that looks for behavior that 
is not considered normal. A baseline must be established and then any behavior that is not 
within the established parameters may be considered abnormal and a possible attack. An 
Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System has the potential to detect a new attack 
because the longer it runs the more it learns about normal behaviors. However, an 
Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System is susceptible to false positives as it is 
possible to have something look abnormal when it is in fact a normal behavior.  
There are advantages and disadvantages to all different types of IDSs. The best 
solution may be a combination of these different types. This can be done by placing 
several IDSs throughout the network. These different IDSs may be a combination of 
HIDS and NIDS, as well as signature- and anomaly-based. This will allow for the best 
chance of detecting all types of attacks. 
Another way to combine the different types of IDSs is to use a new type of IDS, 
Reasoning-based IDS (RIDS). RIDS utilizes both signatures and anomalies to detect 
 33 
possible intrusions. It integrates both types into one IDS, without the need to manually 
combine, and then possibly conduct manual analysis on the output of multiple IDSs. 
Another advantage of an RIDS is that it may employ advanced reasoning in attack 
identification. This allows for an efficient and reliable analysis of the data collected from 
the network to aid in the detection of all types of attacks, including zero-day attacks. A 
zero-day attack is an attack against vulnerabilities that are unknown. A properly designed 
RIDS has the ability to detect a multi-phase complex attack such as the one mentioned-
above using a combination of port scan or telnet probe and vulnerability exploit. 
One way to incorporate advanced reasoning into an RIDS is by using ontology. 
Ontology allows for the semantics, along with the syntax, of the domain knowledge to be 
integrated into the system. In the domain of network security, the syntax refers to the 
signature of an attack, which is the basis of a signature-based IDS. Incorporating 
semantics allows the RIDS to also make decisions based on the meaning of the data, such 
as the importance of a ping scan followed by a port scan, within a specified time frame. 
This may indicate a possible attack, as opposed to seeing a ping scan followed by a 
network management task. Knowledge of the semantics of the domain, and the domain 
data, allows the use of inference, which can be used to learn more about the network 
traffic and possible attacks, both simple and complex. 
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  Related Work Chapter 3
 
3.1 Network Management  
Several management protocols or systems, based on the ISO network management 
model, have emerged in wired networks, including Internet Engineering Task Force’s 
(IETF) SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol), ISO’s Common Management 
Information Protocol (CMIP) [24], Distributed Management Task Force’s (DMTF) 
Desktop Management Interface (DMI) [25] and DMTF’s Web Based Enterprise 
Management (WBEM) [26]. Each of these systems is in use today, with SNMP being the 
most common system used in wired networks. SNMP is a basic request-reply protocol 
with a smart management station sending requests to a dumb agent on each device to be 
managed. The agent simply replies to the request with data stored in the device. The only 
time an agent initiates data transmission is when there is an event that occurs that requires 
notification to the management station, such as a link down or a power supply failure.  
The primary network management protocol in Ad hoc Networks (AHNs) is Ad hoc 
Network Management Protocol (ANMP) [27]. ANMP is compatible with SNMPv3 and 
many of its features are based on SNMP. ANMP includes more data items to monitor that 
are critical in ad hoc networks, such as remaining battery power, location, and speed. One 
critical feature of ANMP and any AHN network management protocol is its ability to 
handle the dynamic nature of the nodes in the network as normal events and not 
exceptions. This includes nodes dying, moving, joining the network, and belonging to 
multiple networks.  
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ANMP utilizes a three-level hierarchical architecture, depicted in Fig. 3.1. The top 
level is the network manager and the bottom level consists of the nodes in the network, 
called agents. Several agents close to each other are grouped together to form clusters and 
each cluster has a cluster head. These cluster heads, which are managed by the network 
manager, manage the agents and form the middle level of the hierarchy. ANMP also 
includes a user interface, making management more user-friendly and effective.  
 
Figure 3.1: Hierarchical architecture of ANMP [27]. 
 
Despite research performed in the area of network management of wireless sensor 
networks, a standard has not emerged. One system that has been developed is MANNA 
[28]. It is different from most network management systems in that it “considers three 
management dimensions: functional areas, management levels, and WSN 
functionalities”, instead of the two (functional areas and management levels) defined in 
traditional network management. Fig 3.2 illustrates the relationship among these three 
dimensions, which are all considered when defining a management function. MANNA 
also comprises three sub-architectures: functional, information and physical. The 
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functional architecture defines how management functionalities are distributed among 
manager, agents and management information base. This distribution can be centralized, 
distributed or hierarchical. How this functional architecture is implemented is the 
physical architecture of MANNA. The information architecture is object-oriented and 
consists of classes representing the resources under the three management dimensions.  
 
Figure 3.2: MANNA management functionality abstractions [28]. 
 
Another WSN management system is the Sensor Network Management System 
(SNMS) [29]. SNMS provides two management functions. One function is event logging 
which is event-driven. This feature allows nodes to report their data if they meet 
conditions specified by the user. The other management function collects data from the 
nodes, both physical characteristics, such as remaining battery power, and sensed data, 
such as temperature. Besides only having limited functionality, SNMS also monitors in 
the passive mode only, in response to a user query. This monitoring imposes little 
network bandwidth or processing overhead. 
3.1.1 Network Management Systems with Ontology 
The utilization of ontology in network domains has seen extensive research in recent 
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years. There has not been a NMS developed for a HMN; however, some related work has 
contributed to the network management domain. Table 3.1 identifies the related works in 
this section and provides an overview of their primary features.  
Table 3.1: Comparison of NMS. 
Work Wired 
Tier 
AHN 
Tier 
WSN 
Tier 
Goal 
Wong [30]    Automatically map management 
concepts 
Lo´pez de Vergara [31, 32, 
33, 34] 
   Common management model 
Cleary [35]   √ Configuration management 
Moraes [36] √   Performance management 
Orwat [37]  √  Security management 
OntoSensor [38, 39]   √ Trend discovery in sensor 
measurements 
New HMNMS √ √ √ Network management (topology 
discovery tested) 
 
One area of research related to the work here is the interoperability support provided 
by ontology and the mapping of various network management concepts. As the mapping 
techniques advance and become stable, they may be incorporated into the development 
of the mapping ontology used in the HMNMS, which was manually created.  
According to Wong, et al [30], interoperable systems must share in data or knowledge 
exchange, exhibit coordinated behavior, and cooperate in problem solving. They 
proposed a “method of automatic ontology mapping based on a semantic similarity 
function” [30]. This was accomplished by developing a concept similarity estimation and 
an ontology mapping. The network management concepts researched were represented in 
First Order Predicate Calculus (FOPC). The degree of similarity between the FOPC 
statements was measured and then an ontology mapping procedure was developed. The 
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first step in the ontology mapping procedure was a scheme that classifies matching 
results according to their FOPC similarity values. The classification scheme is then used 
to guide the search process through a target ontology, which is the ontology traversal 
algorithm.     
López de Vergara, et al [31, 32, 33, 34] present how an ontology can assist in the 
comparison of different management information languages, including the semantic 
expressiveness of these languages. Their research has concentrated on semantically 
integrating management information from different network management models, such as 
SNMP and CMIP. This was done by obtaining behavior characteristics through the use of 
rules, axioms and constraints, which are all parts of an ontology. Fig 3.3 illustrates the 
mapping process. Management specifications from different management models are 
merged into one ontology using semantic mapping rules. This mapping will lead to the 
different management models being able to understand the semantics of the other models.  
There has been research in the use of ontology for various aspects of network 
management. The majority of this work is for one-tier networks, not HMNs, in a 
specific area of management.  The following works highlight some of the applications 
of using ontology in specific areas of network management. 
Configuration management is one area of network management that may take 
advantage of ontologies. This is because of the large amount of human interaction 
necessary for configuration tasks and the similarities between configuration management 
and other problems related to knowledge sharing, reuse and reasoning. In [35], Cleary,  
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Figure 3.3: Merge and map process for network management information [33]. 
 
Danev and O’Donoghue developed a new network modeling approach that is based on 
ontology. They applied this approach to wireless networks. The new application interacts 
with a traditional network management system via an XML representation of the 
configuration data. The overall architecture for this approach is shown in Fig 3.4. 
WCDMA-RAN is the Radio Access Network (RAN) used, which uses the WCDMA 
(Wideband Code Division Multiple Access) communication protocol [40]. The 
application reads the XML data and uses it to create ontology instances.  
These instances are supplied to the inference engine. The engine suggests possible 
configurations and also validates the consistency and integrity of user configurations 
against the knowledge base. The new configuration is converted to XML and fed back to 
the NMS for deployment to the network. The engine uses three different types of expert 
rules to validate existing configurations and suggest possible configurations for use. The 
new approach reduces the amount of human interaction needed for configuration tasks.  
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Figure 3.4: Ontology centric architecture [35]. 
 
Moraes, Sampaio, Monteiro, and Portnoi [36] developed an ontology, MonONTO, 
that can be used primarily in performance management, including quality of 
service and monitoring. MonONTO was used with an expert system that could 
determine application performance based on previous performance. The previous 
performance is learned from the network and fed to the knowledge base. The knowledge 
base contained ontology instances about advanced network applications, application 
users, and network monitoring. These instances were used to determine the most likely 
network performance in a given situation. This work was for wired networks in 
determining application performance in a specific network environment.  
Ontologies have also been researched to assist in providing a secure management 
environment for Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) [37]. Orwat et al. created MANET 
Distributed Functions Ontology (MDFO), which was “used to structure MANET 
performance and security information” [37]. This new approach provides a mechanism to 
assist in making decisions for dynamic configuration changes in MANETs. It will also 
provide a foundation to incorporate security factors to enhance the decision processes in 
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MANETs. One part of MDFO is the translator, which will convert information collected 
from the network into ontology semantics. The output of the translator will populate a 
database with static and dynamic information about MANET devices. The database is 
queried when a MANET function is necessary and will then create instances in the 
ontology and send relevant attribute values to the decision making process. MDFO can 
“serve as the basis for MANET decision making and optimization and correspondingly 
both control and facilitate the conduct of MANET operations” [37]. This research is the 
first step to providing optimized management of MANET functions and services.  
OntoSensor [38, 39] is a domain ontology designed for a heterogeneous sensor 
network prototype environment. OntoSensor extends the upper-level IEEE Suggested 
Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO) [41], which defines general concepts and associations. 
It is also built on SensorML [42], which is a generic data model that defines associations 
and properties common to sensors. The base station includes an OntoSensor ontology. 
Information about the sensors, including the data acquisition boards, sensing elements, 
and processors, is included in the repository. The repository responds to ad hoc queries to 
assist in trend discovery in the measurements. The prototype environment only covers 
devices in the 2006 Crossbow [43] catalog and requires a priori knowledge of the 
platform class of each sensor. 
3.2 Analytical Models for Network Performance Analysis  
There has been some research on the development of an analytical model for 
performance analysis of heterogeneous networks. A comparison of these models is 
summarized in Table 3.2. The primary difference of the new analytical model developed 
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in this research is that it is for conducting a performance analysis on a multi-tier network. 
Prior work was done on models for single-tier networks.  
Table 3.2: Comparison of Analytical Models. 
Work Homogenous or 
Heterogeneous 
Network 
Number of Tiers in 
Network 
Queuing Model Used 
Ismail and Zin [44] Heterogeneous Single-tier M/M/1 
Hedayati, Kamali, and 
Izadi [45] 
Heterogeneous Single-tier M/M/1 
New Analytical Model Heterogeneous Multi-tier M/M/1 
 
Ismail and Zin [44] developed a simulation model based on queuing theory. The 
model was developed to be used to measure the performance behaviors of a live network. 
The model was developed to analyze the performance of a heterogeneous environment 
over a Wide Area Network (WAN), specifically in an institution of Higher Education.  
The model developed was based on the M/M/1 queuing theory model. It was 
developed by studying a heterogeneous environment in a live network. The information 
learned from the heterogeneous environment was converted into a logical model.  
The live heterogeneous environment was at a Higher Educational Institution. It 
consisted of a Local Area Network (LAN) at a main campus and a WAN connecting a 
branch campus. The goal was to develop a model to study the performance of services 
over the WAN connection.  
The model was used to find the total size of various packet services of all the clients 
in the heterogeneous environment, Trafik_Heter. The model was: 
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                   (3.1) 
where μJumlah is the total size of packet services requests by clients, JLAN is the LAN 
distance, JWAN is the WAN distance, v is the speed of light, CLAN is the LAN bandwidth, 
CWAN is the WAN bandwidth, and n is the total nodes in the two networks (LAN and 
WAN).  
Services were run in a live network environment. Remote data transfers were 
simulated in the live environment and the propagation and transmission delays were 
measured. Results from the simulation model were less than one second, typically within 
tens of milliseconds, to the actual values. This confirmed that the simulation model can 
be used to estimate data transfer times in a heterogeneous environment over a LAN and 
WAN.  
There were several assumptions made in the simulation model. These assumptions 
were that there was no packet loss, no jitter in delays and sufficient network bandwidth. 
Jitter refers to the difference in the end-to-end delay (arrival times) among packets. While 
the model was used in a heterogeneous network environment, it was for a single-tier 
network. 
A similar approach to network traffic monitoring was proposed by Hedayati, Kamali, 
and Izadi [45]. Similar to the previous approach, Hedayati, et al proposed a model based 
on M/M/1 queuing theory. The model was developed to simulate and monitor the 
network traffic of a heterogeneous LAN environment.  
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The live network used to verify the model was a university LAN. The results of the 
live network tests were similar to the simulation model. This confirmed that the 
simulation model can be used to calculate network throughput (the rate for successful 
delivery of messages on the network, often in some form of bits per second) and 
congestion rates (the amount of data on a network that causes delays in packet delivery) 
for a live heterogeneous network.  
The model developed was for calculating the instantaneous congestion rate, A0(t), and 
the stable congestion rate, AC. The equation developed for the instantaneous congestion 
rate was 
                                                                  (3.2) 
where  is the arrival probability of the queue length for the router’s group at time t 
and m is the service rate. The following equation was developed to calculate the stable 
congestion rate 
                                     (3.3) 
where C is the routers’ buffers. 
As with the previous work, this analytical model was developed as a simulation 
model for a heterogeneous network. It is for a single-tier network, not for multi-tier 
networks.  
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3.3 Intrusion Detection Systems  
3.3.1 Basic Intrusion Detection Systems 
Huang and Wicks [46] use the analogy of an intrusion to that of a battlefield. In 
intrusion detection as well as in the battlefield they cite a number of shared characteristics 
including an environment that is heterogeneous and widely distributed, a significant 
amount of data that is constantly changing and which can be extremely noisy, incomplete 
and inconclusive information that makes decision making difficult, and attack patterns 
which are constantly changing. One must take these characteristics into account when 
devising mechanisms for intrusion detection. 
Huang and Wicks point out that if a file-access-violation is detected, the true purpose 
of this event cannot be determined without additional information referred to as context. 
Such contextual information would include such information as the present machine 
configuration, the location of the files, permissions, and account configuration. The 
important point that Huang and Wick make is that by the time sufficient information 
arrives at a central analysis point, the situation (context) may have changed drastically. 
Huang and Wicks’ approach to analyzing what may be happening is to consider the 
strategy the attacker may be using. This in turn calls for a description of the attacks that 
are more abstract in nature. This is consistent with the approach described in this 
research, namely to represent descriptions of attacks in the form of a conceptual 
ontology. 
In Camtepe and Yener [47] an approach to detecting complex attacks is presented that 
is based on the construction of finite automatons that represent the “patterns” of complex 
attacks. They define a non-deterministic enhanced finite automata to be a tuple consisting 
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of Q, a set of states, QPA, a set of partial attack states, QA, a set of attack states, F, the 
input alphabet, D, a set of derivation rules for goals and subgoals, and DELTAF and 
DELTAB, sets of forward and backward transition rules. The finite automata can 
recognize complex attack patterns. The automata implicitly specifies the relationships 
between the attack elements and therefore, unlike a conceptual representation, possesses 
no ability to generalize or specialize exists without the specification of another 
automaton. 
A Process Queuing System (PQS) was the method used in [48] to detect complex 
attacks. The complex attacks were represented as finite state machines (FSM) with the 
attack elements represented as states and the transitions were triggered by observations 
about the occurrence of an attack element or a response to an attack element. The FSM 
were represented as models, which could be incorporated into a hierarchy of models, 
allowing for high-level models to be developed to detect complex attacks based on results 
of lower-level models.  
A system was developed, PQSNet, to demonstrate the application of PQS to network 
security. PQSNet utilized existing sensors, such as Snort [49], firewalls, system log files, 
etc. to obtain security information. Information from the sensors were fed into a PQS 
model. FSMs were used in PQSNet to represent complex attacks with each step in a 
complex attack represented as a finite state. When an alert is received from a sensor 
indicating an event occurred, a transition will occur. A general sample of a FSM in 
PQSNet is depicted in Fig. 3.5. The Start state indicates that there has been no malicious 
activity, the Recon state indicates that some reconnaissance activity was detected, and the 
Attacked state indicates that the host was attacked. PQS supports model tiering, which 
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allows the output of one model to become input to a higher-level model. This 
characteristic allows PQSNet to abstract basic attacks, which permits complex attacks to 
be written in an easier manner in higher-level models.  
 
Figure 3.5: General FSM in PQSNet [48]. 
 
Snort [49, 50] is a common, open-source, network-based IDS. Snort is primarily a 
signature-based IDS, with its signatures called rules. The rules in Snort contain sufficient 
expressive power to detect simple attacks. Detecting complex attacks, which consist of 
multiple packets, is more complicated and requires cross-event analysis in Snort.  This 
task requires preprocessors, which are more resource intensive than rules. Anomaly-
based detection is also possible with some of Snort’s preprocessors.  
The Snort architecture, shown in Fig. 3.6, consists of several components. The traffic 
on the network is captured using a packet sniffer. The packets captured are then sent to 
any configured preprocessors. The detection engine is responsible for applying the rules 
to the captured packets looking for matches, which results in alerts. The alerts are written 
to files or a database for viewing by the network manager.  
One feature of Snort is its configurability. This adds some complexity but also much 
flexibility, as it allows each administrator to configure Snort for their network 
deployment and use, as well as their IDS needs. There are many configuration options  
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Figure 3.6: Snort architecture [50]. 
 
available in Snort, including the choice of which rules to incorporate. Another option is 
the addition of selected preprocessors, which will do some processing prior to rule 
processing on the data. Some of the possible preprocessors are protocol checks for 
common protocols, packet re-assembly for fragmented datagrams and port scanning. The 
preprocessors allow for more complex intrusion detection. 
Snort is a real-time IDS, meaning it will run the preprocessors and rules against 
network packets as the packets pass through the Snort engine. For this reason, Snort may 
not process all packets because of the speed of the network and the amount of data 
passing through its engine. In order to behave in real-time, Snort will skip some packets 
and not process them. This will allow some network attacks to get through the Snort 
implementation and into the network.  
The rules provide the ability to configure Snort to meet a network’s needs and quickly 
adapt to new attacks. The rules also lead to a disadvantage in Snort. The addition of new 
rules to handle new attacks has led to a rapid growth of the rule set in Snort (see Fig. 3.7). 
This requires more time to process packets and perform the pattern matching against the 
rules. This will lead to performance degradation and fewer packets processed by Snort, 
which will result in more false negatives. 
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Figure 3.7: The growth trend of the number of rules in Snort [51]. 
 
Although Snort is an IDS and will generate alerts for attacks detected, there is still 
considerable manual analysis required. The recommended manual analysis when using 
Snort [50] is to first check the priority of the alert generated. Any low priority alerts, 
which indicated an important alert in Snort, are further analyzed. All alerts involving any 
critical device on the network, which must be identified by the organization, are 
identified and investigated. Any source address appearing in multiple alerts is further 
investigated. Well-known attack methods, such as using static source ports and IP 
fragments, are identified. If these attack methods target a weakness in the network, this 
should be addressed by incorporating a security measure to strengthen the weakness. As 
time permits, which it often does not, the network manager prioritizes the remaining 
alerts and further examine the one prioritized high.  
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3.3.2 Reasoning-based Intrusion Detection Systems 
Various RIDS research is presented here. Each uses some type of logical reasoning in 
the IDS. Table 3.3 presents a high-level comparison of the research presented. The table 
indicates if the IDS detected attacks against hosts or the network, if the IDS detected 
complex attacks, and how ontology was utilized in the IDS. The IDS research presented in 
this dissertation is denoted as “new IDS”.  
Table 3.3: Comparison of RIDS. 
Work Host or 
Network 
Detects 
Complex 
Attacks 
Ontology Use Goal 
MulVAL [52] Host √ No ontology, used Datalog Vulnerability analysis 
Xu, et. al. [53] Both  Common vocabulary for 
security information 
Formal representation of 
alert analysis 
Martimiano, et. al. 
[54, 55] 
  Common vocabulary for 
security tools 
Model concepts for security 
incidents 
Tsoumas, et. al. 
[56] 
  Common vocabulary for 
security requirements 
Security management system 
based on interoperability, 
aggregation and reasoning 
ReD [57] Both  Instantiate new security 
policies after attack 
detection 
Detect and react to attacks 
Vorobievf, et. al. 
[58, 59, 60] 
Both √ Common vocabulary for 
IDS components 
Detect attacks using common 
vocabulary among 
distributed components 
Undercoffer, et. al. 
[61, 62] 
Host √ Model computer attacks Detect attacks 
Mandujano, et. al. 
[63, 64] 
Network √ Represent attack signatures 
and environment 
characteristics 
Detect outgoing intrusions 
New IDS Both √ Represent and detect 
attacks 
Detect complex attacks based 
on traffic data 
 
The MulVAL [52] system uses a logical deduction process to determine the existence 
of a multistage attack on a network. It is a framework to model the interaction between 
software bugs and the configurations of nodes on the network (systems and network 
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devices). This framework, illustrated in Fig 3.8, consists of generic rules, including rules 
to determine if a vulnerability exists and the consequence of an exploit against the 
vulnerability. MulVAL is used to filter attack information and only output essential data 
for the system administrator to analyze.  
 
Figure 3.8: MulVAL framework [52]. 
 
There are six different inputs to MulVAL’s analysis. The first input is the advisories. 
These consist of the vulnerabilities, which are then checked for existence on each 
machine. This is done by using an OVAL (Open Vulnerability Assessment Language) 
[65] scanner. The results of this scanning process are converted to Datalog clauses. 
Datalog [66] is a query and rule language that is a subset of Prolog. To understand the 
effect of each vulnerability NIST’s National Vulnerability Database (NVD, formally 
ICAT) is used, with the relevant information also converted to Datalog clauses.  
The configurations for each host and network device to be scanned are two more 
inputs to MulVAL. Host configuration information includes the software and services 
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running on the host as well as their configurations. The OVAL scanner is also used to 
gather host configuration information, with the output once again converted to Datalog 
clauses. The network devices that are a part of MulVAL’s analysis are limited to routers 
and firewalls. These configurations are manually created using Datalog clauses.  
Information about the principals, or users of the network, is another input to 
MulVAL. These Datalog clauses map a principal to its accounts on the various network 
hosts. Additional Datalog clauses describe the policies of the network, which indicate the 
data access for each principal.  
The last input is a model of how all the components interact. These interactions, 
represented as Horn clauses, include a pattern that can be matched to identify a 
multistage attack. Instead of coding specific vulnerabilities for the interactions, the 
vulnerabilities were generalized, preventing frequent rule changes.  
The OVAL scanner is run on each host with the output reported to the host running 
MulVAL. The scanner must be run on each host and identifies vulnerabilities specific to 
each host. MulVAL will then run an analyzer on the properties received from all the 
scans. This analysis is done in two phases, an attack simulation phase and a policy 
checking phase. The attack simulation phase identifies all possible data accesses of an 
attacker, which are then sent to the policy checking phase. This phase will compare the 
output of the attack simulation phase with the specified security policy and identify 
violations. Both of these phases utilize a Datalog program, but the separation of the 
phases provides for the possibility of using a richer policy language for the policy 
checking phase without affecting the complexity of the attack simulation phase.  
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An important feature of MulVAL is the ability to reason about multistage attacks.  
This is done through the use of Horn clauses that are created for the semantics of the 
vulnerability and the operating system allowing the determination of an adversary’s 
options in each stage of a multistage attack. The use of generalizations of attack 
methodologies in the interaction rules allows the rules to be more static; however, since 
MulVAL uses vulnerability recognition in its scanning process, a scanner must be run on 
each host to be monitored. Also, when a new vulnerability report is utilized, each host 
must be re-scanned.  The authors of MulVAL concentrated their efforts on denial of 
service and privilege escalation attacks only.  
3.3.3 Reasoning-based Intrusion Detection Systems with Ontology 
Context-aware alert analysis was researched by Xu, Xiao, and Wu [53]. They argue 
that alert analysis for unified security management can be divided into three stages: alert 
collection, alert evaluation, and alert correlation. An ontology was developed following a 
four-step process: 1) model the conceptual level, 2) define the model in OWL [15], 3) 
define correlation rules using SWRL [67], and 4) define security management services 
using OWL-S. OWL-S can be used to provide a semantic description to Web services. 
The overall architecture is shown in Fig 3.9. 
The ontology developed was based on the CIM (Common Information Model) 
Schema [68]. The key concepts include context, asset owner, vulnerability, threat and 
countermeasure. The context was used for alert evaluation. Alert correlation was 
achieved by extending the ontology with SWRL, which adds behavior information 
through the use of rules. As an example, if a host is running an FTP service and a specific 
operating system, then the attacker may be able to learn operating system information 
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about that host. Attack scenarios were built from the defined SWRL rules. OWL-S was 
used to define security management policies for automatic response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Proposed architecture for context-aware alert analysis [53]. 
 
The system proposed takes input from multiple IDSs, both HIDS and NIDS, and 
integrates it into the knowledge base. Reasoning rules are used to perform alert 
correlation and build attack scenarios.  
The work of Xu, et. al. is similar to the work described in this research as they both 
examine attack scenarios, but focused on attacks against Web Services, while the system 
to be described in this research focuses on all types of attacks on any node on the 
network. The context-aware alert analysis was the foundation of an ontology to provide 
security knowledge in a uniform manner, available to multiple security tools or systems, 
although it is not used for the identification of multi-phased, complex attacks.  
Martimiano and Moreira [54, 55] focused their research on what they identified to be 
the difficult problem in security management: “efficiently generate knowledge about 
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security to make decisions and solve security incidents”. One of the problems with 
solving security incidents is that the various security tools often used by system and 
network administrators generate data in different formats. The authors developed an 
ontology called ONTOSEC to assist with solving security incidents. The main concept 
was the Security Incident class and all other classes related to this class. The other 
primary classes included access, agent, asset, attack, consequence, time, tool, and 
vulnerability. The main concepts and relations for ONTOSEC are shown in Fig. 3.10. 
Attacks identified by this system assume that all security incidents exploit a 
vulnerability. The information in the vulnerability ontology was based on the CVE 
(Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) project [69] and NIST’s NVD. Attack 
information was obtained from Snort [49] rules. The primary attributes used to identify a 
security incident were the source IP address, destination IP address, security incident 
type, date, time, weekday, description, reference, and severity.  
ONTOSEC was validated using a data driven approach by comparing it with the 
source data about the domain. The source data used for comparison was Snort alerts. The 
ontology developed was used to provide a common format to be shared by various 
security tools. It will store security incident data but not identify security attacks. A 
security incident can precede and/or succeed another incident but there is no mention of 
identifying multi-phased, complex attacks.  
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Figure 3.10: Main concepts and relations in ONTOSEC [54]. 
 
Tsoumas and Gritzalis [56] developed a “knowledge-based, ontology-centric security 
management system” used to “bridge information system (IS) risk assessment and 
organizational security policies with security management”. They extended the CIM 
(Common Information Model) standard to create a generic Security Ontology (SO). The 
development consisted of a model of the conceptual level, which was an extension of 
CIM and then implemented in OWL. Their work consisted of four phases, building an 
ontology, collection of security requirements, definition of security actions, and 
deployment and monitoring of the system security.  
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The first phase was to build the Security Ontology. This included the use of scanning 
tools to get data from the assets in the infrastructure being monitored. The organization’s 
mangers were consulted to discuss business decisions made about the security 
environment. From the infrastructure data retrieved from the assets, instances were 
created in the ontology.  
Security requirements were collected in phase two; security knowledge was extracted 
from the IS policy document and used to create ontology instances. The security 
requirements were evaluated by management and security experts for correctness.  
Phase three consisted of defining security actions. The security requirements were 
associated with specific security controls. These controls were then transformed into a 
form that could be used for Ponder rules. Ponder is a language used to specify security 
policies in a common way.  
The fourth and final phase is the deployment and monitoring of security actions. The 
Ponder rules that were created in phase three were deployed in the IS infrastructure. The 
last important step in the process was to iterate from step one again, in a timely manner. 
This was necessary to continually iterate over the steps to keep current with the changes 
in the IS environment and policies.  
Their work focused on security requirements in a centrally managed location. It 
abstracted security requirements by extending the CIM Schema into OWL ontologies. 
The ontology developed was focused on risk assessment and demonstrated that security 
information can be extracted from risk assessment countermeasures.  
Various tools were used to get infrastructure data, such as the network topology, 
servers, active ports, etc. The security management requirements, including information 
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from security policies, were entered into the knowledge base manually and were then 
linked to security controls for countermeasure identification.  
These ontologies were used for knowledge sharing and to provide risk assessment 
support. The system they developed did not utilize an IDS or identify security attacks. 
The primary goal was to combine risk assessment and an organization’s security policies 
to assist with security management.   
The ReD (Reaction after Detection) project [57] defined and designed solutions to 
enhance the detection and reaction process of network attacks. A framework was 
developed to find the best way to react to a network attack, both for the short- and long-
term. The architecture, shown in Fig. 3.11, consisted of five components: 1) the Policy 
Instantiation Engine (PIE), 2) the Alert Correlation Engine (ACE), 3) the Policy Decision 
Point (PDP), 4) the Reaction Decision Point (RDP), and 5) the Policy/Reaction 
Enforcement Point (PEP/REP). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11: ReD architecture [57]. 
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The proposed ontology was used to instantiate new security policies in reaction to 
identified attacks. The alerts and policies were defined in the ontologies and inference 
rules were used to map the alerts into attack contexts. The architecture also utilized the 
Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [70] for exchanging alerts among 
elements and OrBAC (Organization Based Access Control) [71] as the policy language.  
Alerts were sent from the network nodes to the ACE, which performed some analysis 
to detect an attack. The ACE sent the attack information to the PIE, which instantiated 
new security policies to react to the attack. The new policies were sent to the PDP, which 
deployed the policies to the PEP/REP for enforcement. The RDP also received 
information about the attacks from the ACE and determined mid-level reactions to the 
attack. 
Three types of reactions were defined, low-, mid-, and high-level. These 
classifications were based on the level of diagnosis that was required to apply the 
reactions. Low-level reactions were decided by the PEP/REP and immediately enforced. 
The RDP decided on mid-level reactions based on attack information it received from the 
ACE. These reactions did not include new security policies. The PIE determined the 
high-level reactions, which resulted in the generation of new security policies that were 
eventually deployed.  
The PIE was the center of the architecture. It mapped the IDMEF alert information in 
the Alert Ontology and the OrBAC reaction policy in the OrBAC Ontology. The PIE 
used these ontologies, along with the alert information received from the ACE to 
determine which components required a reaction and what that reaction should be. 
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SWRL rules were used to infer the hierarchy information in the OrBAC model, map 
IDMEF alerts to OrBAC holds, and obtain the necessary security policy.  
The mapping of the attack alerts information to security policies was their focus. The 
policy instantiation process is shown in Fig. 3.12. The ontologies developed were used to 
identify and instantiate the security policies necessary to react to an attack; they were not 
used to detect an attack. The attacks were detected by using modified Snort IPSs, syslog 
daemons, and host-based IDSs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Policy instantiation with ontologies. [57]. 
 
Reasoning was a part of its architecture. It was used to infer the mapping from 
IDMEF alerts to OrBAC policies. The ontologies received alerts from the IDSs (NIDS 
and HIDS) and syslogs. From these alerts, analysis could be performed about attacks, 
including multi-phases, complex attacks. The focus was on the mapping from security 
attacks to security policies.  
Vorobiev, Han, and Bekmamedova [58, 59, 60] discussed how distributed firewalls 
and IDSs (F/IDSs), monitoring different hosts, must work together in a distributed 
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manner. They evaluated five different types of attacks: attacks against Web Services, P2P 
attacks, Denial of Service attacks, sniffing attacks, and multi-phased, distributed attacks. 
Their research paid particular attention to the gaming industry and the implementation of 
gaming systems using the component-based software system (CBSS) and peer-to-peer 
(P2P) approaches.  
A framework was developed that used a variety of components from different 
vendors that acted as a coalition. The primary component was called a defensive 
component (DC).  
The research also resulted in the development of several ontologies. The Security 
Asset-Vulnerability Ontology (SAVO) was the main ontology in the system and gave a 
simplified view of information security. It was the high-level ontology and included 
classes to describe the various aspects of the system, including attack, vulnerability, 
defense, risk, and threat agent. The ontologies were developed to assist in simplifying 
security information. The Security Attack Ontology (SAO) and the Security Function 
Ontology (SFO) were both used by the system to provide a common vocabulary to the 
other ontologies. The SAO defines the classes for specific types of attacks, such as a Web 
Services attack or a Peer-2-Peer attack. The defenses against each of these attacks are 
defined in the Security Defence Ontology (SDO). The SFO was used by developers to 
define protections against security attacks and failures. The Security Algorithm-Standard 
Ontology (SASO) was used to define security algorithms and standards used in the 
system. 
As part of the framework, shown in Fig 3.13, Snort instances were deployed 
throughout the network. These Snort instances sent information about attacks to the DCs. 
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When a DC detected a new attack, it added the attack to the SAO, which was then shared 
with the other members of the coalition. If a coalition member developed a defense 
against a new attack, a countermeasure was added to the SDO, which was distributed to 
all coalition members. The manager, which was running the framework engine, decided 
how to react to the attack and sent orders to the DCs for action.  
 
Figure 3.13: Prototype implementation [60]. 
 
The ontologies in this framework provided a common vocabulary for the distributed 
F/IDSs. These worked collaboratively to detect multi-phased, complex attacks. When a 
host identifies an attack, it shares this information with the other hosts in the framework, 
which then use the shared information to detect a multi-phased, complex attack. Each 
host is required to implement a F/IDS, where the IDS portion is an HIDS. The framework 
also includes countermeasures against identified attacks.  
Undercoffer, Joshi and Pinkston [61, 62] produced work that performed analysis to 
identify various elements of an attack, including the means or method, consequence, 
target, and most common origin location. “An intrusion is comprised of some input 
resulting in some consequence, while the impact is directed towards a system component, 
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received from some location and causes some means of by inducing some system 
behavior” [62]. The target of the attack refers to the specific component of the target and 
could be classified as the network layers, kernel-space, application, or other. The method 
used by the attacker, the means, was categorized as an input validation vulnerability, a 
general exploit, or a mis-configuration of the target or one of its components. The 
consequence refers to the end result of the attack and may be one or more of denial of 
service, the attacker achieves user access to the target system, the attacker achieves root 
access to the target system, there is a loss of confidentiality, or some other undesired 
result. The location refers to the origin of the attack in relation to the target of the attack. 
Possible values for location are remote (another network), local (same network), or either 
local or remote (may be either on another network or the same network). The high-level 
overview of these concepts in the ontology can be seen in Fig. 3.14. 
 
Figure 3.14: High level overview of ontology [62]. 
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Vulnerability information was taken from CERT/CC advisories and the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) [72], formally the Internet Catalog of Assailable 
Technologies (ICAT), maintained by NIST (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology). The host attributes, such as network connections, memory usage, open 
connections, etc. were monitored and the state of the host was determined. This was done 
by an IDS monitoring the host, requiring an IDS to be installed on or adjacent to all hosts 
that are a security concern.  
The authors developed a taxonomy based on these attack elements. The taxonomy 
was defined in terms of observable relationships and measurable characteristics of the 
target, such as the total memory, average CPU load, instruction pointer value, and 
number of child processes running. The ontology was developed from the taxonomy and 
centered on the target of the attack. The system learned normal behavior and then used 
the ontology to detect anomalies in the behavior.  
This research utilizes IDSs that send security alerts to the ontology, which will then 
infer information about attacks. The system performs reasoning to detect multi-phased, 
complex attacks. One host detects a simple attack that is one step in the multi-phased, 
complex attack, while another host may detect another step of the multi-phased, complex 
attack. This information is combined so the multi-phased, complex attack occurrence can 
be inferred. It focused on hosts as the targets of all attacks, which is not always the case 
when dealing with network security. To do damage to more aspects of the network, an 
attacker may target a network device, thus attempting to take down an entire subnet or 
network. The research described in this work focuses on any node as the target of an 
attack, including hosts and network devices, such as switches, routers, and firewalls.  
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An ontology-based intrusion detection system was described by Mandujano [63] and 
Mandujano, Galvin, and Nolazco [64]. In this approach, the authors are looking to detect 
outgoing intrusions using a multiagent system. A multiagent system utilizes multiple 
software agents to gather data for input into the system. The goal of an OID is to help 
protect remote systems. This work accomplished OID by taking advantage of the fact that 
many complex attacks are automated using scripts or executable programs. The system 
developed analyzed changes in the network traffic and the resources used by an 
automated attack tool. The resources were identified by evaluating the program profile 
during execution. The agents were used to collect data, detect possible incidents, and 
implement reactions to the incidents identified.  
The ontology developed for the system was an attacker-based ontology, focusing on 
the originating user or system. The ontology identified all elements about the system, 
including automated attack tools, network traffic, signatures, sensors, and reactions, as 
well as their relationships. The ontology they propose enables the detection of code and 
network activity that identifies a possible intruder. The ontology specifies concepts like 
hostile and safe processes as subclasses of a process, for example. Their ontology, unlike 
the ontology proposed in this research, does not distinguish between traffic and attack. It 
is our contention that such a distinction is necessary to successfully identify sequences of 
incoming attacks and also to be able to recognize the type and kind of attack that is 
transpiring. 
Much of the research has concentrated on attacks against hosts. Only the ReD Project 
utilized NIDSs for alert information, the other research used HIDS or no IDS. This 
research will detect attacks against any node on the network, including network devices 
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such as switches, routers and firewalls. Network devices can provide attackers with very 
valuable information about the network and hosts. For instance, if an attacker identifies a 
password for a network device, it may also be a password used on other network devices 
or perhaps even servers on the network. A significant consideration is that a 
compromised network device is much less likely to be detected.  
Much of the previous work is focused on identifying vulnerabilities of systems and 
evaluating the threats against these targets. This work will focus on the network traffic 
and not the vulnerabilities or targets. By doing this, it is possible to identify attacks and 
also attack attempts, even if the vulnerability doesn’t exist in the target node or network. 
This may be the result of the target of the vulnerability not being deployed in the 
network, or the target may have been patched to resist the vulnerability, etc. It is 
important to note that attack attempts are just as important or meaningful as an actual 
attack. The attempts can alert the administrator to an attacker existing that is trying to 
penetrate their network or a node on their network. It also allows the administrator to 
prepare the future deployments such as a user adding a web server to the network that 
may contain vulnerabilities.  
This work will begin with specific attack examples but will evolve into more general 
cases. The rules developed for identifying complex, multi-phase attacks will be generic, 
and will lead to the identification of any type of attack, including zero-day attacks. These 
rules will allow a family of complex, multi-phased attacks to be defined and detected. By 
representing these attacks ontologically, a more advanced and reusable representation of 
network attacks will be created.   
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  Network Management of a Heterogeneous, Multi-tier Chapter 4
Network 
 
4.1 Challenges of Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network Management  
When considering a HMN, each tier in the network may have its own network 
management system or protocol; there may even be varying management systems or 
protocols within one tier. This presents a considerable problem for proper network 
management; it is difficult to exchange information between disparate systems. This 
requires the network manager to gather information from several management stations.  
Network management software exists that can help manage a heterogeneous network. 
An example is ProIT [73] by PerformanceIT, Inc. This software utilizes SNMP to retrieve 
data from devices from a variety of manufacturers. The software is primarily used for 
performance and fault management. Configuration management, a common network 
management function, is often too manufacturer-dependent for third-party software.  
Another disadvantage of third-party management software solutions is the need to 
install add-ons or agent software for the management station to retrieve the data from the 
devices. Typically software must be installed for each different manufacturer. As new 
devices are added to the network, often an upgrade must be done for that manufacturer’s 
add-on to allow proper communication with the new devices.  
Each new manufacturer and device must be configured in the management software. 
This is often a device-by-device task, but some software does allow some group 
configurations for similar devices. This configuration is a time-consuming process. 
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Another issue is that the majority of network management systems gather raw 
measurement data only. There is no semantic information gathered. For example, the 
NMS may state that there were 567 dropped packets on interface 23, but that data alone is 
meaningless. The semantic information for this might specify that 567 dropped packets 
may be a critical concern since it is over a specified threshold; however, semantic 
information about that particular interface indicates it is a printer that may have a higher 
threshold for dropped packets so there is no alert generated. In existing NMSs, the 
analysis to create the semantic information must be carried out by the user – in this case 
the network manager. Even if one system was able to gather semantics about the network, 
there is no way for the various systems to exchange semantic information because there is 
no standard way to represent this semantic information.  
Four domains of a network system have been identified, all requiring management. 
The four domains are Nortel wired, Cisco wired, ad hoc, and wireless sensors. The 
challenge is to bring coherence to a network system that consists of different types of 
equipment, described in different ways, to provide a unified view to a NMS. An 
investigation transpired to see if it would be possible to create a unified NMS that would 
be usable for each of the identified types of networks while at the same time providing a 
common view of these networks. In addition to these requirements for the solution, it 
must also be scalable and adaptable. 
4.2 An Overview of an Ontology-based Network Management System 
We investigate a potential solution that meets these requirements, specifically a 
unified approach to network management. This approach uses an ontological 
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representation of the various networks rich enough to express raw and semantic 
information and at the same time able to be processed by appropriate algorithms. 
The ontological representation provides the backbone of the integration of disparate 
systems. From a computational approach, an ontological representation can be 
algorithmically acted upon thus allowing us to apply processing power to determine what 
is going on in any of the network types. Most deployed systems are able to provide a 
network manager with information of the state of the network passively. The correct 
knowledge represented ontologically can be acted upon using expert knowledge to 
provide a richer description of the state of the network. We hope to create an NMS that 
operates at a level significantly exceeding those that exist today by employing this 
knowledge. 
The new design for an NMS using these ideas [74] is shown in Figure 4.1. The 
system contains a Graphical User Interface (GUI), an Ontology Subsystem, an Ontology 
Instances Interface, and descriptions of the network management protocols for each 
network type (wired, AHN, and WSN). Each component will be explained.  
The Ontology Subsystem consists of three components: the ontology, the knowledge 
base, and the reasoner. The ontology is explained in the next section. The knowledge 
base contains the ontology definition files and raw instances of all devices deployed in 
the HMN. When the NMS is launched, the ontology definition files are loaded into the 
knowledge base. Also during the NMS launch, instances are added to the knowledge base 
for all active deployed devices. The instances are added by the Ontology Instances 
Interface, which is explained soon.  
 70 
 
Figure 4.1: Component diagram of the Network Management System (NMS) [74]. 
 
The reasoner is the part of the NMS that allows a network manager to interact with 
the knowledge base. The FaCT++ [75] reasoner is used in this research. FaCT++ is a 
description logic (DL) reasoner, which provides logical reasoning for ontologies. The 
GUI obtains queries from the network manager and then interfaces with the reasoner to 
obtain the query answer from the knowledge base, which returns the results to the GUI. 
The GUI then displays the results to the network manager.  
The Ontology Instances Interface (OII) is a program that interfaces between the nodes 
in the HMN and the knowledge base, which contains the ontology definition files and 
data instances for deployed devices. The OII periodically sends a management query to 
each node in the network. The query depends on the network type and the management 
protocol used for that network type.  
For instance, for wired devices the query is an SNMP query. When the node receives 
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the query, it will extract the raw data that it has been maintaining that answers the query 
and create a response. Upon receiving a response to the query, the OII will extract the 
raw data from the response packet and create an instance in the knowledge base for that 
node. For example, if the query asks node Node1 for its name, location and description, 
then Node1 retrieves that information from its memory, creates a response packet 
containing this information, and sends the response back to the OII. The OII will then 
extract this information (the name, location and description for Node1) from the response 
packet and create an instance in the knowledge base for node1. This instance will contain 
the information returned by the node (its name, location and description).  
The management query is sent to the deployed devices by utilizing existing network 
management protocols, when possible. The wired devices are queried using SNMP. 
When the wired node receives an SNMP query, it will retrieve the MIB values and return 
them to the OII. The OII will create an instance from the MIB values returned and add 
the instance to the knowledge base. A separate query is sent for each wired node 
deployed in the network. 
SNMP is also used for ad hoc devices. For this to happen, a new MIB and ad hoc 
agent were created for ad hoc networks [76]. The new MIB contains properties for 
retrieving battery information, such as the battery life remaining, both in percent and 
seconds, and if the battery life is low. The basic properties for ad hoc nodes, such as 
name, location, serial number, IP address, etc. are retrieved using the new ad hoc agent 
but using existing SNMP MIBs.  
WSN sensors are statically defined. In the future, management protocols or systems 
will be utilized to obtain the device information for this network type as well. There are 
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no current standards for network management protocols for WSNs, so the protocol or 
system used to obtain the data for this network type will be determined based on its 
maturity and effectiveness within the newly developed NMS. For the sensors in the 
WSN, the sensor Network Management Protocol (sNMP) [77, 78] and the Sensor 
Network Management System (SNMS) [26] are two options for use to send the 
management query. When incorporated into the NMS, the data will be obtained from 
sNMP or SNMS, just as it was done with SNMP, and the device instances will be added 
to the knowledge base.  
4.3 The Ontology-based Approach 
The domain of the ontology developed is HMNs. The ontology forms the basis for 
our approach to managing such networks. The ontology will answer questions about all 
tiers and devices of the network. Examples of questions that can be answered by the 
ontology are: 
• Where is each device located? 
• What is the address of all devices? 
• What is the energy level of the device? 
These questions were used as a starting point for the definition of the ontology domain. 
The first step in ontology development [79, 80] is to define the terms for the domain. 
Terms are the vocabulary of the domain or the things that need defined or explained to 
the user. Some of the terms for the ontology in the network management domain are: 
name, location, address, energy level or residual energy, node role (cluster head or 
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member node) and status. After all the terms are defined, the following steps are followed 
to construct the ontology [81]:  
1. The classes and class hierarchy are defined 
2. The class properties or slots are defined 
3. The facets of the slots are defined 
4. Instances of the classes are created 
The ontologies are written using OWL as the knowledge representation language. 
OWL was chosen because of the expressiveness required for the HMNMS. The primary 
expressiveness necessary in the ontology that is provided by OWL and not provided by 
other knowledge representation languages are the specification of disjoint classes and the 
mapping of common terms. It is necessary to specify that some classes are disjoint to 
gather more semantic information about the deployed devices. For instance, if a device is 
characterized as a Nortel device by being a member of the Nortel class, then the device 
cannot be a Cisco device since the Nortel and Cisco classes are specified as disjoint. The 
mapping of common terms means that terms in multiple domains with the same meaning 
can be mapped to one common term in a mapping ontology file. For example, the serial 
number for a device is maintained in both the Nortel and Cisco devices. In the Nortel 
domain, the term used for the serial number is rcChasSerialNumber and in the Cisco 
domain the term is chassisSerialNumber. In order to have the required interoperability for 
one NMS, these two terms must be represented by one common term in the ontology.  
The classes representing the various device types, class hierarchy, class properties and 
facets are defined in the ontology. The class hierarchy consists of the various types of 
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devices that may be deployed in a HMN (see Fig. 4.2). The main class is the Node class, 
which contains properties that exist in any network node, such as name, description, and 
serial number. The wired and wireless nodes are subclasses of the Node class and contain 
properties that exist in each of these network domains. Currently the Wired class has no 
additional properties; the Wireless class has a role (cluster head vs. non-cluster head 
node), a status, and the remaining energy. The subclasses of each of these two classes 
will be the various types of wired and wireless nodes. Currently, wired nodes consist of 
Nortel devices and Cisco devices and the wireless nodes are either ad hoc nodes or 
sensors. Seven ontology definition files were developed, for simplicity, corresponding to 
the nodes in the class hierarchy. The complete OWL code for the Network Management 
System is provided in Appendix A.  
 
Figure 4.2: Class hierarchy for the HMNMS ontology. 
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The Nortel and Cisco classes are quite similar. Each one contains the same fields, 
such as the IP address, subnet mask, system description, system name, and chassis serial 
number. The reason for two different classes is because of the proprietary nature of the 
manufacturer’s MIBs. For instance, Nortel  and Cisco use different terms for the chassis 
serial number, as previously discussed.  
The fields in the AHN and WSN classes are similar and represent items such as the 
node address, location, serial number, remaining energy, role, cluster head, and status. 
The role and cluster head fields are used in clustering to identify if the node is a cluster 
head or an agent/member node and to identify an agent/member node’s cluster head. Two 
different terms are used to correspond to common technology in each network type 
(agent for AHN and member node for WSN). The status field indicates if the node is 
active or inactive (also alive or dead in the case of a WSN node).  
In order to deploy an ontology application for network management, the data must be 
mapped to one domain, using a mapping ontology. This ontology definition maps data 
from the four main classes (Nortel, Cisco, Ad hoc, and Wireless Sensor) into one class by 
taking similar data from each network type and mapping it into a common term (see 
Table 4.1). The development of the mapping ontology definition requires domain 
knowledge and interpretation of this knowledge. Comprehensive ontologies, developed 
by domain experts, reduce the burden on network managers. For example, as discussed in 
the previous section, Nortel and Cisco each use a different MIB identifier for the 
chassis’s serial number. This requires these two fields to be mapped to a common term, 
serialNumber.  
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As another example, consider the network device’s address. Wired and AHN devices 
may use an IP address but a WSN node may use an IP address or simply a node ID (1, 2, 
3, etc.). This research used a node ID for the address of WSN nodes. In order to list all 
network device address’s in a HMN, the IP address in the Nortel, Cisco and Ad hoc 
ontologies are mapped to an address field and the node ID in the WSN ontology is 
mapped to the same address field. This allows a network manager to ask once for a list of 
all devices and their addresses (IP or node ID). Without the mapping ontology, the 
network manager would have to query four different NMSs separately to get all deployed 
devices with their corresponding addresses.  
 
Table 4.1: Common Terms in the Ontology. 
 Cisco 
Domain 
Nortel 
Domain 
Ad hoc 
Domain 
WSN 
Domain 
Common 
Term 
System Name sysName sysName name name name 
System Location sysLocation sysLocation location (xcoord, 
ycoord) 
location 
System 
Description 
sysDesc sysDesc description description description 
Serial Number chassisSerial
Number 
rcChasSerial
Number 
serialNumber serialNumber serialNumber 
Address  sysIPAddr rcSysIPAddr ipAddress nodeID address 
Subnet Mask sysNetMask sysNetMask subnetMask N/A subnetMask 
Role (cluster 
head or member 
node) 
N/A N/A role role role 
Status 
(alive/active or 
dead/inactive) 
N/A N/A status status status 
Remaining 
Energy 
N/A N/A remainingBat
teryLife 
residualEner
gy 
energyLeft 
 
The energy left in AHN and WSN nodes, which is a primary concern because of the 
limited energy resources, is another use of the mapping ontology to assist the network 
manager. If the network manager wants to know how much remaining energy is in each 
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AHN and WSN node, the manager would have to query multiple sources, possibly even 
each individual node if no NMS was implemented for these two network types, which is 
often the case. By utilizing the ontologies developed in this research, the manager could 
ask one query, which consults the mapping ontology and return the remaining energy of 
all AHN and WSN nodes. This allows the network manager to easily find all nodes that 
have energy levels of concern for further evaluation.  
4.4 Implementation of the Ontology-based Network Management 
System 
One facet of configuration management is topology discovery. Topology discovery 
for a HMN is, at best, a difficult task. Other aspects of configuration management that 
may benefit from a new NMS are determining the current status of deployed devices, 
knowing when a configuration needs to be updated, and determining the future 
deployment status of devices. In particular, topology management can answer questions 
posed by the network manager regarding the current, and potentially the future, status of 
deployed devices.  
Network topology is one network management task that is important to all network 
managers. It is important for a network manager to know the devices that are deployed 
and some properties for each. Also, many configuration management tasks rely on the 
network topology. For these reasons, obtaining the network topology was the task that 
was the focus of the prototype system for this research and performed on each test 
network implementation.  
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4.4.1 An Experimental Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network 
An ontologically-based NMS was deployed on a Windows machine for testing 
purposes. The tests were run with a heterogeneous three-tiered network that was created 
for evaluation of the new NMS. The HMN network consisted of various numbers of 
wired (Cisco and Nortel), ad hoc, and sensor nodes. The wired portion of the network 
was simulated using a node emulator. The emulator was an implementation of the SNMP 
agent that would exist in deployed wired devices. The emulator responded to the SNMP 
requests with SNMP responses corresponding to unique wired nodes. The responses from 
the nodes were captured by the Ontology Instances Interface component of the NMS, 
which created instances in the knowledge base for each node. This portion of the network 
behaved in the same fashion as a live wired network and allowed testing of all aspects of 
the NMS. To study the performance and correctness of the developed ontology the 
network also contained AHN and WSN nodes. The AHN and WSN nodes were statically 
defined in the ontology and directly loaded into the knowledge base when the NMS was 
initiated.  
Each test network was deployed, with a different number of nodes, in a simulation 
environment, instances were created for each device deployed, and the network topology 
was obtained and displayed. Ten trials of this experiment were run for each network 
implementation with the arithmetic mean used for comparison purposes. The percentage 
of wired nodes (70%), AHN nodes (10%), and WSN nodes (20%) was the same for each 
experiment. 
A topology discovery was performed on the test HMN using the new NMS. The 
NMS correctly retrieved basic properties from each deployed device in the HMN using 
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the data stored in the knowledge base. Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 show the GUI snapshots for 
some of the wired devices and WSN devices respectively. These snapshots show an 
example of the results returned when the network manager asks to see all properties for 
all deployed devices in the network. As demonstrated by the figures, the properties 
returned vary for device type, specifically between wired and wireless nodes, since the 
properties are different for the different device types.   
 
Figure 4.3: Characteristics of several wired devices in the HMN [74]. 
 
Figure 4.4: Characteristics of several WSN devices in the HMN [74]. 
 
The results of the query for all properties of all deployed devices in the simulated 
network are shown in Fig. 4.5 (KB – knowledge base). When the number of devices is 
relatively small (less than 100), the overhead of the HMNMS (time to add instances to 
and retrieve query results from the knowledge base) is less than half of the total time. The 
total time is the time to initialize the HMNMS (add all deployed devices to the 
knowledge base) and retrieve the network topology.  
As the number of deployed devices grows over 100 devices, the query time increases 
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to more than half of the total time. This is due to the scalability of the knowledge base. 
As the network grows, the scalability is an issue. For most network managers, the 
scalability issue will be an acceptable trade-off as the total time is still less than the time 
that is required when a manual collection of data is necessary for HMNs. The scalability 
of ontology is addressed as future work and is discussed in chapter 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Results for the HMNMS for a simulated network. 
 
4.4.2 A Test Heterogeneous Two-tier Network 
The test network for this deployment of the HMNMS consisted of two of the three 
possible tiers, wired and ad hoc. Sensor nodes were not part of this test network because 
of the lack of a standard management protocol.  The wired tier consisted of both Cisco 
and Nortel nodes.  
The wired nodes were previously configured with SNMP data, which was part of the 
standard installation of the network devices. This included information such as the IP 
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address, network mask, name, location, etc. There was no additional configuration 
required for their deployment to the test network. 
The ad hoc nodes were laptops running Linux with an ad hoc routing protocol 
installed, which is necessary for a multi-hop ad hoc network (an AHN with multiple 
connections between a node and the gateway). The newly-developed SNMP ad hoc agent 
and MIB were installed, which required some additional installation and set-up.  
The IETF developed the Agent Extensibility (AgentX) Protocol [82] to dynamically 
extend SNMP agents. The AgentX protocol splits the agent into two separate parts, a 
master agent and subagents. The master agent is a traditional SNMP agent but has no 
access to management information on the nodes. The subagents have no SNMP 
knowledge but have access to the management information on the nodes. The subagents 
communicate to the management station via the master agent. The management station 
sends the SNMP queries to the master agent, which then communicates the required 
information to the subagents by using the AgentX protocol. The subagents retrieve the 
requested information from the node’s memory and return it to the master agent, which 
then sends it to the management station.   
The newly-developed ad hoc agent was created as an AgentX subagent, so an AgentX 
master agent is also required. The AgentX master agent used in this research is the Net-
SNMP distribution [83]. When the laptops are booted, the AgentX master agent and new 
ad hoc AgentX subagent are started and ready to answer SNMP requests.   
The HMNMS is run on a management station that is part of the test network. The 
management station is able to access the wired network, the ad hoc network, and the 
developed ontology definition files. The ontology definition files are stored on a web 
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server so the management station can read these files via the Internet. The management 
station is used to query the ontological knowledge base, and the results of the NMS 
analysis of the data being collected. 
A simple query is sent from the network manager, via the GUI, to the knowledge base 
requesting the address and description of all deployed nodes in the test HMN. When the 
HMNMS is initiated, all deployed devices are queried and the responses are added to the 
knowledge base via the OII. At that point, the knowledge base contains the ontology 
definition files and instances for all deployed devices. So, when the GUI sends a query to 
the knowledge base, it is sent via the reasoner. The reasoner will send the query to the 
knowledge base and retrieve the answer for the query. The query answer is then returned 
to the GUI where the network manager views it. The address and description of all active 
deployed devices is returned to the network manager in response to the query because of 
the interoperability provided by the incorporation of ontology in the HMNMS.  
A portion of the query results is shown in Fig. 4.6. These results show the information 
requested (address and description) for four of the nodes in the network. The first two 
nodes are wired nodes (the first one is a Cisco node and the second one is a Nortel node. 
The last two nodes are ad hoc nodes deployed in the network. As seen in the results, both 
ad hoc nodes are hosts running Ubuntu versions of Linux.  
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Figure 4.6: Sample query results from the HMNMS for a test network. 
 
4.4.3 Deployments in Live Networks 
In consideration of the contributions of this work, the system was deployed in live 
environments to obtain a quantitative measurement of the performance and deployment 
of this solution. The HMNMS uses existing management protocols to obtain node 
information. This contributes to the ease of deployment for the HMNMS. Deployed 
network nodes will most likely already support the standard management protocol by 
default.  If a node does not support the standard management protocol, it is easily enabled 
by changing a configuration setting in the device. Deployed nodes require no additional 
software to be installed to work with the HMNMS.   
The HMNMS system is installed on a single management station. This requires the 
installation of the FaCT++ reasoner and the Ontology Instances Interface. The reasoner 
requires access to the ontology definition files; they can be copied onto the management 
station or onto a web server that is accessible to the management station. 
The HMNMS was deployed and tested in two live network environments. The first 
was a corporate network consisting of Cisco devices and the second was a university 
--> address: 192.168.2.210  
--> sysDesc: Cisco Systems Catalyst 1900,V9.00.06      
 
--> address: 192.168.2.150  
--> sysDesc: BayStack 450-24T HW:RevL  FW:V1.36 SW:v1.3.1.2  
 
--> address: 10.0.0.1  
--> description: Linux misty 2.6.28-11-generic #42-Ubuntu SMP Fri Apr 17 01:57:59 UTC 2009 i686  
 
--> address: 10.0.0.2  
--> description: Linux lucky 2.6.28-11-generic #42-Ubuntu SMP Fri Apr 17 01:57:59 UTC 2009 i686  
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network with Nortel devices. While the two live networks were homogeneous 
deployments, these deployments provided an opportunity to test the ease of wide-scale 
deployment of the HMNMS. 
As with the test network, the HMNMS deployment was a minor issue and required no 
configuration changes to the network devices. The deployed devices were all configured 
for SNMP and required no additional software or firmware installation.  
The network management station was a laptop that was connected via Ethernet to the 
network. The laptop was running the FaCT++ reasoner to handle the ontology knowledge 
base. The HMNMS was already compiled on the laptop so the only requirement was to 
run the HMNMS utilizing the specified ontology files. In the current deployment, the 
devices must be manually characterized as Cisco or Nortel. After the completion of that 
manual step, the HMNMS properly gathered the necessary information from the 
deployed devices.  
Results of these live deployments demonstrated that the ontology sub-system 
overhead was minimal. A comparison of the performance results for the university 
network is illustrated in Fig. 4.7 (KB – knowledge base; props - properties). These results 
illustrate that the majority of the response time is the query for the SNMP data, which 
exists in all NMSs utilizing SNMP and it not unique to the HMNMS. As noted in the 
figure, instances are added to the knowledge base swiftly. In this live network, which is a 
realistic view of the actual utilization of the HMNMS, the query response time for the 
network topology is minimal. This response time grows as the number of devices grows, 
but it is acceptable provided the benefits provided. 
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The time to add instances to the knowledge base for all deployed devices in the 
network is relatively constant, even as the number of deployed devices increases, as 
shown in Fig. 4.8. The figure also shows that the time to retrieve the network topology 
for all deployed devices in the network grows quickly as the number of devices grows. 
This increase in query time does not increase as quickly as the time to retrieve the 
management data from the deployed devices. The time to retrieve management data is 
present in any NMS and the query time is still less than the time to conduct manual 
analysis for a HMN, so the growth is acceptable provided the benefits of the HMNMS.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Results from the HMNMS for a live university network. 
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Figure 4.8: A scalability perspective of the sample query results from the HMNMS for a 
live university network. 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
Improved techniques represent a critical aspect of managing networks as they grow 
larger and more complex. As the network management task becomes more and more 
complex it becomes more difficult for humans to carry out this task. We already have 
networks of sufficient complexity that are subject to attack and cannot be properly 
managed in their entirety. As we have described by incorporating sufficient knowledge 
into an NMS and by unifying disparate networks through ontological representation we 
can begin to use computational power to address the network management problem. 
In comparison to the alternative of manual processing of data, the overhead of 
obtaining the topology of a network with the new NMS is acceptable. The results of tests 
run to retrieve the network topology for a simulated network, a test network, and two live 
networks demonstrate that the overhead of the ontology (adding instances and retrieving 
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query results) is minimal, particularly as the number of nodes is less than two hundred. If 
the network manager was responsible for an HMN and was not using this NMS, the 
manager would have to consult four different NMSs, one for each device type deployed. 
The manager would then have to manually combine all four network topologies returned 
in order to have one integrated network topology of the HMN. An obvious benefit of the 
NMS that uses ontology is the integration of diverse data.  
Results of a network in a simulation environment and two live deployments show the 
HMNMS incurs negligible, acceptable overhead. The deployments in the live networks 
demonstrate the minimal set-up required to utilize the HMNMS. Thse two observations, 
adjoined with the benefits of the HMNMS, make it an obvious addition to the tool set of a 
manager of a HMN. 
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  An Analytical Model for Performance Analysis of a Chapter 5
Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network 
 
Network applications as a class of applications face many issues. These issues include 
response time, bandwidth capability, and connectivity. As a member of this class of 
applications an NMS has these same issues. The network manager must monitor and 
maintain the network but not impact the users’ experience. To achieve this goal, it is vital 
to optimize the bandwidth, by minimizing the traffic overhead introduced by an NMS. In 
this chapter the performance of an HMN is analyzed while running an HMNMS. 
The performance analysis provides a view of the impact of system design on network 
capacity. A key element of this analysis is determining if there are any bottlenecks in the 
HMN caused by the HMNMS. The analytical analysis was conducted for a 
heterogeneous, two-tier network, consisting of wired and ad hoc nodes.   
5.1 Theoretical Analysis Based on Queuing Theory 
The performance of the HMNMS was evaluated using the model proposed by Nishida 
[84]. Nishida developed an end-to-end performance model to conduct a bottleneck 
analysis. The end-to-end performance was defined as the accumulation of the processing 
time of all the components of the system. For this research, the end-to-end performance is 
defined as 
                                   TNMS = Tnd + Tui + Tont + Tint + t                    (5.1)  
The components of the end-to-end performance are shown in Table 5.1 and correspond to 
the system components in the HMNMS, Fig. 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: End-to-End Performance Components [74]. 
Notation Description Corresponding System 
Component 
Tont Processing time on the 
Ontology Sub-system 
Ontology Sub-system 
Tint Processing time to add the 
ontology instances, 
representing the devices, to the 
knowledge base 
Ontology Instances 
Interface 
Tui Processing and Input/Output 
time of the UI 
UI 
Tnd Processing time in the devices 
in the HMN 
HMN devices 
T Transmission time to obtain the 
management data from the 
devices in the HMN 
Links between Ontology 
Instances Interface and the 
HMN 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Component diagram of the Network Management System (NMS) [74]. 
 
The majority of the run time in the HMNMS is obtaining the data from the deployed 
devices and displaying it to the User Interface (UI). This is illustrated in Fig. 5.2. This 
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portion of the run time consists of the node processing time, Tnd, the transmission time, t, 
and the UI processing time, Tui. The wired and AHN portions of the network include 
sending an SNMP request to each node and receiving an a SNMP response. The round-
trip time for the SNP request and response is the same for any NMS, including the 
HMNMS. The HMNMS uses existing protocols, such as SNMP, to retrieve the 
management data. Since the node processing time, Tnd, and the transmission time, t, are 
the same for any deployed NMS in a network, these two times are combined for the 
performance evaluation, Td. The new formula is  
              TNMS = Td + Tui + Tont + Tint               (5.2) 
 
 
Figure 5.2: End-to-end performance times of experimental tests [74]. 
 
The other parts of this run time are the node processing time and the UI processing 
time. The UI processing time is required to display a graphical view of the network and 
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the deployed devices to the network manager. The UI processing time is not unique to the 
HMNMS since any deployed NMS incurs the same overhead.  
The overhead in the HMNMS that is new to this design is the Ontology Sub-system 
and the Ontology Instance Interface. For this reason, these two components, Tont and Tint, 
are the key points for analysis. The goal is to minimize the processing overhead for these 
two components while maximizing the benefit of incorporating ontology into the NMS.  
As observed in Fig. 5.3, the time to add instances of deployed nodes to the knowledge 
base, Tint, is reasonably small and almost constant. In the overall running time of the 
NMS, this time is negligible for two reasons. First, the time required to add the instances 
to the knowledge base for nodes in the network is insignificant. The second reason is due 
to the way the instances are added to the knowledge base. Instances are added to the 
knowledge base when deployed devices are identified in the network, which is a one-time 
occurrence during the running of the HMNMS. Currently, deployed devices are found by 
hard-coded addresses in the HMNMS. Future work will utilize some type of auto 
discovery of the devices. After the initial loading of devices to the knowledge base, all 
deployed devices exist in the knowledge base. After this initial loading, new instances are 
only added as new devices are deployed to the network. Since devices are added 
randomly, there typically is not a time when there is substantial overhead in the HMNMS 
due to new instances being added to the knowledge base. 
The time to retrieve the network topology, Tont, is exponential to the number of nodes, 
as shown in Fig. 5.3. As the number of nodes increases, the size of the knowledge base 
increases, so additional time is required to process and retrieve the instances. This 
property impacts the HMNMS one time, when the initial network topology is discovered.  
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Figure 5.3: Ontology sub-system and instance interface times [74]. 
 
An analytical model was developed for the performance analysis of the HMNMS 
[85]. The HMNMS has two main systems: the User-Ontology System and the 
Management-Query System. The User-Ontology System is invoked when the network 
manager asks a query and has no impact on the Management-Query System. For 
instance, if the network manager wants to know the address of all deployed devices, the 
query is sent to the knowledge base and the response is returned to the network manager 
via a UI. The knowledge base query and response (Tont) and the UI display (Tui) are both 
components of the User-Ontology System. The User-Ontology System is separate from 
the Management-Query System and does not impact the end-to-end performance of the 
Management-Query System.   
The Management-Query System queries the deployed devices and receives responses 
containing management information. The Management-Query System is the interaction 
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between the knowledge base and the HMN. This interaction is the task of the Ontology 
Instances Interface. 
The Management-Query System is evaluated using a queuing model for the end-to-
end performance. The end-to-end performance for the Management-Query System is 
𝑇𝑁𝑀𝑆 =  𝑇𝑑 +  𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡         (5.3) 
The Ontology Instances Interface sends a query to all the nodes, which send 
responses back. The Ontology Instances Interface then adds a new instance or updates an 
existing instance in the knowledge base. Various implementation tests, which are 
discussed in the next section of this work, reveal that the overhead of the Ontology 
Instances Interface is negligible.  
The HMN is modeled as a packet network. For the analysis, it is assumed that there is 
no network congestion. The queue at each device in the network is assumed to be an 
independent queue. It is assumed that all packets, both queries and responses, have the 
same size and priority when processed at each device. The Poisson distribution 
(explained briefly in section 2.3) is assumed for packet arrivals. The HMNMS is a 
request/response application with each device being managed generating one request and 
one response packet. This request/response query to each managed device is viewed as an 
independent packet flow. Each independent packet flow traverses a node twice, once for 
the request and once for the response. The average end-to-end delay for each packet flow 
(also referred to as flow here) is the sum of all delays of queues the flow traverses. Table 
5.2 briefly explains many of the parameters used in the development of the analytical 
model.  
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Table 5.2: Analytical Model Parameters. 
Notation Description 
P Set of all flows in the network 
p An individual flow, 𝑝 𝜖 𝑃 
xp Arrival rate of each flow 
i An individual node 
cp,i Times a flow may traverse a node i 
λ Packet arrival rate 
μ Packet processing rate 
N Average number of packets in a  queue 
T Delay 
L Packet size 
W(λ) Average packet delay caused by multi-access communication 
Ip Set of all nodes traversed by flow p 
Jp Set of all gateways traversed by flow p 
 
Each flow may traverse a node i cp,i times, where cp,i ϵ {0, 1, 2}. The value of cp,i is: 
• 0 if a flow never traverses node i 
• 1 if the flow p traverses an end device i and returns 
• 2 if the flow traverses a node both on its enquiring and responding paths 
The set of all flows that traverse any given node i in the network is denoted as 𝑃𝑖, where 
𝑃𝑖 ⊆ 𝑃. The total packet arrival rate λi for a node i is written as: 
𝜆𝑖 =  ∑  𝑐𝑝,𝑖 𝑥𝑝𝑝 ∈𝑃𝑖                                                                                  (5.4) 
The Kleinrock Independence Approximation [86] is an approximate analysis of networks 
of M/M/1 queues (M/M/1 queues are explained in section 2.3). The Kleinrock 
Independence Approximation asserts that all queues in the network can be modeled as a 
M/M/1 queue. The average delays in a network can be approximately calculated by 
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assuming the delays in the queues are independent. The average number of packets in 
queue i can be expressed as: 
𝑁𝑖 =  𝜆𝑖𝜇𝑖− 𝜆𝑖      (5.5) 
Here μi is the packet processing rate of node i. If the propagation delay is ignored, then 
Little’s Theorem is applied and the average packet delay is written as: 
𝑇𝑖 =  𝑁𝑖𝜆𝑖 =  𝜆𝑖𝜇𝑖 − 𝜆𝑖𝜆𝑖 =  1𝜇𝑖 − 𝜆𝑖                (5.6) 
A multi-access network is a network where multiple nodes access the same channel, 
such as an Ethernet or wireless channel. In such a network contention among nodes 
competing for the same channel will cause a delay. From the conclusion in [86], for a 
slotted CSMA/CD network, the approximated average packet delay caused by multi-
access is expressed as: 
    𝑊(𝜆) =  𝜆 𝑋2����+ 𝛽(𝐴+2𝜆)2[1− 𝜆(1+𝐵𝛽)]     (5.7) 
Here λ is the total arrival rate to the bus from the nodes. The propagation and detection 
delay required for all sources to detect an idle channel after a transmission ends is  
     β = τ C / L     (5.8) 
Here β is expressed in terms of packet transmission units. τ is this time in seconds, C is 
the raw channel bit rate, and L is the expected number of bits in a data packet. 𝑋2 ����is the 
mean-square of the packet duration and is expressed as  
         𝑋2���� =  ∑𝑥2 𝑃𝑟. (𝑋 = 𝑥)    (5.9) 
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Recalling the assumption that all management request and response packets have 
identical lengths, X2��� is simply 𝑋2. The values of A and B, two constants, depend on the 
detailed assumptions of the network (see [87]). This delay W(λ) can be added to the delay 
of any flow going through a multi-access gateway. 
The total delay of flow p can be expressed as:  
𝑇𝑝,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  ∑ 𝑇𝑖 +  ∑ 𝑊𝑗(𝜆)𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑝𝑖 ∈𝐼𝑝                     (5.10) 
The actual average end-to-end delay depends on the topology of the network. The 
topology of a general HMN (Fig. 5.4) can be generalized as in Fig. 5.5.  
 
Figure 5.4: A general Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network. 
 
The queuing delay caused by the switch in Fig. 5.5, which is part of the wired tier, is:  
𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 =  1𝜇𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑− 𝜆𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 =  1𝜇𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑− 𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑                        (5.11) 
where xwired is the data rate of the switch query flow. The queuing delay caused by the  
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Ethernet gateway is:  
𝑇𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤 =  1𝜇𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤− ∑ 2𝑥𝑝𝑝                                 (5.12) 
 
 
Figure 5.5: A generalized network topology. 
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Since the system is a request/response system, all flows traverse the Ethernet 
gateway, the Ontology Instances Interface, the Ontology Subsystem and the User 
Interface twice. The equations for the delays calculate delays in the ideal case, which 
assumes the management packets are always given top priority by the operating system. 
The actual delay will vary slightly depending on how the operating system schedules 
packets to be forwarded. 
 
The total average end-to-end delay for inquiring a wired node is: 
𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 +  𝑇′𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤 +  𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡 +  𝑊𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤�𝜆𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤� 
   =  1
𝜇𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 −  𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 +  1𝜇′𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤 −  ∑ 2𝑥𝑝𝑝  
        + 1
𝜇𝑖𝑛𝑡− ∑ 2𝑥𝑝𝑝 + 𝑊𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤(∑ 𝑥𝑝)𝑃              (5.13) 
Twired, T'eth-gw, Tint are delays caused by wired devices, the Ethernet gateway, and the 
Ontology Interface, respectively. T'eth-gw is the delay caused by the Ethernet gateway to 
forward packets. This delay is different from Teth-gw because forwarded packets will send 
interrupts to the processor, causing additional overhead to these packets. This is due to 
the fact that the operating system will interrupt their processing, causing them to be in 
placed in the processor queue, incurring some queuing delay. An ad hoc gateway behaves 
in the same manner. 
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Assume there are mwired wired devices and madhoc ad hoc nodes in the network. The 
total average end-to-end delay for sending and receiving management packets to an ad 
hoc node is: 
𝑇𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  𝑇𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐 +  𝑇′𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐−𝑔𝑤 +  𝑇′𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤 +   𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡 
+ 𝑊𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐−𝑔𝑤�𝜆𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐−𝑔𝑤� +  𝑊𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤�𝜆𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤� 
 =  1
𝜇𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐 −  𝑥𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐 + 1𝜇′𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐−𝑔𝑤 − 2𝑚𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑥𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐 
+ 1
𝜇′𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤 −  ∑ 2𝑥𝑝𝑝 + 1𝜇𝑖𝑛𝑡 −  ∑ 2𝑥𝑝𝑝  
+𝑊𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐−𝑔𝑤(�𝑚𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑥𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐)
𝑃
 
+𝑊𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤(∑ 𝑥𝑝)𝑃                  (5.14) 
For the example network topology illustrated in Fig. 5.5, ∑ 2𝑥𝑝 = 2𝑚𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑥𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐 +𝑃2𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑. The summation is over 2xp because all flows traverse the Ethernet 
gateway, Ontology Inferences Interface, Ontology Subsystem, and User Interface twice.  
5.2  Performance Analysis of a Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network 
A performance analysis of the capacity of the Management-Query System was 
performed. The number of wired or ad hoc nodes that can be supported while providing a 
reasonable query response time was determined.  
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From the end-to-end delay expressions for wired devices (Eq. 5.13) and ad hoc nodes 
(Eq. 5.14), the total delay for a query flow can be calculated. The total delay is the sum of 
the delays of each device along the path. As a result, the system capacity is reached when 
any device in the path reaches its capacity. These devices are the two gateways in Fig. 
5.5. In this case, any query flow traversing one of these devices can have infinite delay, 
possibly causing packet loss.  
To maintain a stable system, each term on the right hand side of Eq. 5.14 cannot go to 
infinity. To prevent this, the denominator of each term cannot be greater than 0. Because 
the Ethernet gateway is traversed by all traffic in the network, it is most likely to be the 
bottleneck. To keep Teth-gw finite, the number of wired and ad hoc nodes that can be 
supported must satisfy:  
𝜇𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤 − (𝑚𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐 + 𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑)2𝑥𝑝 > 0                        (5.15) 
This can be written as:  
 𝑚𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐 +  𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 <  𝜇𝑒𝑡ℎ−𝑔𝑤2𝑥𝑝                          (5.16) 
Similarly, to keep the ad hoc gateway delay bounded, the number of ad hoc nodes 
should satisfy:  
   𝜇𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐−𝑔𝑤 −𝑚𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐2𝑥𝑝 > 0                      (5.17) 
This can be transformed into    
          𝑚𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐 <  𝜇𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑐−𝑔𝑤2𝑥𝑝                                (5.18) 
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The maximum number of ad hoc and wired nodes that can be supported by the 
Ethernet gateway is expressed by Eq. 5.16. The maximum number of ad hoc nodes that 
can be supported by the ad hoc gateway is expressed by Eq. 5.18. The capacity of the 
network is determined by both equations, requiring both equations to be satisfied at the 
same time. This is a theoretical prediction of the capacity. In a practical situation, the 
constraint may vary due to the dynamic nature of the hosts and network, such as the 
operating system scheduling policy and traffic patterns.  
5.2.1 Implementation of the Model 
A test network was deployed to verify the theoretical analysis with empirical results. 
The focus of this analysis was the ad hoc tier of the network since the ad hoc gateway 
was determined to be a critical node.  
The test ad hoc network consisted of three Linux laptops with 802.11g wireless 
network cards. One of the laptops was the ad hoc gateway and the other two were ad hoc 
nodes connected to the ad hoc gateway wirelessly. A desktop was the management 
station. The management station was connected directly to the ad hoc gateway with a 
network cable to eliminate the Ethernet gateway performance fluctuations. The 
management station periodically sent SNMP query packets to the three ad hoc nodes, 
including the ad hoc gateway. This simulated the operation of a management station in a 
live network.  
To simplify the analysis, the processing rate for all the deployed devices is assumed 
to be identical and the delays caused by multi-access communication are ignored. The 
value used for the processing rate was determined from experimentation and was 1/20 
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packet per millisecond. The query rate in the test network is constant. This differs from 
the theoretical analysis, which follows a Poisson distribution.  
The delay caused by the ad hoc gateway and one of the ad hoc nodes is shown in Fig. 
5.6. The delay caused by the ad hoc gateway increases faster than the delay caused by the 
ad hoc node. The primary reason for this is because all packets to the ad hoc tier flow 
through the ad hoc gateway. Also, as the gateway is processing packets, the operating 
system assigns different priorities to the packets destined for the gateway and packets to 
be forwarded by the gateway. This is explained later in this section. 
 
Figure 5.6: Delays caused by the ad hoc gateway and nodes  
from the theoretical analysis [85]. 
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Additional test results for the ad hoc network are shown in Fig. 5.7 to 5.9. The x-axis 
in these figures is the indices of the query packet for each device in the network. The 
indices are ordered in time sequence. The y-axis is the delay for the management query 
and response. The figures show the query delay for each of the ad hoc nodes for varying 
inter-arrival times of the query packet. Fig. 5.7 to 5.9 show the queuing delay for the ad 
hoc gateway, one ad hoc node, and the second ad hoc node, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.7: Query delays at the ad hoc gateway [85]. 
 
Several observations can be made from the experimental results. The first observation 
is the buffering effect. When the tests began there were fewer packets in the network so 
the delay was smaller. As more packets are injected into the network, packets are 
buffered and the queuing delay increases. 
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The second observation is that the queries for the ad hoc gateway have a higher average 
delay than the packets for the ad hoc nodes. This is because of how the node handles 
incoming packets. When the node’s network card receives an Ethernet frame, an interrupt 
is sent to the operating system. The operating system stops the current process on the 
processor to handle the interrupt. If the packet is to be forwarded, then the operating 
system will immediately forward the packet. This causes any packet destined for the ad 
hoc gateway and currently being processed to be preempted and placed in a processor 
queue causing the packet being processed to incur some additional processor queuing 
delay. Utilizing an ad hoc gateway that has multiple processors may decrease or eliminate 
this additional processor queuing delay. If one processor is currently processing a 
management packet, another processor may be able to handle the interrupt and process 
the packet to be forwarded.   
 
Figure 5.8: Query delays at the ad hoc node 1 [85]. 
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Figure 5.9: Query delays at the ad hoc node 2 [85]. 
 
In a traditional UNIX operating system, the scheduler categorizes tasks into five 
different categories. Each category has a different priority. These five categories, in 
decreasing priority order, are [88]: 
• Swapper 
• Block I/O device control 
• File manipulation 
• Character I/O device control 
• User processes 
This scheduling scheme is intended to provide the highest priority for I/O operations. 
Forwarding packets is an I/O task with higher priority over local MIB checking tasks, 
which are categorized as user processes. When the operating system receives an interrupt, 
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it will stop the processor and suspend the process currently using the processor. This 
behavior adds to the larger average round trip delays for the SNMP packets destined for 
the ad hoc gateway. 
The conclusion from the experimental results is that the ad hoc gateway is the 
bottleneck of the ad hoc tier. This is supported by the figures, which show the higher 
growth rate of the delay for the ad hoc gateway compared to the ad hoc nodes. As the 
amount of network traffic increases, the delay for the ad hoc gateway is significantly 
higher than the ad hoc nodes. The delay for packets querying the ad hoc gateway 
increases faster than other packets and eventually packet loss will occur. This 
experimental result confirms the conclusion from the theoretical analysis.  
5.3 Chapter Summary 
In comparison to the alternative of manual processing of data, the overhead of 
obtaining the network topology is acceptable under conventional use. If the network 
manager is responsible for an HMN and is not using the HMNMS, the manager must 
consult four different NMSs, one for each device type deployed. To obtain one integrated 
network topology of the HMN, the manager must manually combine all four network 
topologies returned by the various NMSs. An obvious benefit of the HMNMS that uses 
ontology is the integration of diverse data. The benefits would be evident to any network 
manager that must manage a HMN. The results of the experiments conducted show that 
the overhead of incorporating ontology into the NMS are acceptable given the benefits 
provided for the topology discovery of a HMN, provided no path devices reach their 
capacity. 
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A theoretical analysis was performed to provide an analytical view of the network 
performance. The theoretical analysis provides insight to deployment considerations for 
the HMNMS. Specifically, two deployment parameters are considered in the analysis, the 
inter-query time and the number of nodes that can be supported by one ad hoc gateway.  
The inter-query time is the amount of time between the management station sending 
queries to a deployed node. The inter-query time must be small enough to obtain accurate 
information from the nodes for proper management but not too small that the queries 
inject too much traffic into the network. The analysis concludes that the gateways in the 
network are the bottlenecks of the query flow. A test AHN was deployed to conduct 
experiments for query delays. The experimental results support the theoretical conclusion 
showing that the ad hoc gateway is the bottleneck. 
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 A Formal Representation for Complex Attacks using Chapter 6
Ontology 
 
A characteristic of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) is that they are optimized to 
identify simple attacks. A simple attack is an attack against a host or networking 
consisting of a single step. Examples of a simple attack are a ping scan, where an attacker 
scans IP addresses in a network to find active hosts, or a denial of service attack, where 
an attacker takes a host or network offline by making it unavailable to users.  
Often an attack against a network consists of several stages, with each stage being a 
simple attack.  An attack consisting of multiple stages of simple attacks is a complex 
attack. A complex attack can be defined as a combination of two or more simple attacks 
or two or more complex attacks in a spatial or temporal domain.  
Complex attacks often require the examination of both their temporal and spatial 
domains for identification. The temporal domain for an attack requires the examination of 
the time period when the attack occurs. During this time period, there may be multiple 
events that indicate a complex attack has occurred.  
The spatial domain is the location, either physical or logical, in the network where the 
attack occurred. Multiple events in the same network or subnet may indicate a complex 
attack, while the same events in different networks or subnets may indicate normal 
traffic. For example, consider a user performing troubleshooting on their host because 
they are experiencing connectivity issues. The user may try to ping several different hosts 
throughout their network and the Internet to determine the source of the connectivity 
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problems. This is legitimate network traffic; however, if the user pings many hosts on the 
same network, this may indicate the user is attempting to find active hosts, the first step 
in many complex attacks. For an IDS to properly identify a complex attack, it is 
necessary for the system to identify an attack based on multiple events that occurred in 
multiple locations on the network over a period of time.  
Another aspect of the spatial domain is from the source address. The simple attacks 
comprising one complex attack may originate from different hosts, thus different source 
addresses. An attacker may simply be using various hosts to initiate each simple attack, 
or it may be several attackers collaborating on the complex attack.  
Many times, an attacker conducts some preliminary actions before initiating a 
complex attack. Consider the following example. An attacker uses a port scanner tool, 
like nmap [89], to find open telnet or ssh ports on hosts. The attacker will then telnet/ssh 
to these hosts and view the banner or motd. If the banner/motd contains the string “User 
Access Verification”, this indicates a Cisco router. The attacker then uses a tool like 
SING [90] to create a custom ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) packet for a 
netmask request (ICMP type 17). Typically only routers respond to an ICMP type 17 
request. The attacker will then attempt to connect to SNMP on the router by using 
common SNMP community strings. The attacker may then take advantage of known 
vulnerabilities for the device, download the entire configuration for the device, and 
possibly even modify the device configuration. When the router is attacked, it may lead 
to valuable information to allow the attacker to attack more critical information/servers, 
or allow the attacker to disable the entire network.  
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As another example, illustrating the need to consider all traffic and attack attempts 
and not just attacks aimed at vulnerabilities of specified nodes, consider a vulnerability 
on port 80 of a webserver. If the server is not a web server or if the firewall has port 80 
blocked to that server, then it may not be a critical vulnerability to the network manager. 
But what if the firewall was previously compromised and the firewall rules were changed 
or removed by the attacker? What if a user installs a new web server on a host that is 
available through the firewall? Now there will be traffic on the network to port 80 of that 
server, with an external source IP address, which may indicate to the network manager 
that the firewall is compromised. The network manager must examine data on the 
network for all types of attacks, including successful attacks and attack attempts. 
Consider an example of the need to examine the temporal domain of attacks. One of 
the early steps of many complex attacks is for the attack to identify ports that are open on 
devices. If the network manager observes traffic to determine if one port is open on a 
server, this indicates very little about the possible occurrence of a complex attack; 
however, observing a check for multiple ports in sequence, may indicate a complex 
attack is occurring or has occurred.  
A Reasoning Intrusion Detection System (RIDS) utilizes reasoning (primarily 
inference) in attack identification. The reasoning mechanisms and associated knowledge 
base are used to provide efficient and reliable analysis of collected network data to aid in 
attack identification. The reasoning capability of a RIDS also provides the ability to 
identify a family of generic attacks.  The approach we are taking to augment the typical 
IDS is to add an ontological representation of the network space along with a reasoning 
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engine to operate on the ontology [91]. The result is a Reasoning Intrusion Detection 
System using Ontology.   
All ontologically-based systems have the ability to make inferences using the 
knowledge contained in the ontology. In fact this is where their tremendous power lies. 
Through the use of ontological knowledge we are able to carry out complex analysis on 
data collected from the network. In addition the ontology can grow and change as time 
progresses because of the rapid change in networking and networks. For example if we 
understand network traffic from a certain deployed virus than we can use that information 
to augment the ontology in such a way as to recognize that and similar viruses. 
Therefore one tremendous advantage gained by the ontology is the inference 
capability provided allowing additional knowledge to be learned. This will allow the 
incorporation of new rules into the identification process, allowing the IDS to use the 
meaning of the network data to help identify attacks. For example, if a port scan follows a 
ping scan, within a specified amount of time, it may indicate the occurrence of a complex 
attack. As another example, consider what happens when an attacker conducts a denial of 
service attack on a host using the ping utility. This attack results in the creation of a 
PingFlood instance in the knowledge base. In the ontology (see section 6.3), the 
PingFlood class is a subclass of Flood, which is a subclass of Resources, which is a 
subclass of DoS (so indirectly, PingFlood is a subclass of DoS). By using ontology, a 
query for all DoS attacks returns the newly created instance for the ping flood attack. 
Without the inference provided by ontology this query would only return direct instances 
of the DoS class, which would not include the ping flood instance.  
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The inference provided by ontology allows more advanced information to be learned 
from the network data. For example, if there are multiple port scans found in the data 
collected, and they occur within a specified time frame, then the ontology can infer that a 
port scan occurred. The reasoning will then identify the various complex attacks that have 
a port scan as one of its attack elements. Without the use of reasoning, this would require 
a sophisticated, difficult-to-maintain program or manual analysis.  
Another important advantage is the semantic expressiveness provided by ontology. 
XML and XML Schema provide structure to information but no semantic information. 
RDF Schema provides limited semantics, but not sufficient semantics for a RIDS. For 
example, RDF Schema does not provide for disjoint classes, i.e., a packet cannot be both 
TCP and UDP. RDF Schema also does not provide the ability to specify cardinality 
restrictions. For example, an instance can have only one source address; this limitation 
can be specified in ontology using cardinality statements. A powerful semantic 
expressiveness exploited by this research and not supported by RDF Schema is the 
Boolean combinations of classes. The formal representation developed in this research 
creates new classes by combining other classes using Boolean operators, such as union 
and intersection. It is important to note that there is a trade-off between high expressivity 
and computation costs. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
6.1 Generalized Attack Trees 
A complex attack consists of multiple events or attack elements. Decomposing a 
complex attack into its individual attack elements provides a better understanding of how 
attackers launch complex attacks. This analysis provides the ability to consider other 
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related complex attacks that may consist of similar elements and produce similar results. 
Knowledge of specific attacks can lead to the discovery of a more comprehensive set of 
generic attack descriptions.  
Individual attacks were examined to determine if aggregate sequences are represented 
in the wild. For example, a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack is a group of unrelated, 
individual attacks that act together. To develop a generic attack tree, a specific MITM 
attack was launched and the data studied. The specific MITM attack consisted of the 
following individual attacks: 
1. A ping scan against the network 
2. A SYN scan to find open TCP connections on an active host on the network 
3. A series of TCP connections against an active host on the network to predict 
the TCP sequence number 
4. A Denial of Service (DoS) attack against the second host in an established 
TCP connection by sending many pings to the host 
5. Spoof the IP address of the second host in the TCP connection  
By examining these individual attacks, and looking at other MITM attack data, it was 
determined that each step can be generalized. For example, the second step, a node scan 
to find active TCP connections, can be done in a number of ways. This example used an 
SYN scan, but another MITM attack may use an FIN scan. Also, for the fourth step, there 
are many different ways to launch a DoS attack against a host, including the ping packets 
used in this example, SYN packet flood, application floods, etc. The generalized steps 
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were aggregated into a generic attack tree for the MITM attack, which can be used to 
identify many different types of a MITM attack, even as new ones develop.  
Attack trees are used to aid in complex attack identification. An attack tree is a tree 
diagram representing the steps in a complex attack. A single path in the attack tree 
illustrates the steps for a particular complex attack. With multiple paths in each attack 
tree, multiple specific complex attacks are represented. The root node of the tree 
represents the goal of the attack. The other nodes represent the steps necessary to reach 
the goal. The nodes are joined by the “AND” keyword to indicate that each node is 
required to reach the goal. Same-level nodes not linked by the “AND” keyword represent 
options for that particular step. Most attack trees, such as the ones used in this work, have 
“AND” conditions for all the root’s children, indicating that each of root’s children must 
be satisfied for the goal to be achieved. Each branch from each child node from root then 
indicates a method to satisfy that child node.  
For example, to take a host in a TCP connection offline for the duration of the 
connection, an attacker may execute a denial of service attack against the host or spoof 
the host’s MAC (ARP) address. This branch of an attack tree is illustrated in Fig. 6.1, 
showing two different methods to spoof a host’s MAC address. Each of these options 
would be represented in the attack tree as child nodes of the same parent (the parent node 
would be “take host offline for a TCP connection”) with no “AND” connection, 
indicating success of one of the child nodes would satisfy the parent node.  
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Figure 6.1: An attack tree branch example. 
 
The attack trees used in this research began as attack trees for specific attacks. 
Common complex attacks were identified as a sequence of simpler attacks and the attack 
trees were constructed from these simpler attacks. The specific attack trees were studied; 
similarities were identified, which lead to the development of generalized attack trees. A 
generalized attack tree is a representation of a class of complex attacks.   These 
generalized attack trees were used to develop the formal representation and were based 
on the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) five pillars of Information Assurance [92]. The 
five pillars are confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and availability. 
As the generalized attack trees were developed, it was discovered that each root node 
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matched one of the five pillars. The result was four generalized attack trees, each 
corresponding to one of the five pillars. The methods used by attacks to breach 
confidentiality and non-repudiation are similar resulting in one generic attack tree for 
these two pillars.  
An example specific attack tree is depicted in Fig. 6.2. Each node was manually 
assigned a unique identification number, which is used by the RIDS. Many of the attack 
elements in a variety of attack trees are similar. Many attacks include an attacker first 
finding all available hosts on a network (a ping scan) and then finding all the open ports 
(a port scan) on each available host. Similar attack elements were identified as generic 
simple attacks. If a node in an attack tree is one of the generic simple attacks, then the 
node is mapped to that attack.  
A mapping was manually developed for the generic attack trees. For example, the 
first step in Fig. 6.2 is the “find active hosts on network”. This is a very common step in 
complex attacks and is found in all attack trees used in this research. This step is 
identified as generic attack #1. The corresponding node in Fig. 6.2, Node 8.1, is mapped 
to generic attack #1. Any time generic attack #1 is identified, it will color all 
corresponding nodes in attack trees, such as Node 8.1 in Fig. 6.2. 
When identifying attacks, the IDS identifies all the generic attacks and then identifies 
each node in the attack trees that correspond to these generic attacks, based on mappings 
developed. These nodes are marked in the attack tree based on the coloring scheme 
described in the next section. The IDS then identifies any specific attacks, which do not 
map to a generic attack, and annotates those nodes in the attack trees. The annotated 
attack trees are then used by the RIDS to assist with complex attack identification.  
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Figure 6.2: An attack tree example. 
 
6.1.1 Plan Recognition and Attack Trees 
Plan recognition, an Artificial Intelligence research area, is “the process of deducing 
an agent’s goals from observed actions” [93]. A hierarchical task network (HTN) is very 
similar to an attack tree. The use of attack trees for the ontology development is similar to 
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a plan recognition problem. Future work may entail the development of HTNs in place of 
the attack trees and the evaluation of utilizing the HTNs to develop the ontology.  
Geib [94] describes the complexity when a plan recognition system must consider 
multiple instances of the same goal. This is the case when describing complex attacks as 
there are many different methods an attack may utilize to launch a complex attack. Geib 
used the cyber security domain in his discussion of the complexity of a plan library 
consisting of multiple observations for the goal where the goal is a complex attack. 
According to Kichkaylo, et.al. [95], the assumptions of traditional plan recognition to 
the intrusion detection domain are not valid. Geib [94, 96] believes that it is valid but 
more complex. Beyond the complexity reason described above, another reason for this 
complexity is the fact that attackers attempt to hide their actions. Many attackers will 
attempt to remove all evidence of their attack by removing entries in log files pertaining 
to their attack steps. Kichkaylo, et.al. and Geib both developed approaches based on plan 
recognition to help in detecting intrusions.  
Detecting attacks after they occur is an important step in the security cycle; however, 
it would be optimal to predict an attack before it occurs. This is a very difficult endeavor 
as one cannot easily predict what an attacker may do in the future. Plan recognition may 
help with determining the path an attacker may take based on the current knowledge. 
Geib [96] outlines two problems that add to the complexity of using plan recognition in 
the intrusion detection domain. The first one is because attacks typically have multiple 
goals. The second problem is that many of the steps in a complex attack may also be a 
legitimate use of the network. For instance, many pings to nodes on one network is used 
by many attackers to find hosts that are active and open to an attack, but this may also be 
 119 
used by a network manager to help in diagnosing a network problem. Using probabilities 
can help alleviate these two problems.  
Geib introduced a plan recognition algorithm to help predict an attack by using 
probability. This algorithm assigns probabilities for each goal to determine the top-level 
goals of the attacker. The algorithm is based on Combinatory Categorial Grammars 
(CGGs), a grammar formalism used in Natural Language Parsing (NLP). It may be 
appropriate to consider applying these techniques to TRIDSO but first their applicability 
must be explored. We defer this to future research. 
 
6.2 Design of the Formal Representation 
Many of the RIDSs detect attacks against hosts. Many attackers will target network 
devices, such as routers. If an attacker can breach a router, they can often gain valuable 
information about other nodes on the network or impact the entire network (cause the 
entire network to not function properly). The developed RIDS detects attacks against any 
node on the network.  
Another characteristic of many of the RIDSs is that they detect attacks based on 
vulnerabilities. The RIDS will identify vulnerabilities against systems and evaluate the 
threats against these systems, based on the vulnerabilities and the current state of the 
system. For example, Undercoffer, et al [61, 62] developed a target-centric approach 
using ontology. In their work, the focus was on the target nodes and the state of the target 
nodes. This included the components of the nodes, such as the operating system, network 
layers, and processes running on the node. This requires monitoring of the nodes and 
their components. Mandujano, et al [63, 64] also monitored resources using agents 
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installed on the nodes. These agents collected data on the nodes, such as program 
profiles. The work by Martimiano and Moreira [54, 55] assumed that all security 
incidents exploit a vulnerability. Their work assumed that an attacker used a tool that 
manipulated a known vulnerability.  
The RIDS developed in this research does not focus on target nodes or vulnerabilities 
but will identify attacks based on network events. By examining network traffic, the 
RIDS can detect attacks regardless of existing vulnerabilities; it examines the traffic on 
the network and identifies events that may indicate attacks. It does not matter if there is a 
known vulnerability; if the traffic looks like a possible attack, it will be detected.  
Another advantage of using traffic to identify attacks is the ability to also identify 
attack attempts. An attempted attack may be just as important to a network manager as a 
successful attack. Consider the scenario where an IDS simply watches for attacks against 
the web port of web servers. If a user installs a new web server on the network, this 
server would be vulnerable to an attack since the IDS is not aware of this web server. It 
may also be the case that this new web server is susceptible to vulnerabilities because it is 
not patched correctly. By analyzing network traffic, the RIDS in this research detects an 
attack attempt against the web port on any device on the network, and can alert the 
network manager. This also allows the network manager to see what types of attacks are 
being attempted against their network so they can properly secure the network and its 
resources.   
Attacks and attack attempts are detected regardless of the state of the nodes on the 
network. Detections are performed based on observed traffic conditions and not the state 
of the nodes. Consequently, this RIDS does not require additional software to obtain 
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information about the nodes. There is no extra installation or overhead on the nodes to 
utilize this RIDS.   
Another advantage of using traffic to identify attacks is the ability to identify attacks 
against multiple hosts on the same network. Consider an attack attempting to find active 
hosts to attack. The first step for the attacker is to ping all hosts on the network by 
incrementally going through all IP addresses on the network. By examining all network 
traffic and not just traffic at specific hosts, all of the ping packets are observed. This 
results in an ping scan attack being detected.  
6.3 Development of the Formal Representation Using Ontology 
6.3.1 Traffic Representation 
The traffic ontology, see Fig. 6.3, represents the raw network traffic data in a variety 
of forms. All network traffic is first added to the knowledge base by creating instances 
for all packets captured. The instances are created based on the data found in the packet. 
For instance, if the packet represents a TCP packet, then a TCPPacket instance is created.  
The OWL code for the TCPPacket class is provided in Fig. 6.4. This only contains 
the properties specific to the TCPPacket; it will also inherit the properties from the 
L4Packet, IPPacket, L2Packet and Packet classes (the OWL code1 for all the classes is 
provided in Appendix B). 
 
                                                 
1 Available for download at http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/index.html 
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Figure 6.3: The traffic ontology [97]. 
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Figure 6.4: OWL code for TCPPacket in the traffic ontology. 
 
From these basic packet instances, other instances are created in the knowledge base 
through the use of inference, which is performed by a reasoner. Again, consider the 
TCPPacket example. As seen in Fig. 6.3, the TCPPacket class is a subclass of the 
L4Packet class. When a TCPPacket instances is created, the reasoner will use inference 
to create an instance in the L4Packet class because of the subclass relation. The reasoner 
will continue to traverse up the class tree, creating instances in the parent classes. In this 
example, for every instance created in the TCPPacket class, instances are also created in 
the following classes: L4Packet, IPPacket, L2Packet, and Packet.  
<owl:Class rdf:ID="TCPPacket"> 
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L4Packet"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#UDPPacket"/> 
</owl:Class> 
 
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpSeqNum"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
</owl:DatatypeProperty> 
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpAckNum"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
</owl:DatatypeProperty> 
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpFlags"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
</owl:DatatypeProperty> 
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpAckFlag"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
</owl:DatatypeProperty> 
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpRstFlag"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
</owl:DatatypeProperty> 
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpSynFlag"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
</owl:DatatypeProperty> 
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpFinFlag"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
</owl:DatatypeProperty> 
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpWinSize"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
</owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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Based on instance properties, ontology constructs, and inference rules, packet 
collection instances are created. These instances represent groups of similar packets. For 
example, a Mask packet is an ICMP packet requesting the netmask value of the queried 
node. This type of ICMP packet is identified by a type value of 17. It is used as an 
information-gathering step in some complex attacks. The specification of this packet type 
in OWL is accomplished by obtaining all ICMPPacket instances with a restriction on the 
value of the icmpType property. This is done by using the intersetionOf construct and a 
property restriction. The OWL code for a Mask packet is provided in Fig 6.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: OWL code for an ICMP netmask packet type. 
 
As another example of the packet collection, consider the Ping of Death attack. This 
attack sends a large-sized ping packet to a host causing a buffer overflow at that host (the 
target machine). This attack uses a ping packet, which is an ICMP packet with a type of 
8, with a packet length of 65535. OWL uses the intersectionOf construct with two 
property restrictions, one for the icmpType property and one for the packetLen property.  
The Stream hierarchy in the traffic ontology is used to maintain information about 
past and present streams in the network. Instances are created for connection-oriented 
 <owl:Class rdf:ID="MaskPacket"> 
<rdfs:comment> 
    MaskPacket are ICMPPackets with ICMPtype of 17 (netmask request) 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="#ICMPPacket"/> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#icmpType"/> 
   <owl:hasValue  rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">17</owl:hasValue> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
 </owl:intersectionOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
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protocol streams, such as TCP, and non-connection-oriented protocol streams, such as 
UDP and ARP. This information is important to maintain to assist with the detection of 
attacks that modify address information, such as spoofing attacks. 
When a host sends an ARP request and another host sends a response, considerable 
useful information is obtained. The source and destination MAC and IP addresses are 
learned. An instance in the IPStream class is created for this ARP communication 
containing the learned address information. If an attacker conducts an IP spoof against 
one of these hosts, the corresponding MAC address will differ from the one in the 
knowledge base. This leads to the detection of a possible IP spoof attack.  
The other part of the traffic ontology is the alerts generated by Snort. The raw 
network traffic is run through Snort and an alert output file is created consisting of the 
alerts generated by Snort. This leverages an existing IDS to identify some of the simple 
attacks. For each alert generated by Snort, an instance is added to the knowledge base. 
Fig. 6.6 illustrates the part of the traffic ontology used for alerts. These instances are used 
by the attack ontology to identify the occurrence of specific attack elements.  
6.3.2 Attack Representation 
The attack ontology is used to maintain information about simple attacks. The attack 
data is obtained by using inference through ontology constructs and rules. Based on 
traffic instances created by the traffic subsystem, instances are added to the knowledge 
base using the attack ontology.   
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Figure 6.6: The alert part of the traffic ontology. 
 
The primary class is the Attack class, which maintains much of the information about 
all types of attacks, such as the description of the attack, begin and end date and time, 
source IP address, and target IP address. There are four main classes of the Attack class. 
These classes are described in Table 6.1 and illustrated in Fig. 6.7.  
Table 6.1: Main Classes of the Attack ontology. 
 
 
 
 
Class Description 
Availabiltiy An attack that makes a node or network unavailable to 
 Recon At attack that gathers information 
GainAccess An attack that allows the attacker to gain access to a 
d  ViewChangeData An attack that allows the attacker to view or modify 
data on a node or in a packet 
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Figure 6.7: Main classes of the attack ontology. 
 
To illustrate how the attack ontology follows from these main classes, one branch of 
the ontology hierarchy is shown in Fig. 6.8. This figure shows the various classes in the 
Availability branch of the ontology. There are two primary techniques an attacker will use 
to make a node or network unavailable. These two ways are a denial of service or 
spoofing attack. Each of these corresponds to a subclass of the Availability class and has 
several subclasses of their own.  
One leaf node of the denial of service (DoS) hierarchy is PingFlood. This DoS attack 
uses many ping packets to flood a node or network consuming the resources and leaving 
no resources for other users. An instance of the PingFlood class, as well as the other 
flood nodes, is created from the PacketCollection instances in the traffic ontology. For 
each unique target IP address in the PacketCollection class, an instance is created in the 
PingFlood class, including the number of occurrences in the PacketCollection class for 
that target IP address. This frequency of occurrences is used when determining if an 
attack occurred. An attack occurs if the frequency is above a threshold value. For the 
purposes of this research, these values have been selected, rather than computed. 
Determination of the optimal threshold value will be addressed in future work.  
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Figure 6.8: The availability branch of the attack ontology [97]. 
 
The SimpleAttack class is used to identify all occurrences of simple attacks. It is used 
to easily relay this attack information to the network manager. The instances in this class 
are the union of all instances in the four main attack classes (Availability, Recon, 
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GainAccess, and ViewChangeData). The OWL code for collecting all SimpleAttack 
instances uses the unionOf construct and is shown in Fig. 6.9. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9: OWL code for the SimpleAttack class. 
 
6.3.3 Complex Attack Representation 
From the attack instances, complex attacks are identified. This is done by inferring 
the existence of attack elements for specific occurrences of complex attacks. The 
complex attack ontology, see Fig. 6.10, has instances created when the simple attack 
instances are created, and the ontology infers the parent instances in the complex attacks. 
When an instance is created in the root class of the complex attack ontology, it indicates 
that a complex attack occurred and the network manager is alerted.  
The complex attack ontology was designed from the generic attack trees. Consider 
the generic attack tree in Fig. 6.11 illustrating a hijacking attack. There are five child 
nodes of the root node in the attack tree. Each of these nodes corresponds to a child node 
of the Hijacking class in the complex attack ontology (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: Attack Tree Nodes Link to Complex Attack Ontology Classes. 
 
 
 
<owl:Class rdf:ID="SimpleAttack"> 
    <owl:unionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="#Availability"/> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="#Recon"/> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="#GainAccess"/> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="#ViewChangeData"/> 
    </owl:unionOf> 
</owl:Class> 
Attack tree node Corresponding ontology class 
8.1 Find the active hosts on the network PingScan 
8.2 Find open ports on a host NodeScan 
8.3 Find active TCP sessions TCPConnect 
8.4 Take one host of TCP session offline Availability 
8.5 Spoof a host in a TCP session Spoofing 
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Figure 6.10: Complex attack portion of the attack ontology. 
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Figure 6.11: An attack tree example. 
 
These children nodes are not part of the complex attack ontology; they represent 
simple attacks and are part of the simple attack ontology. It is important to note that a 
hijacking attack is actually conducted against two target hosts, the two hosts in an 
established TCP connection. First, the attack will identify an active host (ping scan), an 
active TCP connection on that host (node scan), and then predict the TCP sequence 
number for that TCP connection (TCP connect attack). The attacker then targets the other 
host in the TCP connection to make it unavailable to respond to requests from the first 
 132 
host (DoS attack) and spoof it’s IP address (spoofing attack). The complex intersection of 
these five classes indicates the occurrence of a complex hijacking attack. The OWL code 
for the Hijacking class is shown in Fig. 6.12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12: OWL code for the Hijacking class. 
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Hijacking"> 
  <rdfs:comment> 
 A complex Hijacking attack is a Ping scan, Node  
    scan, TCP Scan, Availability and Spoofing attack 
  </rdfs:comment> 
 
  <owl:equivalentClass> 
   <owl:Class> 
    <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="&traffic;NWaddressScanned"/> 
      <rdf:Description rdf:about="&traffic;IPaddress"/> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
    <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
     <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;NodeScan"/> 
      </owl:Restriction> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
    <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
     <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;TCPConnect"/> 
      </owl:Restriction> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&traffic;hasTCPStreamWith"/> 
 <owl:someValuesFrom> 
  <owl:Class> 
       <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
     <rdf:Description rdf:about="&traffic;IPaddress"/> 
         <owl:Restriction> 
          <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
           <owl:someValuesFrom  
   rdf:resource="&attack;Availability"/> 
         </owl:Restriction> 
     <owl:Restriction> 
          <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
           <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;Spoofing"/> 
         </owl:Restriction> 
       </owl:intersectionOf> 
      </owl:Class> 
     </owl:someValuesFrom> 
      </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
   </owl:Class> 
  </owl:equivalentClass> 
</owl:Class> 
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The code for the Hijacking class returns the instances for hosts with all of the 
following events: 
• Host A’ network was scanned 
• A node scan attack was performed against host A 
• A TCP connect attack was performed against host A 
• An availability attack was performed against the other host in the TCP 
connection, host B 
• A spoofing attack was performed against host B 
The OWL code will identify all instances that meet these criteria. This is done by using 
the intersectionOf all IPaddress instances that have their network scanned 
(NWaddressScanned), had a NodeScan against them, had a TCPConnect scan against 
them, and had a TCP connection with (hasTCPStreamWith) another host. This second 
host had two attacks against it, an Availability attack and a Spoofing attack. All IP 
addresses that meet these criteria are identified as a target of a hijacking attack in 
TRIDSO.  
This example will follow a complex attack through the entire ontology as an 
illustration of how all instances are created. The example is for a complex denial of 
service attack. The following are an example of the steps an attacker may take when 
conducting a complex denial of service attack: 
1. Scan all nodes on a network to see which nodes respond indicating they are 
active. 
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2. Scan all ports on an active node on the network to see which ports are active 
and listening for requests. 
3. Take a node off-line by sending many ping packets to it making it unavailable 
to users.  
The first step includes the attacker sending a ping packet to every IP address on a 
network. A response indicates the node is active. These packets are added to the traffic 
ontology as ICMPPacket instances since ping uses ICMP. From these instances, it is 
determined through a rule (rules are explained in chapter 7) that a PingScan occurred and 
an instance is added to the PingScan class in the attack ontology. A similar sequence 
happens for the NodeScan class for the second step. The third step results in the creation 
of a PingFlood instance.  
Inference, through taxonomic relationships, specifically subclass, causes an instance 
to occur in the following classes: Flood, Resources, DoS, and Availability. Now, there 
exist instances in the PingScan, NodeScan, and Availability classes in the attack 
ontology. Because of the definition of the DoSComplex class, shown in Fig. 6.13, an 
instance is created in that class, indicating that a complex denial of service attack 
occurred.  
A denial of service complex attack may only consist of the first and third steps above; 
it is possible to launch the availability attack against a node or the network without 
knowing all open ports on a node(s). In this case, the DoSComplex class only consists of 
the intersection of the PingScan and Availability instances. This OWL code is the same 
as in Fig. 6.13 except the restriction for the NodeScan is removed. The full DoSComplex 
class definition is then the union of these two class definitions.  
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Figure 6.13: OWL code for the DoSComplex class. 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
The formal representation presented in this chapter provides a high-level abstraction 
of the network activity. It bridges the gap between the raw data and how humans view 
sophisticated attacks. It eliminates the need to have specific patterns to match against to 
detect the occurrence of an attack.  
A RIDS can be used to identify complex attacks and attack attempts. The RIDS 
developed in this research (Traffic-based Reasoning Intrusion Detection System using 
Ontology, TRIDSO) bases the attack detection on all network traffic, not just certain 
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DoSComplex"> 
 
  <rdfs:comment> 
      A complex DoS attack is a Ping scan, Node scan, and  
Availability attack 
  </rdfs:comment> 
  <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#ComplexAttack"/> 
  
  <owl:equivalentClass> 
    <owl:Class> 
      <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
 <owl:Class rdf:about="&traffic;NWaddressScanned"/> 
       <rdf:Description rdf:about="&traffic;IPaddress"/> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
         <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;PingScan"/> 
       </owl:Restriction> 
       <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
         <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;NodeScan"/> 
       </owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
         <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;Availability"/> 
       </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
    </owl:Class> 
  </owl:equivalentClass> 
  
</owl:Class> 
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systems or known vulnerabilities. It will detect generic attacks and attack attempts, 
possibly even zero-day attacks, by analyzing specific attack elements and incorporating 
these elements into attack trees.  
This IDS, unlike its predecessors, uses ontological technology to reason about traffic 
and what specific packets may represent in the context of undesirable traffic. Some 
advanced ontology constructs, such as subclasses, unions, and intersections, allow 
inference within the ontology. The use of reasoning will allow TRIDSO to detect more 
attacks and attack attempts than traditional IDSs, as evidence by the evaluation of 
TRIDSO explained in the next chapter.  
Another advantage of TRIDSO is that the initial versions of the ontologies can be 
augmented over time due to the flexibility and portability of ontology. This may include 
the addition of new attack representations, allowing the detection of all attacks and attack 
attempts. Ultimately the TRIDSO ontology may be extended by many different network 
managers. 
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Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are utilized to detect attacks against host and 
networks. IDSs are one type of application that may benefit from the many advantages 
provided by ontology. Some of the advantages provided by ontology include inference, 
advanced semantic expressiveness, flexibility, and portability. While these advantages are 
beneficial to RIDSs, there exist some shortcomings of ontology. Some of the 
requirements of the RIDS developed in this research not supported by ontology are the 
ability to select instances based on ranges of values for a specified field, selecting 
instances that have a field that is optional, performing aggregate operations on values to 
obtain results, and selecting instances based on regular expression matching. Some of the 
useful aggregate operations are finding the minimum value from a set of instances, the 
maximum value from a set of instances, or counting the number of matching instances. 
To satisfy these requirements in the RIDS, SPARQL [17], a query language for use with 
ontology applications, is used.  
7.1 A Set of Heuristics for Complex Attack Identification 
A set of high-level conceptual heuristics is developed, using SPARQL, to process the 
declarative representation of captured network data to aid in detecting complex attacks 
and attack attempts. The set of heuristics is used to perform some advanced processing of 
the instances in the knowledge base to create additional instances. Specifically, SPARQL 
is used to create instances for packet collections, packet streams, and simple attacks. 
Instances are created in the knowledge base. 
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One advantage of SPARQL is its flexibility. The rules developed are generic, 
allowing for the identification of instances for general types of attacks and not 
occurrences of specific attacks.  
The set of rules developed are also extensible. The ontology definition contains much 
of the necessary information for the attacks. For this reason, it is not difficult to create a 
new rule for a newly identified type of attack. This allows other researchers to add to the 
set of rules allowing for the detection of additional attacks.  
SPARQL rules are used to create instances in the PacketCollection class. These 
instances are created for groups of instances in the traffic ontology. PacketCollection 
instances exist for various types of floods and scans. A flood is a group of packets that 
are generated in quantity to utilize a lot of resources. The most common type of flood is a 
ping flood, which is a large amount of ping packets sent to consume bandwidth. The ping 
packets may be sent to one specific host or multiple hosts in a network. Other types of 
floods are ICMP, TCP and application. These floods are similar to ping floods but use 
other packet types. The SPARQL rules for the prototype system are in Appendix C. 
Finding ping scans to multiple nodes on a network is fairly complex in SPARQL 
because it requires finding the network address corresponding to the IP address of each 
node. An IP address is split into two main parts, the network part and the host part. The 
parts vary in size (the number of bytes) depending on the class of the IP address. Table 
7.1 shows the number of bytes corresponding to the network and host part of the IP 
address for the three classes of IP addresses used for hosts in a network. The network 
address consists of the network number part of the IP address and zero for each host part 
of the IP address.   
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Table 7.1: Network Address Compilation. 
 
 
 
The rule to find ping scans to a class B network, shown in Fig. 7.1, must look for 
packets sent to the multiple IP addresses on the same network. This requires finding the 
network address for each IP address for all ping packets in the traffic ontology and then 
determining the number of pings sent to nodes on the same network. This requires more 
complex matching in the rule because it involves instances from multiple classes; the 
PingPacket class to find all ping packets and the IPaddress class to find the network 
address for each target IP address in Ping packets. The rule also requires the 
concatenation of fields to obtain the network IP address for the Ping packet.  
Scans gather information about the network or nodes on the network. The two 
common scans are ping scan and port scan. A ping scan is conducted to find nodes on the 
network that are active. It consists of sending a ping packet to each possible IP address to 
see which nodes respond, indicating an active node. After finding active nodes, it is 
common to run a port scan on each active node. A port scan is performed to find which 
services are active on a specific node. Now the attacker knows possible points of attack 
(open ports on active nodes are possible points of attack). Finding port scans to one node 
is fairly simple using SPARQL. The rule, shown in Fig. 7.2, looks for packets sent to 
multiple ports on the same IP address.  
 
 
Address Class Network Part Host Part 
A 1 byte 3 bytes 
B 2 bytes 2 bytes 
C 3 bytes 1 byte 
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Figure 7.1: A SPARQL rule to describe a class B network ping scan. 
 
PREFIX traffic: <traffic.owl#>  
PREFIX attack: <attack.owl#>  
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>  
INSERT  { 
         _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection;  
             attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime;  
             attack:endDate ?endDateTime;  
      attack:pcType traffic:PingScanType;  
attack:hasTargetIP ?nwadd;  
       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt .  
 }   WHERE { {  
         SELECT ?nwadd ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2  
                 (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime)  
                  (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime)  
                 (count(?nwadd) as ?cnt)  
         {  
           SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?ipadd1 ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2  
                           ?IPoctet3a ?IPoctet4a ?nwadd ?dateTime 
           {  
             ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:PingPacket;  
                      traffic:hasDestIP ?ipadd1;  
                      traffic:dateTime ?dateTime .  
             ?ipadd1  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress;  
                      traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1;  
                      traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2;  
                      traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3a;  
                      traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4a .  
             ?nwadd apf:concat (?IPoctet1 "." ?IPoctet2 ".0.0")  
            {  
              SELECT DISTINCT ?packet2 ?ipadd2 ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2  
                               ?IPoctet3b ?IPoctet4b ?nwadd2  
               {  
                 ?packet2 rdf:type traffic:PingPacket;  
                          traffic:hasDestIP ?ipadd2;  
                          traffic:dateTime ?dateTime2 .  
                 ?ipadd2  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress;  
                          traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1;  
                          traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2;  
                          traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3b;  
                          traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4b .  
                 ?nwadd2 apf:concat (?IPoctet1 "." ?IPoctet2 ".0.0")  
            }  }  
           FILTER ( ( ?packet1 != ?packet2 ) &&  
                    ( ?IPoctet1 >= 128 ) &&   
                    ( ?IPoctet1 <= 191 ) ) .  
         }   }  
         GROUP BY ?nwadd ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 
}  } 
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Figure 7.2: A SPARQL rule to describe a node port scan. 
 
TrafficStream instances are also created by using SPARQL rules. These instances are 
created containing information for source and destination nodes for all TCP, UDP, ICMP, 
layer 3, and ARP packets sent. This information is used to identify possible spoof attacks; 
attacks where a third node pretends to be one of the original nodes in the communication. 
PREFIX traffic: <traffic.owl#>  
PREFIX attack: <attack.owl#>  
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>  
INSERT  
{ 
       _:a  rdf:type  attack:PacketCollection;  
        attack:beginDate  ?beginDateTime;  
         attack:endDate  ?endDateTime;  
       attack:pcType traffic:PortScanType; 
 attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP;  
 attack:pcFrequency ?cnt .  
}   WHERE { {  
       SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?destIP  
                (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime)  
      (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime)  
                (count(?destIP) as ?cnt)  
         {  
             ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:L4Packet;  
                       traffic:dateTime ?dateTime;  
                       traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP;  
                    traffic:l4DestPort ?l4DestPort1 .  
            {  
               SELECT ?packet2 ?destIP ?l4DestPort2 ?dateTime2  
               {  
                 ?packet2  rdf:type traffic:L4Packet;  
                               traffic:dateTime ?dateTime2;  
                               traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP;  
                        traffic:l4DestPort ?l4DestPort2 .  
               }  
               GROUP BY ?destIP  
            }  
            FILTER ( ( ?packet1 != ?packet2) &&  
                      ( ?l4DestPort1 != ?l4DestPort2 ) ) .  
         }  
        GROUP BY ?destIP  
        HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0)  
}   } 
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The SPARQL rule for creating a TrafficStream instance for a TCP connection is shown in 
Fig. 7.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: A SPARQL rule to describe a TCPStream. 
 
SPARQL rules are also used to create instances for simple attacks. Snort identifies 
some simple attacks. The information about these attacks is useful and is utilized by this 
research. Recall that instances exist in the traffic ontology for all Snort alerts generated. 
These instances are matched against regular expressions using SPARQL rules to find 
occurrences of specific simple attacks. For example, a SPARQL rule is used to find all 
PREFIX traffic: <traffic.owl#>  
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>  
INSERT  
 {  
   ?stream rdf:type traffic:TCPStream;  
                 traffic:protocol \"TCP\";  
                 traffic:startTime ?dateTime;  
                 traffic:endTime ?dateTime;  
                 traffic:hasNode1MAC ?srcMAC;  
                 traffic:hasNode2MAC ?destMAC;  
                 traffic:hasNode1IP ?srcIP;  
                 traffic:hasNode2IP ?destIP;  
                 traffic:node1Port ?l4SrcPort;  
                 traffic:node2Port ?l4DestPort .  
}  
WHERE  { {  
      SELECT DISTINCT ?packet ?dateTime ?srcMAC ?destMAC  
                    ?srcIP ?destIP ?l4SrcPort ?l4DestPort  
         {  
             ?packet rdf:type traffic:TCPPacket;  
                      traffic:dateTime ?dateTime;  
                   traffic:hasSrcMAC ?srcMAC;  
                  traffic:hasDestMAC ?destMAC;  
                  traffic:hasSrcIP ?srcIP;  
                   traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP;  
                   traffic:l4SrcPort ?l4SrcPort;  
                     traffic:l4DestPort ?l4DestPort .  
       }   }  
      LET (?stream := ?packet) .  
} 
 143 
attacks where an attacker gained root access on a node. The code for this SPARQL rule is 
shown in Fig. 7.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: A SPARQL rule to describe a simple attack for gaining root access. 
 
Instances for other simple attacks are also created using SPARQL rules. These 
instances include Land attacks, which are identified by the source IP address and port 
number being the same as the destination IP address and port number in a packet. 
Another rule exists to find possible ARP spoofs. This spoof occurs when an attacker 
modifies the MAC address of their host to match the MAC address of a target host. This 
type of attack is identified by a packet with an IP address associated with a different 
MAC address than previously observed.  
PREFIX traffic: <traffic.owl#>  
PREFIX attack: <attack.owl#>  
INSERT  
{  
         ?attack rdf:type attack: “AdminPG ";  
                      attack:attBeginDate ?aDateTime;  
                      attack:attEndDate ?aDateTime;  
                      attack:description ?aDesc;  
                      attack:targetAddress ?aDestIP .  
}  
WHERE  { {  
       SELECT ?alert ?aDateTime ?aDesc ?aDestIP  
         {  
             ?alert rdf:type traffic:Alert;  
                       traffic:aDateTime ?aDateTime;  
                       traffic:aDescription ?aDesc;  
                       traffic:aClassification ?aClassification .  
           OPTIONAL { ?alert traffic:aDestIP ?aDestIP . } .  
           FILTER REGEX(?aClassification, "Administrator Privilege Gain", "i") .  
       }     }  
      LET (?attack := ?alert) .  
} 
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7.2 Development of a Prototype System 
A prototype system was developed [97] to show the feasibility of using the ontology 
and set of heuristics for detecting attacks. The prototype system developed is the Traffic-
based Reasoning Intrusion Detection System with Ontology (TRIDSO).  TRIDSO (see 
Fig. 7.5) consists of a variety of subsystems: traffic, attack, vulnerability, and device. 
Each subsystem consists of a variety of components, including an ontology definition 
file. TRIDSO provides data-driven reasoning; the reasoning and decisions are based on 
traffic data.  
 
 
Figure 7.5: TRIDSO architecture [97]. 
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TRIDSO was developed using Java and Jena [18], a framework for ontology 
applications. Jena was chosen primarily because it provides a leading implementation of 
SPARQL. This implementation includes support for SPARQL extensions, such as 
INSERT and count, which are necessary in the set of heuristics developed.  
The traffic subsystem deals with raw network traffic data. Wireshark [98, 99] is used 
to capture all network traffic. A program converts this data to ontology instances in the 
traffic ontology. This conversion program reads through a tcpdump-formatted capture 
file. For each packet found, the type of packet is determined, such as TCP, UDP, IP or 
ARP, and the required data for that packet type is extracted. An instance is then created 
for each packet in the appropriate class. A sampling of the relationships between packet 
data and ontology properties is provided in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Relationship Between Packet Data and Ontology Property.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instances are added to the knowledge base using the createIndividual function in the 
Jena library. The function used to add the properties for each instance depends on the 
property type. For datatype properties, two functions are used. To create an OWL literal 
Packet Type Packet Data Ontology Class Ontology Property 
Any Date and time Packet dateTime 
ARP Source MAC address L2Packet hasSrcMAC 
ARP Destination MAC address L2Packet hasDestMAC 
IP Source IP address IPPacket hasSrcIP 
IP Destination IP address IPPacket hasDestIP 
IP IP version IPPacket ver 
IP Packet length IPPacket packetLen 
IP Time to Live (TTL) IPPacket ttl 
IP Checksum IPPacket ipChecksum 
TCP / UDP Source port number L4Packet l4SrcPort 
TCP / UDP Destination port number L4Packet l4DestPort 
TCP Sequence number TCPPacket tcpSeqNum 
TCP Acknowledgement number TCPPacket tcpAckNum 
TCP Flags TCPPacket tcpFlags 
ICMP ICMP type ICMPPacket icmpType 
ICMP ICMP code ICMPPacket icmpCode 
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value, createTypedLiteral is used and then the literal is added as the property value using 
createLiteralStatement. If the property is an object property, the object that is the value of 
the property must already exist in the knowledge base. If it does not, it is added as an 
instance. To create the actual statement relating the subject to the object for the object 
property, the function createStatement is used.  
Data is also added to the knowledge base for alerts identified by Snort. Prior to 
running the RIDS, the tcpdump-formatted capture file is run through Snort, which 
generates an alert file. The alerts in the alert file are read by the RIDS, which creates 
appropriate instances in the alert classes. Table 7.3 lists some of the alert information 
from the alert file and their relationships with the ontology properties.  
Table 7.3: Alert Information’s Relationship with Ontology Property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Raw network data is captured using Wireshark. Snort is run on the raw data to 
produce an alert file. The Wireshark capture file and alert file are processed by 
conversion programs and instances are added to the knowledge base. This flow of data 
for the traffic subsystem is illustrated in Fig. 7.6. 
Alert Type Alert Information Ontology Class Ontology Property 
Any Date and time Alert aDateTime 
Any Identification Alert aID 
Any Description Alert aDescription 
IP Source IP address IPAlert hasAlertSrcIP 
 IP Destination IP address IPAlert hasAlertDestIP 
 IP Header length IPAlert aIPHdrLen 
IP Packet length IPAlert aIPDgramLen 
TCP / UDP Source port number L4Alert aL4SrcPort 
TCP / UDP Destination port number L4Alert aL4DestPort 
TCP Sequence number TCPPacket aTCPSeqNum 
TCP Acknowledgement number TCPPacket aTCPAckNum 
TCP Flags TCPPacket aTCPFlags 
ICMP ICMP type ICMPAlert aICMPType 
ICMP ICMP code ICMPAlert aICMPCode 
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Figure 7.6: The data flow of the traffic subsystem. 
 
The attack subsystem consists of an ontology that will hold attack data. There are 
actually two ontology definition files in the attack subsystem, the attack ontology and the 
complex attack ontology. Two files are used to simplify the maintenance of the ontology 
files. The attack ontology contains class definitions for all simple attacks. Complex attack 
classes are defined in the complex attack ontology.  
The attack instances are created in a variety of methods. Some are added using 
SPARQL from traffic ontology instances. For example, scan and flood attack instances 
are created using SPARQL queries based on PacketCollection instances.  
Some simple attacks are detected by Snort. Some of these are added as simple attacks 
in the knowledge base. Attacks detected by Snort that are to be added to the knowledge 
base are identified using regular expression matches in various alert instance properties. 
For instance, some Snort alerts indicate a malicious code type of attack. These are 
identified by finding alert instances with the following strings in the classification 
property (these are just some examples, there are more strings identifying a malicious 
code attack): Decode of an RPC Query, Executable Code was Detected, A Suspicious 
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String was Detected, Access to a Potentially Vulnerable Web Application, and A System 
Call was Detected.   
The vulnerability subsystem manages the existing vulnerabilities. The ontology in 
this subsystem contains data about vulnerabilities. The development of this subsystem 
has not been completed and is left as future work. The data will be loaded into the 
ontology from existing sources, such as NIST’s NVD, OVAL [65], or Snort rules. There 
is reason to believe that the NVD data can be obtained from OVM (Ontology for 
Vulnerability Management) [100], which is existing research that loads NVD data to an 
ontology. To determine vulnerabilities of hosts, a vulnerability scanner, such as nessus 
[101] or SSA Security System Analyzer [102], may be used.  
The device subsystem consists of the device ontology and a program to convert 
device data to ontology instances. The ontology contains classes representing the devices 
in the network and their characteristics. This data is retrieved from the devices using a 
standard management protocol, such as SNMP. After the device information is retrieved, 
instances are added to the knowledge base using the devices ontology. Initially, the 
devices are routers and switches. The device ontology has been developed for the 
HMNMS discussed in chapter 4. Future work will include incorporating this ontology 
into the device subsystem of TRIDSO.  
7.2.1 Implementation Decisions 
The design and development of TRIDSO included some implementation decisions. 
Decisions had to be made between datatype vs. object properties in OWL, using OWL vs. 
SPARQL, and using various SPARQL statements. For two of the implementation 
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decisions, two different implementations were completed in the existing version of 
TRIDSO and trials were conducted against a test data file. 
The first implementation decision was how to represent the nodes’ addresses, both 
MAC and IP, in the ontology. Two options were considered, using a datatype property or 
an object property for the addresses. As seen from the results in Table 7.4, the 
implementation using the datatype property runs faster than the implementation using the 
object property; however, there are other advantages to using the object property. The 
primary advantage is the inference available when using the object property. Object 
properties can have inverse properties defined. This switches the subject and object in the 
triples. For example, if an attack is executed against a specified IP address, then that 
address is the object for the hasTargetIP property. The wasAttacked property is declared 
to be the inverseOf the hasTargetIP property. The IP address is now the subject and the 
attack element is the object of that property. This allows the ontology reason to 
automatically add instances to the knowledge base. This is beneficial when identifying 
complex attacks. For example, a DoSComplex attack can be identified by finding each IP 
address that was attacked using a PingScan, a NodeScan, and an Availability attack using 
OWL constructs as shown in Fig. 7.7. When specifying the addresses as a datatype 
property, these inference capabilities could not be leveraged making complex attack 
detection much more difficult. Both implementations identified the same complex attacks 
in the example data file used in the trial runs; however, the use of object properties 
required no additional queries or programming as the complex attacks were all identified 
using OWL constructs. 
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Table 7.4: Results of Trial Runs for Address Property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7: OWL code for the DoSComplex class. 
Task Time (ms) for Addresses as Datatype Property 
Time (ms) for Addresses as 
Object Property 
Create ontology model 1,387.9995 1,507.6309 
Read ontology definition 
files into knowledge base 1,398.9981 1,496.5411 
Add address instances to 
knowledge base N/A 33.0590 
Add packet instances to 
knowledge base 12,130.2060 6,869.0530 
Add alert instances to 
knowledge base 1,644.6810 1,239.9490 
Add stream instances to 
knowledge base 58,570.1117 68,098.7770 
Add PacketCollection 
instances to knowledge 
 
33,367.9724 38,456.5279 
 
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DoSComplex"> 
<rdfs:comment> 
   A complex DoS attack is a Ping scan, Node scan, and  
Availability attack 
</rdfs:comment> 
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#ComplexAttack"/> 
  
<owl:equivalentClass> 
  <owl:Class> 
    <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="&traffic;NWaddressScanned"/> 
      <rdf:Description rdf:about="&traffic;IPaddress"/> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
         <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;PingScan"/> 
       </owl:Restriction> 
       <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
         <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;NodeScan"/> 
       </owl:Restriction> 
         <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
         <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;Availability"/> 
       </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
</owl:equivalentClass> 
 
</owl:Class> 
 151 
The second implementation decision was compared when inserting instances in the 
knowledge base for the PacketCollections class. These instances represented groupings 
of similar packets for the detection of simple attack elements, such as flood and scan 
attacks. The two options implemented and tested were to use multiple SPARQL queries 
or one SPARQL query. The multiple SPARQL queries option used one SPARQL query 
to select all the matching instances. The results of this query were then processed 
programmatically and a SPARQL INSERT statement was constructed and executed. The 
one SPARQL query option used a single SPARQL query consisting of a combination of 
the SELECT and INSERT statements. An example of this query is shown in Fig. 7.8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8: A SPARQL query to describe a PingFlood. 
 
PREFIX traffic: <traffic.owl#>  
PREFIX attack: <attack.owl#>  
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>  
INSERT  
{ 
   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection;  
         attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime;  
         attack:endDate ?endDateTime;  
         attack:pcType traffic:PingFloodType; 
         attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP;  
         attack:pcFrequency ?cnt .  
}  
WHERE { {  
   SELECT  ?destIP   (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime)  
                   (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime)  
                   (count(?destIP) as ?cnt)  
        WHERE {?pack rdf:type traffic:PingPacket;  
                     traffic:dateTime ?dateTime;  
                     traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP .  
        }  
        GROUP BY ?destIP   
        HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0)  
 }  
} 
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Both implementations were run using a sample data file. Each run resulted in the 
same instances created in the knowledge base. The results of the trial runs are shown in 
Table 7.5. For the majority of the types of PacketCollection instances added to the 
knowledge base, the time to execute the single SPARQL query was less than the time to 
execute two SPARQL queries. The other advantage of the single SPARQL query is the 
simplicy of the program. The single SPARQL query is a more complex query to write, 
but it does not require any programming to process the results from the first query and 
create the INSERT query based on these results, eliminating 115 lines of source code.  
Table 7.5: Results of Trial Runs for PacketCollection Instances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3 Evaluation Methods of the Prototype System 
According to Obrst, et al [103], there are many different criteria that can be used to 
evaluate an ontology. These criteria consist of: 
• The ontology’s coverage of a particular domain 
  Time (ms) for two SPARQL queries 
PacketCollection 
instances added to 
knowledge base  
Time (ms) for 
one SPARQL 
query 
Execute 
SELECT query 
Process 
results from 
SELECT 
query 
Execute 
INSERT 
query 
Total 
Ping floods using 
Ping packets 47.5119 50.0340 2.1898 8.9969 61.2207 
Application floods 2,258.1398 1,419.3626 0.0661 6.0932 1,425.5219 
Port scan using 
SYN packets 37,327.6293 39,689.5169 0.1443 11.7530 39,701.4142 
Port scan using 
FIN packets 49,279.4709 64,990.9385 0.0330 5.7664 64,996.7379 
Port scans using 
Null packets 2.8246 2.4052 0.0321 5.7543 8.1916 
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• The ontology’s ability to address specific use cases, scenarios, requirements, 
applications and data sources 
• The ontology’s formal properties, such as consistency and completeness 
• The ontology’s ability to answer questions, such as “What kinds of reasoning 
methods can be invoked in the ontology?” 
The ontology in the security aspect of this research uses the second criterion: 
evaluating how well the ontology represents the domain knowledge in specific use cases. 
This task-based approach is used because it verifies that the ontology represents the 
domain knowledge concepts and is able to accurately answer queries posed by a domain 
expert in an application.  
The main goal of the validation process is to show that the formal representation can 
be used to detect complex attacks. The primary method for the evaluation of this criterion 
is to compare the results of TRIDSO with a current state-of-the-art IDS. Snort was 
chosen as the system to use for comparison purposes because it is a current state-of-the-
art IDS used by many network managers in today’s networks. Another reason that Snort 
was chosen is because it is the system used by many researchers either as components in 
their IDS or as a comparative system. The evaluation process used is to run Snort and 
TRIDSO using the same set of capture files. The attacks detected by each IDS are 
compared and differences noted. 
The Snort configuration used for comparison with TRIDSO is the basic Snort 
configuration. No special rules were written or installed. Snort generates alerts for many 
common simple attacks, such as pings and backdoor attempts. The additional 
configurations added to the Snort installation are the enabling of the TCP/IP checksum 
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mode and the portscan preprocessor. Enabling the TCP /IP checksum mode tells Snort to 
perform checksum verification for TCP and IP. The portscan preprocessor will generate 
an alert if a host not in the “home network” (this is a variable that must be configured) 
initiates more than four port connections within three seconds. This may indicate a 
possible port scan attack.  
Another important criterion in an IDS is its response time. For this reason, the 
response times, both load and query, for TRIDSO are evaluated. The response times used 
in the evaluation of TRIDSO are: 
1. The time to load the ontology definition files 
2. The time to load the raw data instances from the capture file 
3. The time to execute a rule 
4. The time from the start of TRIDSO until complex attack detection 
The last criterion used for evaluating response times is essentially the run-time of 
TRIDSO against a specific data set (capture file). This is because TRIDSO will load all 
raw data from the capture file, load other instance via inference and queries, and then 
identify all complex attacks found in the knowledge base for this data set.     
The last evaluation conducted for TRIDSO is its scalability. The amount of network 
traffic is continually growing. It is important for TRIDSO to run effectively for any size 
data set. The time to process files of varying size is evaluated.  
 155 
7.4 Evaluation Results of the Prototype System 
7.4.1 Use Case Scenarios 
Many different types of attacks were analyzed and tested with Snort and TRIDSO. 
Snort will identify many of the same simple attacks as TRIDSO, but Snort did not detect 
any of the complex attacks. Simple attacks make up the steps in a complex attack, so 
Snort identified some of the steps of the complex attacks, but was never able to generate 
an alert for a complex attack. TRIDSO was able to detect all of the complex attacks 
launched in the trial runs.  
7.4.1.1 Complex Denial of Service Attack 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack involves an attacker consuming resources on a host 
or network, thus denying legitimate users access to necessary services. Typically the 
attacker will identify specific hosts or networks to use as a target of the DoS attack by 
conducting a ping scan. This combination of a ping scan and DoS attack is categorized as 
a complex DoS attack. Some complex DoS attacks will also include a step where the 
attacker will identify a specific port to use in the DoS attack by searching all ports on a 
found host (a node scan).  
The complex DoS attack was simulated with two steps, a ping scan and a simple DoS 
attack. The ping was performed using nmap [89], a security tool often used to launch 
attacks. The simple DoS attack was accomplished by sending thirty ping packets to a 
specific host that was found in the ping scan. The packets for this attack were captured 
using tcpdump [104].  
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The capture file is processed by Snort. This produces an alert file containing alerts for 
all packets that matched Snort rules. For the complex DoS attack, Snort generated eight 
alerts, two each of the following: 
• ICMP PING to the target machine 
• ICMP PING NMAP to the target machine 
• ICMP Timestamp Requst to the target machine 
• ICMP Echo Reply from the target machine 
Two ping alerts would not be enough to trigger an alarm to the network manager 
indicating further analysis is necessary. 
TRIDSO has a rule defined in OWL to detect a complex DoS attack. The rule finds 
all instances of IP addresses that had a ping scan performed against its network and was 
attacked with an Availability attack (a simple DoS attack). When run with the data from 
the complex DoS attack conducted, a complex DoS attack against the target host was 
identified by TRIDSO.  
7.4.1.2 The Mitnick Type Attack 
A classic complex attack, used by many computer security researchers, is the Mitnick 
attack. This is a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) or hijacking attack first performed by 
Kevin Mitnick. The steps in the Mitnick attack are: 
1. Find active hosts to idenfity a target machine (ping scan) 
2. Find active ports on the active hosts to identify TCP connections (node scan) 
3. Predict the TCP sequence number for the identified TCP connection (TCP 
connect) 
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4. Take one host in the TCP connection offline using a DoS attack, typically a 
Flood attack (DoS) 
5. Insert the source machine into the TCP connection by spoofing the host that 
was taken offline in step 4 (Spoof) 
To test a Mitnick attack, an attacker machine, host C, was used to hijack a TCP 
connection between two other hosts, host A and host B. The specific steps used in this 
test Mitnick attack are (shown in Fig. 7.9): 
1. Ping scan: scan the target network using nmap to identify an active host (host 
A) 
2. Node scan: perform a SYN node scan against an active host (host A), using 
nmap 
3. TCP connect: perform a TCP connect scan against the target host (host A) 
using nmap 
4. Availability: perform a DoS attack against the other host in the TCP 
connection (host B) to prevent it from responding to host A 
5. MITM: perform a MITM attack using ettercap [105] to become the new 
trusted host to host A in place of host B 
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Figure 7.9: The steps in the test Mitnick attack. 
 
When Snort processed that data capture file for the Mitnick attack, five alerts were 
generated. The alerts included three unique alerts with two of the alerts repeated for two 
different hosts, the two hosts in the TCP connection. The alerts generated are: 
• TCP Portscan against host A 
• ICMP PING against host A and host B 
• ICMP PING NMAP against host A and host B 
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The data was also run through TRIDSO. The OWL rule used to detect a MITM or 
hijacking attack in TRIDSO finds instances for hosts with all of the following events: 
• Host A’s network was scanned 
• A node scan attack was performed against host A 
• A TCP connect attack was performed against host A 
• An availability attack was performed against the other host in the TCP 
connection, host B 
• A spoofing attack was performed against host B 
Using this rule, TRIDSO detected the target host of the MITM attack.  
In the trial hijacking attack, which was a Mitnick type attack, Snort detected several 
simple attacks but did not detect any complex attacks. TRIDSO was able to detect a 
hijacking attack against the target host used in the test Mitnick attack. A query response 
was generated telling the network manager the IP address of the target host.  
7.4.2 Response Time 
TRIDSO was run with for many different capture files, simulating a variety of 
attacks, both simple and complex. The response times for these capture files was 
analyzed. The response times analyzed are: 
• Time to load the ontology definition files into the knowledge base 
• Time to load the raw data instances into the knowledge base 
• Time to execute a SPARQL query to insert additional instances into the 
knowledge base from existing instances  
• Time to execute a query against the knowledge base to retrieve instances 
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• Time from the start of TRIDSO until complex attacks are detected (run time) 
For the query times, sample queries were used for analysis.  
Several of the capture files were selected for evaluation purposes. These include a 
sampling of both simple and complex attacks. The capture files selected included the 
following types of attacks: 
• A ping scan 
• A port scan 
• A complex Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
• A complex hijacking attack 
The load times for these data sets are shown in Table 7.6. The durations to load the 
ontology definition files are reasonably constant. This is to be expected since the 
ontology definition files are static for all runs of the system.  
The time performance to load the raw data instances into the knowledge base varied 
for each data set. Typically, as the number of raw instances (packets and alerts) increases, 
the time to load the raw instances also increases. There will be some fluctuation in this 
load time due to the variation in packet types in the raw data and the association class 
definitions.   
Table 7.6: Load Time Performance for Trial Data Sets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Input (numbers) Load Time (ms) 
Data Set Packets Alerts Ontology Definition Files Raw Data Instances 
Ping scan 12 4 503.907 27.652 
Port scan 100 0 429.295 3151.427 
Complex DoS 314 8 417.031 674.658 
Hijacking 550 164 438.941 18,696.442 
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Table 7.7 shows the response time performance for alert instances for the sample data 
files. These results clearly show that the time to add instances to the knowledge base is 
directly related to the number of alerts in the raw data set. As the number of alerts 
increases, the time to add the alert instances to the database increases.  
Table 7.7: Alert Query Response Time Performance for Trial Data Sets. 
 
 
 
 
 
The response time data for the query to add PacketCollection instances to the 
knowledge base for the sample data files are shown in Table 7.8. Adding these instances 
involves selecting instances from a variety of classes based on the instances matching 
specified criteria and then inserting the appropriate instance to the PacketCollection class. 
The time to add the PacketCollection instances increases as the number of instances 
involved in the query increases.  
Table 7.8: Query Response Time Performance for Trial Data Sets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Response Time (ms) 
Data Set Number of instances in SELECT clause 
Number of instances 
inserted 
Query Time to Add 
Instances 
Ping scan 35 6 2,542,030.124 
Port scan 344 5 3,230,520.202 
Complex DoS 1124 13 10,815,152.304 
Hijacking 1902 51 8,771,351.157 
 
 Response Time (ms) 
Data Set Number of Alerts Query Time to Add Alert Instances 
Query Time to Add Alert-
related Attack Instances 
Port scan 0 0 66.91 
Ping scan 4 27.652 103.74 
Complex DoS 8 674.658 1,687.90 
Hijacking 164 18,696.440 63,450.320 
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The total detection time, which is the time from the start of TRIDSO to the time it 
takes to detect all complex attacks in the data set, is shown in Fig. 7.10. As the size of 
knowledge base, which is the number of raw and total instances, increases, the time it 
takes to detect complex attacks also increases. The response time data indicates that 
TRIDSO is not able to detect complex attacks in real-time, which is discussed in the next 
section and future work. 
 
 
Figure 7.10: The time performance of complex attack detection by TRIDSO. 
 
7.4.3 Scalability 
The total run time data of TRIDSO against a variety of data file inputs are shown in 
Fig. 7.11. This evaluation highlights one limitation with TRIDSO; the scalability of the 
system. TRIDSO utilizes Jena, which is not a scalable environment; it is acceptable for 
use in the proof-of-concept system but a full implementation of TRIDSO would require a 
different environment.  
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
16 raw,
455 total,
3275 triples
100 raw,
1448 total,
6587 triples
322 raw,
3999 total,
13894 triples
714 raw,
7322 total,
25291 triples
M
in
ut
es
 
Number of Knowledge Base Instances 
 163 
 
 
Figure 7.11: The run time performance of TRIDSO. 
 
The scalability issue in TRIDSO prevents it from detecting attacks in real-time; 
however, it can still be beneficial. Detecting attacks, even if it is post-occurrence, is 
beneficial to the security of a network because there can be many lessons learned post-
attack. The most beneficial lesson learned is the current vulnerabilities of the network and 
its nodes. When TRIDSO detects an attack, it informs the network manager how 
attackers are attempting to attack the network. Even if an attack is successful and 
undetected in real-time, the network manager will now know how the attack occurred so 
future occurrences can be prevented.  
Snort also experiences scalability issues. The number of rules in Snort has been 
growing exponentially in the last few years, according to statistics gathered (see Fig. 
7.12). This leads to more complexity in the management of Snort. The large rule set also 
leads to a larger run time. The way Snort continues to detect in real-time with the large 
rule set is to skip packets when the Snort processor cannot keep pace with the incoming 
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packets. This will lead to a higher rate of false negatives, which means that attacks may 
go undetected by Snort.   
 
Figure 7.12: The growth trend of the number of rules in Snort [51]. 
 
It is important to analyze the time performance for each aspect of the prototype 
system to determine what aspect of the system is contributing most to the large response 
delays. The tasks in TRIDSO contributing the most time toward the overall run time are 
adding the instances for traffic streams and packet collections. Table 7.9 shows the 
individual response delays for the primary aspects of the system, including all the aspects 
contributing the most to the total run time. The initialization of the knowledge base 
includes the loading of the ontology definition files and the raw data instances. These 
aspects of the system are processed programmatically using the Jena API. The remaining 
response delays, which contribute the most time to the overall run time, are for the 
aspects of the system that include the SPARQL queries. These delays represent the 
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addition of many of the simple attack instances to the database, including the packet 
streams, packet collections, and miscellaneous simple attacks.  
Table 7.9: Time Performance for Trial Data Sets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen from Table 7.9, the majority of the overall run time is contributed to the 
execution of the SPARQL queries, specifically the queries to add the packet streams and 
packet collections. For each of these tasks, there are multiple complex queries with each 
query often involving multiple select statements nested within an insert statement. For 
instance, there are five SPARQL queries to add the packet streams, sixteen to add the 
packet collections, and four to add the miscellaneous simple attacks. The time to create 
the instances for complex attacks is not shown in the table because these instances are 
created using OWL code and incur very minimal overhead.  
The system developed, TRIDSO, is a prototype system to test the feasibility of 
utilizing the developed formal representation in detecting complex attacks. TRIDSO was 
developed as a quick-and-dirty prototype system; no optimization techniques were 
included in the system. Optimizing aspects of the system will decrease the run-time and 
help with the scalability problem. For instance, one major contributor to the run-time is 
the addition of the instances to the Streams classes. This is done using numerous 
 Response Time (minutes) 
Data Set 
Load 
ontology 
definition 
files 
Load raw 
data 
instances 
Add the 
packet 
streams 
Add packet 
collections 
Add simple 
attacks 
Ping scan 0.464 0.0005 21.105 8.770 4.055 
Port scan 0.479 0.0572 82.676 167.513 3.308 
Complex DoS 0.456 0.0100 120.444 68.877 7.242 
Hijacking 0.468 0.3161 374.650 224.325 23.201 
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SPARQL queries. Many of these queries can be run in parallel on multiple processors. 
Adding multi-processing functionality, specifically to the execution of the SPARQL 
queries, will decrease the overall run-time and alleviate some of the scalability problem.  
Another optimization that can be added to TRIDSO is the rule engine used for the 
model. The ontology API in Jena is used, which uses an ontology model. The specific 
ontology  model used by TRIDSO is the OWL_MEM_RULE_INF model. This specific 
ontology model supports the OWL Full language and stores the model in memory. The 
reasoner used by this model is a rule-based reasoner with OWL rules. By using a reasoner 
in Jena, the triples that are asserted by the inference algorithm are added to the model, 
thus becoming part of the knowledge base. This will increase the overall run-time of 
TRIDSO because there will be more triples in the knowledge base, requiring additional 
processing by any query.  
The reasoner used by the model in TRIDSO is an OWL rule reasoner. This reasoner 
is not well suited for large ontologies, but it supports the contructs available in OWL 
Full, such as the Boolean constructions (unionOf, intersectionOf), someValuesFrom and 
the cardinality restrictions. It was selected for use in the prototype system to allow 
experimentation with various OWL Full constructs during the development of the formal 
representation. The use of this reasone leads to poor performance: “the rules 
implementing the OWL constructs can interact in complex ways leading to serious 
performance overheads for complex ontologies” [106]. To utilize TRIDSO in a 
production environment a different reasoner needs to be selected and implemented in 
TRIDSO, which would lead to an improvement in the performance.  
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The OWL rule reasoner used in TRIDSO supports a hybrid approach, using both 
forward and backward chaining, to support inference. Forward chaining is used on the 
raw instances in the knowledge base to infer additional triples. Backward chaining is 
invoked to answer queries, which may be invoked by backward rules or when the 
forward chaining engine asserts new backward rules. Utilization of a different reasoner 
may lead to performance improvements. Analysis must be completed to determine the 
appropriate reasoner for an implementation of the formal representation in a production 
system. Additional options for addressing the scalability problem are discussed in the 
section 8.2.2 (Future Works for Representation of Complex Attacks).  
7.5 Chapter Summary 
A prototype system, TRIDSO, was developed to test the formal representation 
designed for detecting complex attacks. TRIDSO used a set of SPARQL rules to 
incorporate additional functionality not achievable with OWL. These rules were used to 
add instances to the knowledge base based on existing instances, such as packet 
collections (scans, floods, etc.) and attacks based on the Snort-generated alerts.  
TRIDSO was run with a variety of sample attacks, both simple and complex. The 
output was compared with Snort, a state-of-the-art IDS used by many security 
administrators and researchers. While Snort was able to detect some of the simple 
attacks, TRIDSO was able to detect more simple attacks. TRIDSO was also able to detect 
all the complex attacks in the data sets, while Snort was not able to detect any of the 
complex attacks.  
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Response delays of the sample runs in TRIDSO were analyzed. As the number of 
knowledge base instances and the data set size increases, the response delays increase. 
These delays underline the fact that the current implementation of TRIDSO is not 
scalable to a real-time detection environment. Additional research and further 
development of TRIDSO is required to determine if TRIDSO could be adapted for real-
time intrusion detections. Even if that is not possible, the use of TRIDSO is a valuable 
asset to a network manager. It allows the network manager to understand weaknesses in 
the network and take corrective action to prevent future attacks.   
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 Conclusions and Future Work Chapter 8
 
 
Networks and the services they provide have become a ubiquitous part of computing 
for virtually any computer users. Users have the expectation that the network will be 
available around the clock. As shown in previous discussions, network management 
today is a significant challenge. This challenge includes availability, network 
management, and security.  
One challenge facing network management is the large variety of components on 
networks. These components may be on different tiers of the network (wired, ad hoc, 
WSN) and from different manufacturers (Cisco, Nortel, etc.). This characteristic of 
Heterogeneous Multi-tier Networks makes network management an arduous task.  
Any network threat represents the possibility that network availability becomes 
compromised. Identifying attacks against the network is a challenge facing network 
managers. The users’ expectations of the always-available network and the organization’s 
expectation of securing its data make security a high-priority task. If a device is attacked, 
it may become unavailable to the users or have data compromised. When the victim 
device is a network device, the consequences are compounded as this affects many 
devices on the network and possibly the entire network.   
As attacks become more common and complex, detecting attacks becomes more 
difficult. A complex attack consists of a sequence of simple attacks. Current Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs) often detect simple attacks, comprising some of the steps in a 
complex attack, but do not detect complete complex attacks. The development of an IDS 
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capable of detecting complex attacks can improve the network manager’s ability to 
ensure an available, secure network.  
We have explored the question of whether an ontological approach to network 
management is effective. Using an ontological approach enables us to create a single 
NMS for all deployed devices. We have shown both the appropriateness and feasibility of 
using ontology as the basis for a NMS.  
Another important aspect of network management is the management of security. 
Using the ontological representation, it is possible to detect more simple and complex 
attacks. Detecting more attacks will ensure better availability and security of the 
organization’s network and data. Even though the developed IDS detects attacks after 
they occur, it is still an important tool in network security. The information learned from 
a detected attack, even post-occurrence, will help with future iterations of network 
security.  
8.1 Conclusions and Contributions 
A framework based on ontological representations was designed to manage and 
provide interoperability among components of Heterogeneous Multi-tier Networks.  Four 
contributions are linked to the network configuration and security management: (1) 
adaptable knowledge base, (2) analysis of performance, (3) ontological representation for 
complex attacks, and (4) evolution of ontological representation with extensible 
heuristics. 
The adaptable knowledge base of the first contribution significantly enhanced the 
ability to manage Heterogeneous Multi-tier Networks as they evolved in number and 
 171 
complexity. An ontology based Network Management System (NMS) addressed potential 
challenges as new technologies and dynamic components were introduced to 
heterogeneous network managers. The reporting process provided seamless integration of 
support to manage Heterogeneous Multi-tier Networks from the daily management 
perspective as additional data was collected. We created a prototype of the ontology-
based NMS to prove its viability in forms of effectiveness and performance. The 
prototype demonstrated the network management as an n:1 improvement in the toolset 
required for management of a HMN, where n is the number of different device types, or 
tiers, within the network. By current industry standards, NMSs provide management 
capability at the device-type level whereas the new HMNMS in this research provided 
systemic management of the entire HMN. This new HMNMS will allow a network 
manager to obtain a systematic view of the HMN instead of having to manage the 
individual component networks.  
Our second line of investigation asks the question of whether a HMNMS would 
degrade network performance. We developed a model to evaluate performance based on 
a theoretical queuing framework.  This analysis of a HMN was conducted to verify the 
model type and identify bottlenecks.  The analytical model in this scenario was then 
utilized to prove that the bottleneck in a Heterogeneous Two-tier Network (wired and ad 
hoc tiers) was the ad hoc gateway and not the Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network 
Management System (HMNMS). The model also demonstrated that the HMNMS did not 
have an adverse effect on the HMN. Network designers may utilize this analytical model 
to determine the bottleneck in a HMN as well as the number of gateway devices required 
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while maintaining optimal performance. Thus our second contribution is based on the 
discovery that a HMNMS will not degrade performance of a HMN.  
The basis for the ontological representation of attacks was based on generalized 
attack trees developed by this researcher. The generalized attack trees for complex 
attacks were defined based on researching specific attacks and recognizing attack 
patterns. The ontological representation provided more flexibility because its declarative 
representation allowed for augmentation without impacting other aspects of the system. 
This in turn allows the ontology to be extended by others doing related research therefore 
extending the knowledge and enabling the detection of evolving attack strategies. Traffic 
data was used to develop and utilize the formal representation allowing for complex 
attacks and attack attempts to be detected, which provided flexibility over a 
programmatic approach.  
As attack trees were developed, heuristics were established that effectively implement 
the attack recognition process. These heuristics represent a fourth contribution as an 
attempt to codify meta-characteristics of attacks. By using ontology constructs available 
in OWL (the formal representation) and a query language (SPARQL), manipulation of 
the ontology became easily modifiable and extendable with the addition of rules to detect 
additional complex attacks.  A prototype system (TRIDSO: Traffic-based Reasoning 
Intrusion Detection System using Ontology) was developed to show the feasibility of 
using the developed formal representation with a set of heuristics to detect complex 
attacks and attack attempts. In the analysis of data, results showed the prototype system 
detected more simple and complex attacks and attack attempts than a current state-of-the-
art system that was used for comparison.  
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The combination of the formal representation and corresponding set of heuristics 
developed identify more simple and complex attacks than a current state-of-the-art IDS. 
This allows a network manager to respond to the simple and complex attacks detected. 
The manager can add additional security measures in a future iteration of security 
measures for the network allowing for the prevention of more simple and complex 
attacks.   
8.2  Future Work 
This research has led to several significant contributions in network management and 
like most research has also led to several open questions. There are many different areas 
for future work in both areas of research, management of HMNs and IDSs. An integral 
part of the future work is to merge the HMNMS and TRIDSO into one NMS for HMN. 
This NMS will begin to provide configuration and security management for HMNs. It 
can eventually provide all management areas by adding performance, fault, and 
accounting management. 
8.2.1 A Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network Management System 
The developed HMNMS is a basic conceptual prototype to show the feasibility of 
using ontology in a NMS for HMNs. The defined ontologies will continue to be refined, 
maintained and extended. Additional properties can be included for the four device types 
included in the initial ontologies. Some of the expanded properties will be the interfaces 
and connections in the network so that a logical network map can be drawn from the 
discovered topology.  
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8.2.1.1 Add Additional Tiers 
Additional device types can also be added to the NMS, such as additional wired 
manufacturers or sensors for WSNs. The WSN device type is included in the developed 
ontology; however, it was never implemented in the prototype system or tested. In the 
simulation tests, WSN device type instances were added to the knowledge base statically 
using OWL code. Future work will be to test the WSN portion of the ontology with a live 
WSN. This portion of the network will then be added to the analytical model so a 
performance analysis can be conducted for a three-tier HMN.  
8.2.1.2 Extend the System to Other Network Management Areas 
The prototype NMS focused on topology management but the HMNMS can be 
extended to include additional management tasks, such as more configuration 
management tasks or performance management. Areas that would be most beneficial to 
network managers are fault and security management. Extending the NMS to security 
management has been tested in the other part of this research by developing a formal 
representation for complex attacks and implementing the representation using ontology. 
There is some discussion about merging the two ontology systems (the HMNMS and 
TRIDSO) later in this chapter.  
8.2.1.3 Automatically Convert MIBs to OWL 
One way to enhance the HMNMS is to automate some aspects of the system 
development, particularly some of the ontology definitions. Future work will include 
incorporating the creation of the OWL files for the device types into the HMNMS. The 
SNMP MIBs can be converted to OWL and used in the HMNMS.  
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It is possible to automatically create OWL ontology files from XML data. Bohring 
and Aver [107] proposed a framework to translate XML data to OWL. Their work 
converts the tree structure in XML to the corresponding class hierarchy in OWL. The 
difficulty is the fact that OWL is more expressive than XML, making some of the 
mapping difficult. It is necessary to determine the appropriate representation in OWL for 
a less-expressive representation in XML. There is a desire to leverage the expressive 
nature of OWL and convert some structures in XML that do not have a direct mapping to 
OWL. For example, Bohring and Aver assume that there are some relational structures in 
XML, such as nested tags. These mappings are not as straight-forward and require some 
assumptions and/or experimentations. In this instance, Bohring and Aver mapped a 
nested tag in XML to an ObjectProperty in OWL.  
Another project that has developed an automatic conversion process, which may be 
used in the HMNMS, is the AstroGrid-D project from the German Astronomy 
Community Grid (GACG) [108]. The AstroGrid-D project required the data to be 
converted to RDF prior to being uploaded to the astronomy application. Two different 
options were defined to do this transformation and both will be evaluated for use in 
converting data for use in the HMNMS. The first one is an XSL stylesheet (xml2rdf.xsl) 
that will convert XML files to RDF files. XSL (Extensible Stylesheet Language) [109] is 
a series of recommendations for transforming XML. The second option uses a Java 
package OwlMap. This package consists of two programs. One program, XS2DAMLOIL 
converts XML to OWL format and the other one, XML2RDF, converts XML to RDF.  
Preliminary investigation was conducted on this research but additional work is 
required. Some of the MIBs are currently available in the XML format. For MIBs not 
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available in XML format, they can be converted to XML or XML Schema (XSD) using 
smidump, which is a program available as part of the libsmi library. The libsmi library is 
a library that provides access to SMI MIB information through various functions. After 
obtaining an XML version of the MIB, it can be converted to RDF, which can be used as 
the OWL definition files in the HMNMS. This was tested with a few MIBs using the 
XS2DAMLOIL program. Preliminary results proved that this was possible but more 
research is required to see if the results are practical for use in the HMNMS.  
8.2.1.4 Utilization of the Analytical Model 
Another area of future work is the utilization of the developed analytical model. The 
analytical model is used to find the network capacity. In this research it was used to 
evaluate the performance of a heterogeneous two-tier network. Specifically, the analytical 
model was used to identify the bottleneck in a heterogeneous two-tier network.  
Future work will employ the analytical model for other performance evaluations. One 
possible use that may be developed is to evaluate the performance and identify 
bottlenecks when additional tiers are added to the network. For instance, a Wireless 
Sensor Network (WSN) may be added as an additional tier. This will require a WSN 
gateway, which may introduce a potential bottleneck. Another performance metric that 
may be evaluated using the analytical model is the determination of the number of nodes 
each gateway, ad hoc or WSN, can efficiently support. This evaluation may be used by 
the network manager in determining when another gateway must be added for continual, 
efficient performance of the gateway node(s).  
The analysis performed used constant parameters, such as the packet size and the 
number of response packets generated. It was also assumed that there was no packet loss. 
 177 
Future work will include conducting dynamic end-to-end network performance by 
varying parameter values. Some of the parameters that may vary in future evaluations are 
the number of management packets sent to different nodes or node types, packet size, and 
the number of response packets generated for each management request. Future work will 
also introduce some probability of packet delays and packet loss.  
The analytical model can also be used for traffic modeling. This requires using a large 
amount of complex traffic in the model. The performance evaluations conducted in this 
research used a constant traffic rate. For traffic modeling, the traffic should be varied in 
type, packet size and rate. Traffic modeling can use the model to determine buffer 
occupancy statistics, queue wait times, and blocking probabilities.  
8.2.2 Representation of Complex Attacks 
This research designed and developed a formal representation for complex attacks, 
which can easily be extended due to the use of ontology. A prototype system was 
developed to demonstrate the viability of using the formal representation in an IDS. This 
prototype system is in its infancy and may continue to be developed.  
8.2.2.1 Incorporation of Additional Subsystems 
One clear extension for TRIDSO is to incorporate the remaining subsystems, the 
device subsystem and the vulnerability subsystem. An initial version of the device 
subsystem was developed as part of this research and utilized in the HMNMS discussed 
in chapter 3. The ontology utilized in the HMNMS forms the foundation for the device 
subsystem in TRIDSO. This ontology will be extended and incorporated into TRIDSO.  
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The vulnerability subsystem requires development. It will utilize existing repositories 
of known vulnerabilities, such as NIST’s NVD (National Vulnerability Database). An 
optimal solution is to utilize existing research that creates ontology instances from these 
repositories. One such work is OVM (Ontology for Vulnerability Management) [100]. 
8.2.2.2 Determining Threshold Values 
There are several threshold values utilized in TRIDSO and the determination of the 
optimal value to use for each is left for future investigation. Specifically, there are four 
threshold values used in TRIDSO: 
1. Rate category – determining the appropriate value for the rate category in the 
coloring scheme [91] 
2. Flood attack occurrences – the number of occurrences of a specific packet 
type before it is identified as a flood attack 
3. Scan attack occurrences – the number of occurrences of a specific packet type 
before it is identified as a scan attack 
4. Timeframe – the length of time to use for including packets when identifying 
attacks 
Initially, optimal values will be determined for each of these threshold values and remain 
static.  
The next step will be to incorporate a training phase into TRIDSO making it self-
learning. The system starts using the identified threshold values. As the system runs, the 
threshold values are adjusted based on observed traffic conditions. For example, consider 
a ping flood attack. Let’s assume the threshold value identified for a flood attack is 
twenty-five occurrences in the specified timeframe. For a corporate network, where ping 
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is only used by network and system administrators, this value may be too high. For a 
university network, where computer science courses may use ping as a teaching tool, this 
value may be too low. As the system runs, an algorithm would be utilized that looks at 
historical traffic data and adjusts the threshold values accordingly.  
A coloring scheme [91] was developed that will be incorporated into TRIDSO. The 
first threshold value is used in the coloring scheme to determine the value assigned to the 
rate category. The threshold is used to determine the number of occurrences of a specific 
packet type, as shown in Table 8.1. The appropriate threshold should be determined prior 
to incorporating the coloring scheme into TRIDSO. 
Table 8.1: The Coloring Scheme’s Rate Category Values. 
 
 
 
The second and third threshold values are similar. They both deal with the number of 
occurrences of a specific packet type to identify flood and scan attacks. A few ping 
packets are often not an issue as ping is a common troubleshooting tool; however, ping is 
also a common tool for attackers. It is important to determine the best value for this 
threshold. A threshold that is too high may lead to false negatives, indicating an attack 
occurred but was not identified. A threshold that is too low leads to true positives, 
indicating an attack was identified but it was not an attack. These situations can lead to 
additional analysis time by the network manager and possibly unnecessary network down 
time.  
Number of occurrences in time period Value 
     Occurs once 1 
     1 < occurrence < threshold 2 
     Threshold < occurrence < 2 * threshold 3 
     Occurs > 2 * threshold 4 
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The fourth threshold value to be determined is the length of time to use when 
identifying attacks. For example, when looking for a ping flood attack, if the flood 
threshold is twenty-five, the system looks for the occurrence of twenty-five ping packets 
to the same host or network. The timeframe determines when these packets occur. Do 
they occur within five milliseconds of each other? Five minutes? Five hours? This is a 
critical question because twenty-five ping packets to the same host over five hours is 
usually not a problem; however, twenty-five in five milliseconds may indicate a possible 
denial of service attack against the host.  
When the optimal value for this timeframe threshold is determined, it will be used in 
detecting possible attacks. As the research is conducted in identifying this optimal value, 
it may be determined that several timeframe thresholds are necessary. A threshold value 
of ping packets to the same host or network in five minutes is probably not enough to 
indicate a possible ping flood attack; however, a threshold value of ping packets to 
different hosts on the same network in five minutes may indicate a possible ping scan 
attack. It may be necessary to use different timeframe thresholds for different types of 
attacks.  
Another use of the timeframe threshold in TRIDSO is determining the occurrence of 
a complex attack. In this case, the time from the first node being in an attack tree to the 
time the root node is colored will be measured. Finding the most effective timeframe is a 
critical step in complex attack identification. 
8.2.2.3 Probabilistic Complex Attack Detection 
A coloring scheme [91] will be incorporated into TRIDSO. This coloring scheme will 
allow for the incorporation of probability in the detection process.  
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When a node in an attack tree is identified as having occurred, the node is colored. A 
three-color scheme is used: 1) green indicates no attack occurred, 2) yellow indicates an 
attack may have occurred, and 3) red indicates that an attack most likely occurred. 
All nodes are assigned a color based on a priority assigned to the attack element for 
that node. The priority is determined based on three categories of analysis. These 
categories are shown in Table 8.2, with their corresponding values, and are explained 
below. 
The first category is the rate, which indicates how often the element occurred in a 
time period. The rate is assigned a value of one through four based on a threshold value. 
A value of one is assigned if the attack element occurred once in the time frame, two if it 
occurred more than once but less than the threshold, three if it occurred more than the 
threshold but less than twice the threshold, and four if it occurred more than twice the 
threshold. The most effective threshold value has not yet been determined.  
 
Table 8.2: Attack Element Priority [91]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category or item Value 
Rate  
Occurs once 1 
1 < occurrence < threshold 2 
Threshold < occurrence < 2 * threshold 3 
Occurs > 2 * threshold 4 
  
Access level  
Access (anonymous) 0 
User and SNMP read-only 1 
Admin 2 
Root and SNMP read-write 3 
  
Alert priority 3 – Snort priority + 1 
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The access level category is the user (for a host) or privilege (for a network device) 
level gained, or possibly gained, by the attack. Four different access levels are utilized. 
The first level is similar to anonymous and gives a remote user access to the device or 
resource, such as a web user on a web server. This first level is assigned a value of zero. 
Next is the user level, with a value of one, which is a typical user on a system. The admin 
level has a value of two and the root level has a value of three. These two levels have 
been separated; even though they are synonymous on many systems, some systems 
separate the two. For example, the Windows operating system admin user, while often 
considered the same as root on the UNIX operating system, is different because some 
operations on Windows require local administrator access. The other type of access is 
that provided by SNMP. Read-only access provided by SNMP is equivalent to the user 
level and read-write access is equivalent to the admin level.  
The last category considered in the coloring scheme is the alert priority. This is based 
on the priority assigned to the alert produced by Snort, if one is assigned. The priority for 
an alert in Snort can have a value of zero through three, with zero being the highest 
priority. The coloring scheme assigns zero the lowest priority, so the following equation 
is used to convert the alert priority to the appropriate value in the coloring scheme: 
   value = 3 – Snort_priority + 1     (8.1) 
The reason to add one is because there is a need to not have a value of zero assigned 
to the alert category since Snort assigned it a priority value, thus considering it of some 
importance.  
The priority of the attack element is calculated by adding the values of the three 
categories. The node in the attack tree(s) corresponding to the attack element is colored 
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appropriately. To determine the appropriate color, the possible values, zero through 
eleven, which is the total possible value for the attack element priority, are divided 
evenly. A priority less than or equal to three causes the node to be colored green, a value 
from three to eight colors the node yellow, and a value of eight or more colors the node 
red.  
After all the affected nodes are appropriately colored, the coloring propagates up the 
attack tree. The parent nodes are colored based on the colors of the children nodes. The 
coloring algorithm (shown in Fig. 8.1) is based on empirical observations of results from 
test iterations of a simulation program developed to design the proposed coloring scheme. 
If the children nodes have an OR condition in the attack tree, then the parent node is 
colored with the “largest” color, with a descending order of red, yellow, green. If the 
children nodes have an AND condition in the attack tree, propagating the color to the 
parent becomes more complex. If all the children are green, then the parent is colored 
green; otherwise, the green nodes are excluded in the determination of the parent color.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: The coloring scheme algorithm [91]. 
 
 
OR conditions between children 
• Color parent the color of the child with the “largest” color 
 
AND conditions between children 
• If all children are green  color parent green 
• Else (skip all green children) 
o Find the color of the majority of the children (if the same 
number of yellow and red, then use color of latest child 
colored) currColor 
o If parent color <= currColor  
color parent currColor 
Else if parent colored more than “time ago”  
color parent currColor 
Else leave parent as-is 
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To begin color analysis for the parent node, the majority color of the children nodes is 
determined. If there are an equal number of yellow and red children, then the color of the 
node that was just colored is used as the majority. If the parent node is the same color as 
the majority color or it was colored less than a time threshold ago, then the parent node 
remains the same color. If the parent color is less than the majority color, then the parent 
is colored that color. The most effective value of the time threshold used has not yet been 
determined.  
As an example (see Fig. 8.2), consider a situation where an attack occurs that scans 
all hosts on the network. There is also a telnet to the SNMP port of a SNMP-managed 
node. The algorithm determined these nodes should be colored yellow. There was also a 
port scan that occurred with high occurrence in a time period, so that node was colored 
red. The colors were then propagated to the parent nodes, resulting in the colored attack 
tree. Uncolored nodes in the attack tree indicate the attack was not detected.  
Probability will be incorporated into the rate category. This category is assigned a 
value (1-4) based on how often the element occurs in a time period in relation to a 
threshold value. The assignments are shown in Table 8.2.  
Based on the rate value, a probability will be assigned to the occurrence of the simple 
attack. The color assigned will be associated with a probability. The most appropriate 
probability to assign each value and color is also part of future work, but a baseline is 
used for discussion. This baseline associates a probability to the various values of the rate 
category according to Table 8.3. These probabilities then correspond to the appropriate 
color. 
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Table 8.3: Probabilities for Rate Category Values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: An example of a colored attack tree. 
Number of occurrences in time period Value Probability Color 
     Occurs once 1 0 – 24 Green 
     1 < occurrence < threshold 2 25 – 49 Yellow 
     Threshold < occurrence < 2 * threshold 3 50 – 74 Yellow 
     Occurs > 2 * threshold 4 75 - 100 Red 
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Within each value for the rate, probability is used because the number of occurrences 
is still important. For instance, assume the threshold for the rate category is determined to 
be twenty-five. If there are fifty-one occurrences of a specific packet type, a value of 4 is 
assigned. If there are five hundred occurrences, a value of 4 is also assigned, but there is 
much more likelihood that there was a ping flood attack. The probability for the five 
hundred occurrences should be higher than for the fifty-one occurrences.  
Probabilities will also be utilized as the colors are propagated up the tree. Instead of 
just using colors of the children nodes to color the parent node, the probabilities will be 
utilized. For instance, if a parent has two children nodes and they are both yellow, the 
current algorithm, shown in Fig. 8.3, colors the parent yellow. Using an algorithm that 
incorporates the probabilities in the children nodes may color the parent node red if the 
probabilities are high in both of the yellow children nodes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: The current coloring scheme algorithm. 
 
Probability will also be utilized in looking at the time frame for the attack. A lower 
probability will be assigned to the possibility of the attack occurring if the attack spans a 
OR conditions between children 
• Color parent the color of the child with the “largest” color 
 
AND conditions between children 
• If all children are green  color parent green 
• Else (skip all green children) 
o Find the color of the majority of the children (if the same 
number of yellow and red, then use color of latest child 
colored) currColor 
o If parent color <= currColor  
color parent currColor 
Else if parent colored more than “time ago”  
color parent currColor 
Else leave parent as-is 
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longer time frame. If the attack spans a shorter time frame, there is more likelihood the 
attack actually occurred so a higher probability is assigned. This will be used in 
identifying simple and complex attacks.  
For example, fifty ping packets to the same host in an hour may indicate a ping flood 
attack. Fifty ping packets to the same host in five seconds indicate that a ping flood attack 
most likely occurred, so the probability will be higher than the fifty in an hour attack. For 
complex attacks, the probability is higher if all the simple attacks comprising that 
complex attack occur in one hour compared to one day or one week, so again the shorter 
time frame indicates a higher probability.  
8.2.2.4 Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly detection is used in IDSs to detect the occurrence of an attack by observing 
behavior in the network that is unusual for that particular network and its users. For this 
to work effectively, normal behavior must be observed and documented. Future work will 
consist of incorporating anomaly detection into the formal representation of complex 
attacks.  
The formal representation must be extended to maintain information about normal 
network traffic. The formal representation is then defined in OWL and incorporated into 
the set of heuristics developed for attack detection. This information (normal behavior) 
may also be useful in the training phase for determining threshold values based on 
network behavior. 
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8.2.2.5 Scalability Improvements 
One drawback of the prototype system developed, TRIDSO, is its scalability. There 
has been research in the area of ontology scalability with several options for 
improvement. One method to improve on the scalability of TRIDSO is to distribute some 
of the processing. Concurrent execution of many of the SPARQL queries is one area of 
processing that may benefit from distribution. Goodman and Mizell [110] demonstrated 
the use of work-load distributions by developing an algorithm that utilized threads. The 
threads were used with replicated ontology data and a shared hash table. The second 
method that may benefit TRIDSO by providing more scalability is the use of a data 
management system.  A data management system was developed specifically for OWL, 
by Park, et. al. [111], to “efficiently manage large sized OWL data” [111]. Park, et. al. 
increased the performance of queries by improving the management of large sized data 
sets. The performance improvement was achieved by storing the OWL data in a relational 
database designed to optimize query response. A third method to improve the scalability 
is to use a system that combines Datalog programs with a relational database. Pan, Li, 
and Heflin [112] developed such a system (DLDB3). DLDB3 is a new knowledge base 
system that showed an improvement of the system performance in load and query times.   
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Appendix A A Heterogeneous Multi-tier Network Management 
System - Ontology Definition Files  
A.1 Node Ontology Definition File 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl#" 
    xml:base="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl"> 
 
  <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""/> 
 
 
  <!-- Create a class for a network node --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="node"/> 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="serialNumber"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="name"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="location"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="address"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="description"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
</rdf:RDF> 
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A.2 Wired Node Ontology Definition File 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY e 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY g 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY owl 'http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#'> 
]> 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl#" 
    xml:base="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl"> 
 
  <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
    <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports  
  rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl"/> 
  </owl:Ontology> 
 
 
  <!-- Create a class for a network wired node --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="wiredNode"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
     
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="subnetMask"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
</rdf:RDF> 
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A.3 Wireless Node Ontology Definition File 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY e 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY f 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY owl 'http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#'> 
]> 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl#" 
    xml:base="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl"> 
 
  <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
    <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports  
rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl"/> 
  </owl:Ontology> 
 
  <!-- Class for node's role --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="roleType"/> 
  <roleType rdf:ID="ch"/> 
   
  <!-- Class for node's status -->  
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="statusType"/> 
 
  <!-- Create a class for a network wireless node --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="wirelessNode"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="&f;wiredNode"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="energyLeft"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="role"> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="status"> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
</rdf:RDF> 
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A.4 Nortel Device Ontology Definition File 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY c 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/cisco.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY e 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY f 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY g 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl#'> 
   <!ENTITY owl 'http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#'> 
]> 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/nortel.owl#" 
    xml:base="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/nortel.owl"> 
 
<owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
    <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports  
rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/cisco.owl"/> 
</owl:Ontology> 
 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="nortelNode"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&f;wiredNode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="&c;ciscoNode"/> 
 </owl:Class> 
 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="rcSysIPAddr"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="sysDesc"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="sysName"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="sysLocation"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="rcChasSerialNumber"> 
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    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="sysNetMask"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
</rdf:RDF> 
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A.5 Cisco Device Ontology Definition File 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY d 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/nortel.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY e 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY f 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY g 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl#'> 
   <!ENTITY owl 'http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#'> 
]> 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/cisco.owl#" 
    xml:base="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/cisco.owl"> 
 
<owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
    <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports  
rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/nortel.owl"/> 
</owl:Ontology> 
 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="ciscoNode"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&f;wiredNode"/> 
  <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="&d;nortelNode"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="chassisSerialNumber"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="sysName"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="sysLocation"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="sysNetMask"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="sysIPAddr"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="sysDesc"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
</rdf:RDF> 
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A.6 Ad hoc Device Ontology Definition File 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY b 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wsn.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY e 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY f 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY g 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY owl 'http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#'> 
]> 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/adhoc.owl#" 
    xmlns:wireless="&g;" 
    xml:base="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/adhoc.owl"> 
 
  <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
    <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports  
rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wsn.owl"/> 
  </owl:Ontology> 
   
   
  <!-- object instances for status and role --> 
  <wireless:statusType rdf:ID="active"/> 
  <wireless:statusType rdf:ID="not_active"/> 
  <wireless:roleType rdf:ID="agent"/> 
   
 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="adHocNode"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="&b;sensor"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="clusterHead"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#adHocNode"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
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  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="description"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="location"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="name"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="ipAddress"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="subnetMask"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="serialNumber"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="remainingBatteryLife"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="role"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&g;roleType"/> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
    >Role of ad hoc node, is it a CH or agent (plain) node</rdfs:comment> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="status"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
    >Status of the ad hoc node, is it active or inactive</rdfs:comment> 
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&g;statusType"/> 
 </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  
 
</rdf:RDF> 
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A.7 Wireless Sensor Network Device Ontology Definition File 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY a 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/adhoc.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY e 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY f 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY g 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY owl 'http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#'> 
]> 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wsn.owl#" 
    xmlns:wireless="&g;" 
    xml:base="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wsn.owl"> 
 
  <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
    <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports  
  rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/adhoc.owl"/> 
  </owl:Ontology> 
  
  
  <!-- object instances for status and role --> 
  <wireless:statusType rdf:ID="alive"/> 
  <wireless:statusType rdf:ID="dead"/> 
  <wireless:roleType rdf:ID="member"/> 
 
 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="sensor"> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" >  
  a node in a wireless sensor network</rdfs:comment> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
    <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="&a;adHocNode"/> 
 </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="clusterHead"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#sensor"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
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  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="description"> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
  Description for sensor</rdfs:comment> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="ycoord"> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
  y-coordinate for sensor</rdfs:comment> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#sensor"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="residualEnergy"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
  Residual energy of sensor</rdfs:comment> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="role"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&g;roleType"/> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
  Role of sensor, is it a CH, member or plain node</rdfs:comment> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty > 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="name"> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
  Name for the sensor</rdfs:comment> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="serialNumber"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&e;node"/> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
  serial number of sensor</rdfs:comment> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="nodeID"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#sensor"/> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
  node ID for sensor</rdfs:comment> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="status"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
  Status of the sensor, is it alive or dead</rdfs:comment> 
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&g;statusType"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty > 
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  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="xcoord"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#sensor"/> 
    <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
  x-coordinate for sensor</rdfs:comment> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
   
 
</rdf:RDF> 
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A.8 Mapping Ontology Definition File 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY a 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/adhoc.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY b 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wsn.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY c 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/cisco.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY d 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/nortel.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY e 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY f 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY g 'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl#'> 
   <!ENTITY owl 'http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#'> 
]> 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns:adhoc="&a;" 
    xmlns:wsn="&b;" 
    xmlns:cisco="&c;" 
    xmlns:nortel="&d;" 
    xmlns:node="&e;" 
    xmlns:wired="&f;" 
    xmlns:wireless="&g;" 
    xmlns="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/map_all.owl#" 
    xml:base="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/map_all.owl"> 
 
 <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
     <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/node.owl"/> 
     <owl:imports  
  rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wiredNode.owl"/> 
     <owl:imports  
  rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wirelessNode.owl"/> 
     <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/adhoc.owl"/> 
     <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wsn.owl"/> 
     <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/cisco.owl"/> 
     <owl:imports rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/nortel.owl"/> 
     <owl:imports  
  rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/adhoc_instances.owl"/> 
     <owl:imports  
  rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/wsn_instances.owl"/> 
     <owl:imports  
  rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/cisco_instances.owl"/> 
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     <owl:imports  
  rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/nortel_instances.owl"/> 
 </owl:Ontology> 
 
 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;name"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&a;name"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;name"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&b;name"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;name"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&c;sysName"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;name"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&d;sysName"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;description"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&a;description"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;description"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&b;description"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;description"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&c;sysDesc"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;description"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&d;sysDesc"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;serialNumber"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&a;serialNumber"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;serialNumber"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&b;serialNumber"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;serialNumber"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&c;chassisSerialNumber"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&e;serialNumber"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&d;rcChasSerialNumber"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&a;ipAddress"> 
   <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&e;address"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&b;nodeID"> 
   <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&e;address"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&c;sysIPAddr"> 
   <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&e;address"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&d;rcSysIPAddr"> 
   <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&e;address"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
  
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&f;subnetMask"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&a;subnetMask"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&f;subnetMask"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&c;sysNetMask"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&f;subnetMask"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&d;sysNetMask"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&a;location"> 
   <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&e;location"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&b;xcoord"> 
   <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&e;location"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&b;ycoord"> 
   <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&e;location"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&c;sysLocation"> 
   <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&e;location"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&d;sysLocation"> 
   <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&e;location"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&g;role"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&a;role"/> 
 </owl:ObjectProperty > 
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 <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&g;role"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&b;role"/> 
 </owl:ObjectProperty > 
 
 <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&g;status"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&a;status"/> 
 </owl:ObjectProperty > 
 <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&g;status"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&b;status"/> 
 </owl:ObjectProperty > 
 
 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&g;energyLeft"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&a;remainingBatteryLife"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&g;energyLeft"> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&b;residualEnergy"/> 
 </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
 <!-- Create a class for all  cluster heads --> 
 <owl:Class rdf:ID="clusterHeadNode"> 
   <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
         <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&a;role"/> 
         <owl:hasValue rdf:resource="&g;ch"/>   
      </owl:Restriction> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="&g;wirelessNode"/> 
   </owl:intersectionOf> 
 </owl:Class> 
 
 
</rdf:RDF> 
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Appendix B Complex Attack Detection - Ontology Definition 
Files 
 
B.1 Traffic Ontology Definition File 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY traffic  
'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/traffic.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY attack  
'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/attack.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY xsd 'http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#'> 
    <!ENTITY owl 'http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY owl11 "http://www.w3.org/2006/12/owl11#"> 
]> 
 
<!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                    Traffic Ontology                         ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
--> 
 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:owl11="http://www.w3.org/2006/12/owl11#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns:traffic="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/traffic.owl#" 
    xmlns:attack="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/attack.owl#" 
    xml:base="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/traffic.owl"> 
 
  <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
   <rdfs:comment>An ontology for network traffic</rdfs:comment> 
  </owl:Ontology> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Object Property Definitions                  ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  
  <!-- 
  *****             Object Properties: MAC addresses                ***** 
  --> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasSrcMAC"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#MACaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L2Packet"/> 
   <owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="#isSrcMACOf"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasSrcMac"/> 
 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasDestMAC"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#MACaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L2Packet"/> 
   <owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="#isDestMACOf"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasDestMAC"/> 
   
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="isSrcMACOf"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#L2Packet"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#MACaddress"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="isDestMACOf"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#L2Packet"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#MACaddress"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasNode1MAC"> 
     <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#MACaddress"/> 
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L2Stream"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasNode1MAC"/> 
   
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasNode2MAC"> 
     <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#MACaddress"/> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L2Stream"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasNode2MAC"/> 
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  <!--   *****             Object Properties: IP addresses                 *****  --> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasNWIPaddress"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasSrcIP"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
   <owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="#isSrcIPOf"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasSrcIP"/> 
   
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasDestIP"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
   <owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="#isDestIPOf"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasDestIP"/> 
   
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="isSrcIPOf"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="isDestIPOf"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
   
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasPCDestIP"> 
     <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#PacketCollection"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasPCDestIP"/> 
 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasAlertSrcIP"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPAlert"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasAlertSrcIP"/> 
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  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasAlertDestIP"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPAlert"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasAlertDestIP"/> 
 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasNode1IP"> 
     <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L3Stream"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasNode1IP"/> 
   
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasNode2IP"> 
     <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L3Stream"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:FunctionalProperty rdf:about="#hasNode2IP"/> 
   
  <!-- Make 'hasTCPStreamWith' a Symmetric property, meaning it will hold in both  
directions. If, host A has a TCP stream with host B, then host B has a  
TCP stream with host A --> 
  <owl:SymmetricProperty rdf:ID="hasTCPStreamWith"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
     <rdfs:range  rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
  </owl:SymmetricProperty> 
 
   
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Address Class Definitions                    ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
 
  <!--   *****                    Class: MACaddres                         *****  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="MACaddress"> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <!--    *****                    Class: IPaddress                         *****  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="IPaddress"> 
  </owl:Class> 
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  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="IPoctet1"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="IPoctet2"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="IPoctet3"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="IPoctet4"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****              Class: NWaddressScanned                        ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  -->    
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="NWaddressScanned"> 
   <rdfs:comment> 
    A list of Network IP addresses that were scanned with a PingScan 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****            Packet and related classes                       ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
   
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Packet                                ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Packet"> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
 226 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="packetID"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Packet"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="dateTime"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Packet"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
   
  <owl:Restriction> 
    <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#packetID" /> 
    <owl:maxCardinality  
rdf:datatype="&xsd;nonNegativeInteger">1</owl:maxCardinality> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: L2Packet                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="L2Packet"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Packet"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: IPPacket                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="IPPacket"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L2Packet"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
     
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="ver"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="hdrLen"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="packetLen"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="transProto"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="flags"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="fragment"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="fragOffset"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="ttl"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="ipChecksum"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: L4Packet                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="L4Packet"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ICMPPacket"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="l4SrcPort"> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L4Packet"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="l4DestPort"> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L4Packet"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="l4Checksum"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L4Packet"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="l4Payload"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L4Packet"/> 
     <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#Application"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: TCPPacket                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="TCPPacket"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L4Packet"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#UDPPacket"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpSeqNum"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpAckNum"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpFlags"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpAckFlag"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpRstFlag"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpSynFlag"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpFinFlag"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="tcpWinSize"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: UDPPacket                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="UDPPacket"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L4Packet"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPPacket"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
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   <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: AppPacket                             ***** 
  *****   This class is the union of the TCPPacket class            ***** 
  *****    and the UDPPacket class.                                 ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="AppPacket"> 
   <owl:unionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="#TCPPacket"/> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="#UDPPacket"/> 
 </owl:unionOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
 <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: ICMPPacket                            ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="ICMPPacket"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#IPPacket"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#L4Packet"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="icmpType"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#ICMPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="icmpCode"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#ICMPPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="icmpPayload"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#UDPPacket"/> 
     <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#Application"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
 
 <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                  Class: Application                         ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Application"> 
  </owl:Class> 
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  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="appProtocol"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Application"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="appData"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Application"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****            Stream and related classes                       ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
   
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Stream                                ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Stream"> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="protocol"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Stream"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="active"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Stream"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="node1"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Stream"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="node2"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Stream"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="startTime"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Stream"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="endTime"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Stream"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="duration"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Stream"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: L2Stream                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="L2Stream"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Stream"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: L3Stream                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="L3Stream"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L2Stream"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: L4Stream                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="L4Stream"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L3Stream"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="node1Port"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L4Stream"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="node2Port"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L4Stream"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: TCPStream                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="TCPStream"> 
   <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en"> 
   A Stream that consists of two nodes sending TCP packets 
   </rdfs:comment> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L4Stream"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#UDPStream"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ICMPStream"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: UDPStream                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="UDPStream"> 
    <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en"> 
   A Stream that consists of two nodes sending UDP packets 
   </rdfs:comment> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L4Stream"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPStream"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ICMPStream"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: ICMPStream                            ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="ICMPStream"> 
    <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en"> 
   A Stream that consists of two nodes sending ICMP packets 
   </rdfs:comment> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L4Stream"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPStream"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#UDPStream"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****          PacketSequence and related classes                 ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
   
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: PacketSequence                        ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="PacketSequence"> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="seqID"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#PacketSequence"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: SeqItem                               ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="SeqItem"> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="seqParentID"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#SeqItem"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="orderNum"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#SeqItem"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="packet"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#SeqItem"/> 
     <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#Packet"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty > 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****           Different Packet Types classes                    ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: PingPacket                            ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="PingPacket"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    PingPacket are ICMPPackets with ICMPtype of 8 (echo request) 
    One packet type for a possible Ping Flood attack 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="#ICMPPacket"/> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#icmpType"/> 
   <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">8</owl:hasValue> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
 </owl:intersectionOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: SmurfPacket                           ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="SmurfPacket"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    SmurfPacket are ICMPPackets with the last octet of destIP of 255 
    One packet type for a possible Ping Flood attack 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="#ICMPPacket"/> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#IPoctet4"/> 
   <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">255</owl:hasValue> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
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 </owl:intersectionOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                  Class: SynPacket                           ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="SynPacket"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    SynPacket are TCPPackets with the SYN flag set 
    One packet type for a possible Port Scan attack 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="#TCPPacket"/> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#tcpSynFlag"/> 
   <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;boolean">1</owl:hasValue> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
 </owl:intersectionOf> 
  
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                  Class: FinPacket                           ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="FinPacket"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    FinPacket are TCPPackets with FIN flag only set 
    One packet type for a possible Port Scan attack 
    Typically, TCP packets with FIN flag will also have ACK flag set 
    TCP response to FIN flag only set will tell attacker if port is open 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="#TCPPacket"/> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#tcpFinFlag"/> 
   <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">1</owl:hasValue> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#tcpAckFlag"/> 
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   <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">0</owl:hasValue> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#tcpRstFlag"/> 
   <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">0</owl:hasValue> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#tcpSynFlag"/> 
   <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">0</owl:hasValue> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
 </owl:intersectionOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                  Class: MaskPacket                          ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="MaskPacket"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    MaskPacket are ICMPPackets with ICMPtype of 17 (netmask request) 
    One packet type for a possible ICMP Flood attack 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="#ICMPPacket"/> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#icmpType"/> 
   <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">17</owl:hasValue> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
 </owl:intersectionOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****             Alert and related classes                       ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                   Class: Alert                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Alert"> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aDateTime"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Alert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aID"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Alert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aDescription"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Alert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aPriority"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Alert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aClassification"> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Alert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                  Class: IPAlert                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="IPAlert"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Alert"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aIPHdrLen"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPAlert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aIPDgramLen"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPAlert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aIPID"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPAlert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aIPProtocol"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#IPAlert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                  Class: ICMPAlert                           ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="ICMPAlert"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#IPAlert"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#L4Alert"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aICMPType"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#ICMPAlert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aICMPCode"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#ICMPAlert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                   Class: L4Alert                            ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="L4Alert"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#IPAlert"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ICMPAlert"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="#aL4SrcPort"> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L4Alert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="#aL4DestPort"> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#L4Alert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
   
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                   Class: TCPAlert                           ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="TCPAlert"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L4Alert"/> 
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   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#UDPAlert"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aTCPFlags"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPAlert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aTCPSeqNum"> 
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPAlert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="aTCPAckNum"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TCPAlert"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                   Class: UDPAlert                           ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="UDPAlert"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#L4Alert"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPAlert"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
</rdf:RDF> 
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B.1 Attack Ontology Definition File 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY attack 
'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/attack.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY traffic 
'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/traffic.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY complex 
'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/complexAttack.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY xsd 'http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#'> 
]> 
 
<!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                    Attack Ontology                          ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
--> 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns:attack="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/attack.owl#" 
    xmlns:traffic="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/traffic.owl#" 
    xmlns:complex= 
      "http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/complexAttack.owl#" 
    xml:base="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/attack.owl"> 
 
  <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
   <rdfs:comment>An ontology for network attacks</rdfs:comment> 
  </owl:Ontology> 
   
   
   
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Object Property Definitions                  ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
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  <!-- 
  *****         Object Properties: Attacks for IP address           ***** 
  --> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="wasAttacked"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#Attack"/> 
   <owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="#hasTargetIP"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                  AttackPacket Class                         ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="AttackPacket"> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasOrigMAC"> 
     <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#FunctionalProperty"/> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#MACaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#AttackPacket"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasTargetMAC"> 
     <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#FunctionalProperty"/> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#MACaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#AttackPacket"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasOrigIP"> 
     <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#FunctionalProperty"/> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#AttackPacket"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="hasTargetIP"> 
    <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#FunctionalProperty"/> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#IPaddress"/> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#AttackPacket"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="beginDate"> 
     <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#FunctionalProperty"/> 
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 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#AttackPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="endDate"> 
     <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#FunctionalProperty"/> 
 <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#AttackPacket"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="pcType"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#PacketCollection"/> 
     <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&traffic;PacketType"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
  <!-- Restriction on type property --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="#PacketCollection"> 
 <rdfs:subClassOf> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#pcType"/> 
   <owl:allValuesFrom rdf:resource="&traffic;PacketType"/> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
 </rdfs:subClassOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                PacketCollection Class                       ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="PacketCollection"> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="pcFrequency"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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<!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                  SimpleAttack Class                         ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="SimpleAttack"> 
     <owl:unionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
        <owl:Class rdf:about="#Availability"/> 
       <owl:Class rdf:about="#Recon"/> 
        <owl:Class rdf:about="#GainAccess"/> 
        <owl:Class rdf:about="#ViewChangeData"/> 
     </owl:unionOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
   
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                     Attack Class                            ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Attack"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#AttackPacket"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="name"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="description"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="preconds"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="postconds"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="priority"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="consequence"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="motivation"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="attTimeInt"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 244 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="remedy"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="snortPriority"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="attPacketSeq"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="attStream"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****              Availability and Related Classes               ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Availability                          ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Availability"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Attack"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Recon"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#GainAccess"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ViewChangeData"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: DoS                                   ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="DoS"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Availability"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Spoofing"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Resources                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Resources"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#DoS"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CrashNode"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Flood                                 ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Flood"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Resources"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Memory"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CPU"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="floodFrequency"> 
     <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&xsd;nonNegativeInteger"/> 
     <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="#pcFrequency"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: PingFlood                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="PingFlood"> 
   <rdfs:comment> 
    A PingFlood packet is an instance of the PacketCollection 
    of type PingFloodType with greater than "threshold" frequency. 
 </rdfs:comment> 
  
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Flood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ICMPFlood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPFlood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#AppFlood"/> 
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    <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
     <owl:Class rdf:about="#PacketCollection"/> 
     <owl:Restriction> 
    <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#pcType"/> 
    <owl:hasValue rdf:resource="&traffic;PingFloodType"/> 
     </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: ICMPFlood                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="ICMPFlood"> 
    <rdfs:comment> 
    A ICMPFlood packet is an instance of the PacketCollection 
    of type ICMPFloodType with greater than "threshold" frequency. 
 </rdfs:comment> 
  
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Flood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PingFlood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPFlood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#AppFlood"/> 
    
    <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
     <owl:Class rdf:about="#PacketCollection"/> 
     <owl:Restriction> 
    <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#pcType"/> 
    <owl:hasValue rdf:resource="&traffic;ICMPFloodType"/> 
     </owl:Restriction> 
 </owl:intersectionOf> 
  
  </owl:Class> 
   
 
   
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: TCPFlood                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
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  <owl:Class rdf:ID="TCPFlood"> 
    <rdfs:comment> 
    A TCPFlood packet is an instance of the PacketCollection 
    of type TCPType with greater than "threshold" frequency. 
 </rdfs:comment> 
  
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Flood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PingFlood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ICMPFlood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#AppFlood"/> 
    
    <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
     <owl:Class rdf:about="#PacketCollection"/> 
     <owl:Restriction> 
    <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#pcType"/> 
    <owl:hasValue rdf:resource="&traffic;TCPFloodType"/> 
     </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
 
  </owl:Class> 
   
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: AppFlood                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="AppFlood"> 
    <rdfs:comment> 
    A AppFlood packet is an instance of the PacketCollection 
    of type AppFloodType with greater than "threshold" frequency. 
 </rdfs:comment> 
  
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Flood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PingFlood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ICMPFlood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPFlood"/> 
    
    <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
   <owl:Class rdf:about="#PacketCollection"/> 
   <owl:Restriction> 
  <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#pcType"/> 
  <owl:hasValue rdf:resource="&traffic;AppFloodType"/> 
   </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
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  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Memory                                ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Memory"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Resources"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Flood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#CPU"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="memAvail"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Memory"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="memUsed"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Memory"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
    
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: CPU                                   ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="CPU"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Resources"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Flood"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Memory"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="cpuAmount"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#CPU"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="cpuPercUsed"> 
     <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#CPU"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: CrashNode                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="CrashNode"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#DoS"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Resources"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Land                                  ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Land"> 
    <rdfs:comment> 
    A Land packet is a TCPPacket with DIP = SIP and DPort = Sport   
 </rdfs:comment> 
  
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CrashNode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Teardrop"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PingOfDeath"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Teardrop                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Teardrop"> 
    <rdfs:comment> 
    A Teardrop packet is a PacketSequence with multiple packets   
    with same SIP and overlapping, oversized payloads 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CrashNode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Land"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PingOfDeath"/> 
 
 <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
   <owl:Class rdf:about="#PacketCollection"/> 
   <owl:Restriction> 
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  <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#pcType"/> 
  <owl:hasValue rdf:resource="&traffic;TeardropType"/> 
   </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: PingOfDeath                           ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="PingOfDeath"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    PoDPacket (Ping of Death) are ICMPPackets with ICMPtype of 8  
    (echo request) and packetLen of 65535 (should really be -ge 65535) 
    One packet type for a possible Ping Flood attack causing buffer overflow 
 </rdfs:comment> 
  
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#CrashNode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Land"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Teardrop"/> 
 
    <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
   <owl:Class rdf:about="&traffic;ICMPPacket"/> 
   <owl:Restriction> 
  <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&traffic;icmpType"/> 
  <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">8</owl:hasValue> 
   </owl:Restriction> 
   <owl:Restriction> 
  <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&traffic;packetLen"/> 
  <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">65535</owl:hasValue> 
   </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
  
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Spoofing                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Spoofing"> 
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   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Availability"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#DoS"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: ARPSpoof                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="ARPSpoof"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Spoofing"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#IPSpoof"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: IPSpoof                               ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="IPSpoof"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Spoofing"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ARPSpoof"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                  Recon and Related Classes                  ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Recon                                 ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Recon"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Attack"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Availability"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#GainAccess"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ViewChangeData"/> 
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  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="reconPortNum"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Scan                                  ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Scan"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Recon"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#GatherInfo"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="scanFrequency"> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&xsd;nonNegativeInteger"/> 
     <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="#pcFrequency"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: PingScan                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  -->    
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="PingScan"> 
   <rdfs:comment> 
    A PingScan packet is an instance of the PacketCollection 
    of type PingScanType. 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Scan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NodeScan"/> 
 
    <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
     <owl:Class rdf:about="#PacketCollection"/> 
     <owl:Restriction> 
    <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#pcType"/> 
    <owl:hasValue rdf:resource="&traffic;PingScanType"/> 
     </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
 
 253 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: NodeScan                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="NodeScan"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Scan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PingScan"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: PortScan                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="PortScan"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#NodeScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SYNScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#FINScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NULLScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPConnect"/> 
 
    <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
   <owl:Class rdf:about="#PacketCollection"/> 
   <owl:Restriction> 
  <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#pcType"/> 
  <owl:hasValue rdf:resource="&traffic;PortScanType"/> 
   </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: SYNScan                               ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="SYNScan"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#NodeScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PortScan"/> 
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   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#FINScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NULLScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPConnect"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: FINScan                               ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="FINScan"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#NodeScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PortScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SYNScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NULLScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPConnect"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: NULLScan                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="NULLScan"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    NullPacket are TCPPackets with no flags set 
    One packet type for a possible Port Scan attack 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#NodeScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PortScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SYNScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#FINScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPConnect"/> 
 
    <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
   <owl:Class rdf:about="&traffic;TCPPacket"/> 
   <owl:Restriction> 
  <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&traffic;tcpFlags"/> 
  <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="&xsd;integer">0</owl:hasValue> 
   </owl:Restriction> 
    </owl:intersectionOf> 
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  </owl:Class> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: TCPConnect                            ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="TCPConnect"> 
   <rdfs:comment> 
    Mitnick sent SYN request to X-Terminal and received SYN/ACK response.  
    Then he sent RESET response to keep the X-Terminal from being filled up. 
    For our purposes, we will look for multiple TCPPackets to the same  
    destination IP address with the RST flag set. 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#NodeScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PortScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SYNScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#FINScan"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NULLScan"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: GatherInfo                            ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="GatherInfo"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Recon"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Scan"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="infoLearned"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Sniffing                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
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  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Sniffing"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#GatherInfo"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#InfoLeak"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: NodeInfo                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="NodeInfo"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Sniffing"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#UserInfo"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPInfo"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: UserInfo                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="UserInfo"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Sniffing"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NodeInfo"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#TCPInfo"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: TCPInfo                               ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="TCPInfo"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Sniffing"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#NodeInfo"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#UserInfo"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: InfoLeak                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="InfoLeak"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#GatherInfo"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Sniffing"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****               GainAccess and Related Classes                ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: GainAccess                            ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="GainAccess"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Attack"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Availability"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Recon"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ViewChangeData"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: UnauthAccess                          ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="UnauthAccess"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#GainAccess"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#PrivilegeGain"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="uaPortNum"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: PrivilegeGain                         ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="PrivilegeGain"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#GainAccess"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#UnauthAccess"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="pgValue"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
   
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: User                                  ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="UserPG"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#PrivilegeGain"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#AdminPG"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#RootPG"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Admin                                 ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="AdminPG"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#PrivilegeGain"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#UserPG"/> 
  <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#RootPG"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
   
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Root                                  ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
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  <owl:Class rdf:ID="RootPG"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#PrivilegeGain"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#UserPG"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#AdminPG"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
 
  
  
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****             ViewChangeData and Related Classes              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: ViewChangeData                        ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="ViewChangeData"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Attack"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Availability"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Recon"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#GainAccess"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  
  
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: MaliciousCode                         ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="MaliciousCode"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#ViewChangeData"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="mcService"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="mcPortNum"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
  
 260 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: RPC                                   ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="RPC"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#MaliciousCode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ExecCode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#WebServer"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SendFile"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SystemCall"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="rpcCode"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
  
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: ExecCode                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="ExecCode"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#MaliciousCode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#RPC"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#WebServer"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SendFile"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SystemCall"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="ecCode"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
  
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: WebServer                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="WebServer"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#MaliciousCode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#RPC"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ExecCode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SendFile"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SystemCall"/> 
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  </owl:Class> 
 
  
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: SendFile                              ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="SendFile"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#MaliciousCode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#RPC"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ExecCode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#WebServer"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SystemCall"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="filename"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
  
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: SystemCall                            ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="SystemCall"> 
   <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#MaliciousCode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#RPC"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#ExecCode"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#WebServer"/> 
   <owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#SendFile"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="sysCall"> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
</rdf:RDF> 
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B.3 Complex Attack Ontology Definition File 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY complex  
'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/complexAttack.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY attack  
'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/attack.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY traffic  
'http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/traffic.owl#'> 
    <!ENTITY xsd 'http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#'> 
    <!ENTITY time 'http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-time#'> 
]> 
 
<!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                 Complex Attack Ontology                     ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
--> 
 
 
<rdf:RDF     
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns:time="http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-time#" 
    xmlns:complex=  
"http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/complexAttack.owl#" 
    xml:base=  
"http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/complexAttack.owl"> 
 
  <owl:Ontology rdf:about=""> 
   <rdfs:comment>An ontology for complex attacks</rdfs:comment> 
    <owl:imports  
     rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/attack.owl"/> 
    <owl:imports  
     rdf:resource="http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/traffic.owl"/> 
  </owl:Ontology> 
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  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Complex Attack Classes                       ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
   
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="ComplexAttack"> 
    <rdfs:comment> 
     A complex attack 
    </rdfs:comment> 
  </owl:Class> 
   
  <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="caHasTargetIP"> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#ComplexAttack"/> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&attack;hasTargetIP"/> 
  </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="caBeginDate"> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#ComplexAttack"/> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&attack;beginDate"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
  <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="caEndDate"> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#ComplexAttack"/> 
   <owl:equivalentProperty rdf:resource="&attack;endDate"/> 
  </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
 
   
   
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: DoSComplex                            ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="DoSComplex"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    A complex DoS attack is a Ping scan, Node scan, and Availability attack 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#ComplexAttack"/> 
  
 <owl:equivalentClass> 
     <owl:Class> 
      <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
       <owl:Class rdf:about="&traffic;NWaddressScanned"/> 
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       <rdf:Description rdf:about="&traffic;IPaddress"/> 
    <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty  
rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
        <owl:someValuesFrom  
rdf:resource="&attack;Availability"/> 
       </owl:Restriction> 
      </owl:intersectionOf> 
     </owl:Class> 
 </owl:equivalentClass> 
  
  </owl:Class> 
 
   
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: PrivilegeEscalation                   ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="PrivilegeEscalation"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    A complex Privilege Escalation attack is a GainAccess instance OR the  
   combination of a Ping scan, Node scan, and Gather Information attack. 
 </rdfs:comment> 
  
 <owl:unionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="&attack;GainAccess"/> 
  <owl:Class> 
   <owl:equivalentClass> 
       <owl:Class> 
        <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
         <owl:Class  
rdf:about="&traffic;NWaddressScanned"/> 
         <rdf:Description rdf:about="&traffic;IPaddress"/> 
         <owl:Restriction> 
             <owl:onProperty  
rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
              <owl:someValuesFrom  
rdf:resource="&attack;NodeScan"/> 
         </owl:Restriction> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
              <owl:onProperty  
         rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
               <owl:someValuesFrom  
rdf:resource="&attack;GatherInfo"/> 
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         </owl:Restriction> 
        </owl:intersectionOf> 
       </owl:Class> 
   </owl:equivalentClass> 
  </owl:Class> 
 </owl:unionOf> 
  
  </owl:Class> 
 
   
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: ConfIntLoss                           ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="ConfIntLoss"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    A complex Confidentiality or Integrity Loss attack is a Ping scan,  
    Node scan, and Malicious Code attack 
 </rdfs:comment> 
  
 <owl:equivalentClass> 
     <owl:Class> 
      <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
       <owl:Class rdf:about="&traffic;NWaddressScanned"/> 
       <rdf:Description rdf:about="&traffic;IPaddress"/> 
       <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty  
rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
        <owl:someValuesFrom  
rdf:resource="&attack;NodeScan"/> 
       </owl:Restriction> 
    <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty  
rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
        <owl:someValuesFrom  
rdf:resource="&attack;MaliciousCode"/> 
       </owl:Restriction> 
      </owl:intersectionOf> 
     </owl:Class> 
 </owl:equivalentClass> 
 
  </owl:Class> 
 
   
 266 
  <!-- 
  *********************************************************************** 
  *****                Class: Hijacking                             ***** 
  *********************************************************************** 
  --> 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Hijacking"> 
 <rdfs:comment> 
    A complex Hijacking attack is a Ping scan, Node scan, TCP Scan against 
    one host (host A) and an Availability and Spoofing attack against another  
    host (host B) that has a current TCP connection with the first host (host A) 
 </rdfs:comment> 
 
    <owl:equivalentClass> 
     <owl:Class> 
          <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="&traffic;NWaddressScanned"/> 
      <rdf:Description rdf:about="&traffic;IPaddress"/> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
      <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
       <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;NodeScan"/> 
      </owl:Restriction> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
      <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
       <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&attack;TCPConnect"/> 
      </owl:Restriction> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
       <!-- host A has a TCP connection (stream) with a host B that has  
        had an availability and spoof  attack against it   --> 
      <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&traffic;hasTCPStreamWith"/> 
       <owl:someValuesFrom> 
        <owl:Class> 
                  <owl:intersectionOf rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
         <rdf:Description rdf:about="&traffic;IPaddress"/> 
         <owl:Restriction> 
         <owl:onProperty  
     rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
          <owl:someValuesFrom 
     rdf:resource="&attack;Availability"/> 
         </owl:Restriction> 
     <owl:Restriction> 
         <owl:onProperty  
     rdf:resource="&attack;wasAttacked"/> 
          <owl:someValuesFrom  
     rdf:resource="&attack;Spoofing"/> 
         </owl:Restriction> 
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             </owl:intersectionOf> 
        </owl:Class> 
       </owl:someValuesFrom> 
      </owl:Restriction> 
         </owl:intersectionOf> 
    </owl:Class> 
     </owl:equivalentClass> 
  
  </owl:Class> 
 
 
</rdf:RDF> 
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Appendix C SPARQL Rules in TRIDSO 
 
This appendix contains the Java files for the prototype system (TRIDSO) that contain 
SPARQL rules. These rules are used to add instances to the knowledge base for attack 
detection. Only the Java files containing SPARQL rules are included in the appendix; 
files not containing SPARQL rules are not included. All of the source code for TRIDSO 
can be downloaded at http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/index.html.  
C.1 Java File to Create Packet Collection Instances 
/*****************************************************************/ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/* Author: Lisa Frye                                                */ 
/* Date: February 2011                                              */ 
/* Filename: PacketCollections.java                                 */ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/* Description: This file contains functions to execute SPARQL      */ 
/*              queries against the KB and add instances for        */ 
/*              packet collections.                                 */ 
/* API: this program uses the Jena ontology API.                    */ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/*****************************************************************/ 
 
 
// imports for Jena API 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.GraphStore; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.GraphStoreFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateAction; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateProcessor; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateRequest; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateExecutionFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.util.iterator.ExtendedIterator; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.Query; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.Syntax; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryExecution; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryExecutionFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QuerySolution; 
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import com.hp.hpl.jena.datatypes.xsd.XSDDatatype; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.datatypes.xsd.XSDDateTime; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.ResultSet; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.ResultSetFormatter; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.ontology.OntClass; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.ontology.Individual; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.ontology.DatatypeProperty; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.ontology.ObjectProperty; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.datatypes.xsd.XSDDatatype; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.rdf.model.Statement; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.rdf.model.StmtIterator; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.rdf.model.Literal; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.rdf.model.RDFNode; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.rdf.model.Resource; 
 
// general imports 
import java.lang.*; 
import java.io.*; 
import java.util.*; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
import java.util.Collection; 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.text.DecimalFormat; 
 
 
 
public class PacketCollections { 
  
    
  // variables to time adding instances via SPARQL 
 private static double sparqlTime = 0; 
 private static String sparqlTimeSt; 
     
 private static DecimalFormat decVal = new DecimalFormat ("#0.0000000"); 
    
   public static final String URL_PREFIX =  
             "http://faculty.kutztown.edu/frye/res/onto/reason/tridso_v1/"; 
             
   private static final String TRAFFICONT = KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic"; 
 private static final String TRAFFICONT_URL = TRAFFICONT + ".owl"; 
 private static final String TRAFFICONT_PREFIX = TRAFFICONT_URL + "#"; 
 private static final String ATTACKONT = KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack"; 
 private static final String ATTACKONT_URL = ATTACKONT + ".owl"; 
 private static final String ATTACKONT_PREFIX = ATTACKONT_URL + "#";         
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  /*****************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****         Add PingFlood PacketColletion Instances                *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
 /*******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addPingFloods(PrintStream outputFile, 
                                   double addCollectionsTime) { 
 
  try { 
  
   System.out.println("\tAdding Ping Flood instances..."); 
     outputFile.println("Adding PingFloodType instances from PingPacket...");  
  
 // Retrieve all PingPacket instances to same destIPs 
 String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:PingFloodType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " +  
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "   SELECT ?destIP (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "         (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "         (count(?destIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "         WHERE {?pack rdf:type traffic:PingPacket; " + 
      "                      traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "                      traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP . " + 
      "        } " + 
      "        GROUP BY ?destIP  " + 
      "        HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0) " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
 
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
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                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false); 
       
 outputFile.println("Adding PingFloodType instances from SmurfPacket..."); 
 
 // Retrieve all SmurfPacket instances to same destIPs 
 queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:PingFloodType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " +  
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "     SELECT ?destIP (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "         (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "         (count(?destIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "         WHERE {?pack rdf:type traffic:SmurfPacket; " + 
      "                      traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "                      traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP . " + 
      "               } " + 
      "        GROUP BY ?destIP  " + 
      "        HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0) " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
 
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false); 
  
   
 }  // end initial try 
 
 catch(Exception e) { 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
 }  // end catch 
 
  return addCollectionsTime; 
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  }   // end function addPingFloods 
  
  
  
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****         Add ICMPFlood PacketColletion Instances                *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addICMPFloods(PrintStream outputFile, 
                                   double addCollectionsTime) { 
 
  try { 
   
 sparqlTime = 0; 
   
 System.out.println("\tAdding ICMP Flood instances..."); 
 outputFile.println("Adding ICMPFlood instances from MaskPacket..."); 
 
 // Retrieve all MaskPacket instances to same destIPs 
 String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:ICMPFloodType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " +  
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "     SELECT ?destIP (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "            (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "            (count(?destIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "            WHERE {?pack rdf:type traffic:MaskPacket; " + 
      "                         traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "                         traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP . " + 
      "            } " + 
      "            GROUP BY ?destIP " + 
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      "        HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0) " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
         
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false);   
   
 }  // end initial try 
 
 catch(Exception e) { 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
 }  // end catch 
 
  return addCollectionsTime; 
  }   // end function addICMPFloods 
   
   
   
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****          Add TCPFlood PacketColletion Instances                *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addTCPFloods(PrintStream outputFile, 
                                  double addCollectionsTime) { 
 
  try { 
   
 sparqlTime = 0; 
   
 System.out.println("\tAdding TCP Flood instances..."); 
 outputFile.println("Adding TCPFlood instances from TCPPacket..."); 
 
 // Retrieve all TCP Packet instances to same destIP and tcpSynFlag = true 
 String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
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      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:TCPFloodType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " +  
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "   SELECT ?destIP " +  
      "          (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "          (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "          (count(?destIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "   { " + 
      "    SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?destIP ?dateTime " + 
      "     { " +  
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:TCPPacket; " + 
      "                traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "                traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "              traffic:tcpSynFlag true . " +  
      "      { " + 
      "         SELECT DISTINCT ?packet2 ?destIP ?dateTime2 " + 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?packet2 rdf:type traffic:TCPPacket; " + 
      "                    traffic:dateTime ?dateTime2; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "                  traffic:tcpSynFlag true . " +   
      "         } " + 
      "      } " + 
      "      FILTER ( ?packet1 != ?packet2 ) . " + 
      "     } " + 
      "   } " + 
      "  GROUP BY ?destIP " + 
      "  HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0) " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
  
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false);   
   
 }  // end initial try 
 
 catch(Exception e) { 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
 }  // end catch 
 
  return addCollectionsTime; 
  }   // end function addTCPFloods 
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  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****          Add AppFlood PacketColletion Instances                *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addAppFloods(PrintStream outputFile, 
                                  double addCollectionsTime) { 
 
  try { 
   
 sparqlTime = 0; 
   
 System.out.println("\tAdding App Flood instances..."); 
 outputFile.println("Adding AppFlood instances from AppPacket..."); 
 
 // Retrieve all AppPacket instances to same destIP and destPort 
 String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:AppFloodType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " +  
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "   SELECT ?destIP " +  
      "          (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "          (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "          (count(?destIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "   { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:AppPacket; " + 
      "                traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "                traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "              traffic:l4DestPort ?l4DestPort . " +  
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      "      { " + 
      "         SELECT ?packet2 ?destIP ?l4DestPort ?dateTime2 " + 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?packet2 rdf:type traffic:AppPacket; " + 
      "                    traffic:dateTime ?dateTime2; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "                  traffic:l4DestPort ?l4DestPort . " +   
      "         } " + 
      "         GROUP BY ?destIP ?l4DestPort " + 
      "      } " + 
      "      FILTER ( ?packet1 != ?packet2 ) . " + 
      "   } " + 
      "  GROUP BY ?destIP ?l4DestPort " + 
      "  HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0) " + 
      "  ORDER BY ?destIP " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
  
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false);   
   
 }  // end initial try 
 
 catch(Exception e) { 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
 }  // end catch 
 
  return addCollectionsTime; 
  }   // end function addAppFloods 
  
 
 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****          ADD PingScan PacketColletions Instances               *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addPingScans(PrintStream outputFile, 
                                  double addCollectionsTime) { 
 
  try { 
   
 sparqlTime = 0; 
 String queryStr; 
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 System.out.println("\tAdding Ping Scan instances..."); 
   
 // Find all ping scans by comparing appropriate octets for equality 
 // Class A - first octet 0 - 127 
 // Class B - first octet 128 - 191 
 // Class C - first octet 192 - 223 
   
 // Class A networks 
 queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "PREFIX apf: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/property#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:PingScanType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?nwadd; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " + 
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "   SELECT ?nwadd ?IPoctet1 " +  
      "          (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "          (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "          (count(?nwadd) as ?cnt) " + 
      "   { " + 
      "     SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?ipadd1 ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2a " + 
      "                     ?IPoctet3a ?IPoctet4a ?nwadd ?dateTime" + 
      "     { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:PingPacket; " + 
      "                traffic:hasDestIP ?ipadd1; " + 
      "                traffic:dateTime ?dateTime . " + 
      "       ?ipadd1  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2a; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3a; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4a; " +       
      "                traffic:hasNWIPaddress ?nwadd . " + 
      "      { " + 
      "        SELECT DISTINCT ?packet2 ?ipadd2 ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2b " + 
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      "                         ?IPoctet3b ?IPoctet4b ?nwadd2 " + 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?packet2 rdf:type traffic:PingPacket; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasDestIP ?ipadd2; " + 
      "                    traffic:dateTime ?dateTime2 . " + 
      "           ?ipadd2  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2b; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3b; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4b; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasNWIPaddress ?nwadd2 . " +  
      "         } " +          
      "      } " +  
      "     FILTER ( ( ?packet1 != ?packet2 ) &&  " + 
      "              ( ?IPoctet1 >= 0 ) &&  " + 
      "              ( ?IPoctet1 <= 127 ) ) . " + 
      "     } " +  
      "   } " + 
      "   GROUP BY ?nwadd ?IPoctet1 " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
       
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false); 
       
     
    // Class B networks   
    queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "PREFIX apf: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/property#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:PingScanType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?nwadd; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " + 
  "WHERE { { " + 
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      "   SELECT ?nwadd ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " +  
      "          (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "          (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "          (count(?nwadd) as ?cnt) " + 
      "   { " + 
      "     SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?ipadd1 ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " + 
      "                     ?IPoctet3a ?IPoctet4a ?nwadd ?dateTime" + 
      "     { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:PingPacket; " + 
      "                traffic:hasDestIP ?ipadd1; " + 
      "                traffic:dateTime ?dateTime . " + 
      "       ?ipadd1  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3a; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4a; " +       
      "                traffic:hasNWIPaddress ?nwadd . " + 
      "      { " + 
      "        SELECT DISTINCT ?packet2 ?ipadd2 ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " + 
      "                         ?IPoctet3b ?IPoctet4b ?nwadd2 " + 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?packet2 rdf:type traffic:PingPacket; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasDestIP ?ipadd2; " + 
      "                    traffic:dateTime ?dateTime2 . " + 
      "           ?ipadd2  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3b; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4b; " +       
      "                    traffic:hasNWIPaddress ?nwadd2 . " + 
      "         } " +          
      "      } " +  
      "     FILTER ( ( ?packet1 != ?packet2 ) &&  " + 
      "              ( ?IPoctet1 >= 128 ) &&  " + 
      "              ( ?IPoctet1 <= 191 ) ) . " + 
      "     } " +  
      "   } " + 
      "   GROUP BY ?nwadd ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
       
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                   KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false); 
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    // Class C networks  
 queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "PREFIX apf: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/property#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:PingScanType; " + 
      "       attack:hasTargetIP ?nwadd; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " + 
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "   SELECT ?nwadd ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 ?IPoctet3 " +  
      "          (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "          (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "          (count(?nwadd) as ?cnt) " + 
      "   { " + 
      "     SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?ipadd1 ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " + 
      "                     ?IPoctet3 ?IPoctet4a ?nwadd ?dateTime" + 
      "     { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:PingPacket; " + 
      "                traffic:hasDestIP ?ipadd1; " + 
      "                traffic:dateTime ?dateTime . " + 
      "       ?ipadd1  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4a; " +       
      "                traffic:hasNWIPaddress ?nwadd . " + 
      "      { " + 
      "        SELECT DISTINCT ?packet2 ?ipadd2 ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " + 
      "                         ?IPoctet3 ?IPoctet4b ?nwadd2 " + 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?packet2 rdf:type traffic:PingPacket; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasDestIP ?ipadd2; " + 
      "                    traffic:dateTime ?dateTime2 . " + 
      "           ?ipadd2  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
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      "                    traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4b; " +       
      "                    traffic:hasNWIPaddress ?nwadd2 . " + 
      "         } " +          
      "      } " +  
      "     FILTER ( ( ?packet1 != ?packet2 ) &&  " + 
      "              ( ?IPoctet1 >= 192 ) &&  " + 
      "              ( ?IPoctet1 <= 223 ) ) . " + 
      "     } " +  
      "   } " + 
      "   GROUP BY ?nwadd ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 ?IPoctet3 " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
       
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false); 
     
     
    // Add Host IP addresses into NWaddressScanned class for each  
    //      host whose network was scanned with a PingScan attack. 
    System.out.println("\tAdding Host IP address into NWaddressScanned class..."); 
 outputFile.println("Adding Host IP address into NWaddressScanned class..."); 
   
 queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   ?hostadd rdf:type traffic:NWaddressScanned; " + 
      "            traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " +  
      "            traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2; " +   
  "            traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3; " +  
  "            traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4 . " +  
  "} " + 
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "   SELECT ?ipadd ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " + 
      "                   ?IPoctet3 ?IPoctet4 " + 
      "   { " + 
      "       ?ipadd  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "               traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
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      "               traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2; " + 
      "               traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3; " + 
      "               traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4; " + 
      "               traffic:hasNWIPaddress ?ipadd1 . " + 
      "    { " + 
      "     SELECT ?packet1 ?ipadd1 " + 
      "     { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type attack:PingScan; " + 
      "                attack:hasTargetIP ?ipadd1 . " + 
      "     } " + 
      "    } " + 
      "   FILTER  ( ( ?IPoctet4 != 0 ) ) " +   
      "   } " + 
      " } " + 
      "LET (?hostadd := ?ipadd) . " + 
      "}"; 
       
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false); 
   
 }  // end initial try 
 
 catch(Exception e) { 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
 }  // end catch 
 
  return addCollectionsTime; 
  }   // end function addPingScans 
  
  
  
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****          ADD PortScan PacketColletions Instances               *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addPortScans(PrintStream outputFile, 
                                  double addCollectionsTime) { 
 
  try { 
   
  sparqlTime = 0; 
   
 System.out.println("\tAdding Port Scan instances..."); 
 outputFile.println("Adding PortScan instances of multiple ports to same node..."); 
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 // Retrieve all L4Packet instances to same destIPs with different Ports 
 String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:PortScanType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " +   
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "   SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?destIP " + 
      "          (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "          (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "          (count(?destIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "   { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:L4Packet; " + 
      "                traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "                traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "              traffic:l4DestPort ?l4DestPort1 . " +  
      "      { " + 
      "         SELECT ?packet2 ?destIP ?l4DestPort2 ?dateTime2 " + 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?packet2 rdf:type traffic:L4Packet; " + 
      "                    traffic:dateTime ?dateTime2; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "                  traffic:l4DestPort ?l4DestPort2 . " +   
      "         } " + 
      "         GROUP BY ?destIP " + 
      "      } " + 
      "      FILTER ( ( ?packet1 != ?packet2) &&  " + 
      "               ( ?l4DestPort1 != ?l4DestPort2 ) ) . " + 
      "   } " + 
      "  GROUP BY ?destIP " + 
      "  HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0) " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
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    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false);   
         
    outputFile.println("Adding PortScan instances from SynPacket..."); 
  
// Retrieve all SynPacket instances to same destIPs 
 queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:PortScanType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " +  
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "     SELECT ?destIP (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "            (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "            (count(?destIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "            WHERE {?pack rdf:type traffic:SynPacket; " + 
      "                         traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "                         traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP . " + 
      "            } " + 
      "        GROUP BY ?destIP " + 
      "        HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0) " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
 
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false);   
   
   
 outputFile.println("Adding PortScan instances from FinPacket..."); 
 // Retrieve all FinPacket instances to same destIPs 
 // FinPacket instances are TCP packets that only have FIN flag set 
 queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
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      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType traffic:PortScanType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " +  
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "     SELECT ?destIP (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "            (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "            (count(?destIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "            WHERE {?pack rdf:type traffic:FinPacket; " + 
      "                         traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "                         traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP . " + 
      "            } " + 
      "        GROUP BY ?destIP " + 
      "        HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0) " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
 
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false);  
   
   
 outputFile.println("Adding PortScan instances from NullPacket..."); 
 // Retrieve all NullPacket instances to same destIPs 
 queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
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  "       attack:pcType traffic:PortScanType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?cnt . " + 
  "} " +  
  "WHERE { { " +  
      "     SELECT ?destIP (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "            (MAX (?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "            (count(?destIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "            WHERE {?pack rdf:type traffic:NullPacket; " + 
      "                         traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "                         traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP . " + 
      "            } " + 
      "        GROUP BY ?destIP " + 
      "        HAVING (count(?destIP) > 0) " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
 
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false);   
   
 }  // end initial try 
 
 catch(Exception e) { 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
 }  // end catch 
 
  return addCollectionsTime; 
  }   // end function addPortScans 
   
   
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****          Add PingScan PacketColletion Instances                *****/ 
  /*****        Add for nodes where network instance exists             *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addNodePingScans(PrintStream outputFile, 
                                      double addCollectionsTime) { 
 
  try { 
   
  sparqlTime = 0; 
   
 // Class A networks 
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 System.out.println("\tAdding Ping Scans for nodes from network class A scan 
instances..."); 
 outputFile.println("Adding PingScan instances for nodes from network class A 
scans..."); 
 
 String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "PREFIX apf: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/property#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType attack:PingScanType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?nodeadd; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?pcFreq . " + 
  "} " + 
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "   SELECT ?beginDateTime ?endDateTime ?pcFreq " + 
      "          ?nodeadd " +  
      "   { " + 
      "     SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?ipadd1 ?beginDateTime ?endDateTime " + 
      "                     ?pcFreq ?IPoctet1 " + 
      "     { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type attack:PingScan; " + 
      "                attack:hasTargetIP ?ipadd1; " + 
      "                attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " + 
      "                attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " + 
      "                attack:pcFrequency ?pcFreq . " + 
      "       ?ipadd1  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet2 0; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet3 0; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet4 0 . " + 
      "      { " + 
      "        SELECT DISTINCT ?nodeadd ?IPoctet1 " + 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?nodeadd  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2b; " + 
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      "                    traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3b; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4b . " + 
      "         } " +          
      "      } " +  
      "     FILTER ( ( ?ipadd1 != ?nodeadd ) ) . " + 
      "     } " +  
      "   } " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
  
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false); 
     
     
    // Class B networks 
 System.out.println("\tAdding Ping Scans for nodes from network class B scan 
instances..."); 
 outputFile.println("Adding PingScan instances for nodes from network class B 
scans..."); 
 
 queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "PREFIX apf: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/property#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType attack:PingScanType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?nodeadd; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?pcFreq . " + 
  "} " + 
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "     SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?ipadd1 ?beginDateTime ?endDateTime " + 
      "                     ?pcFreq ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " + 
      "   { " + 
      "     SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?ipadd1 ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " + 
      "                     ?IPoctet3 ?IPoctet4a ?nwadd ?dateTime" + 
      "     { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type attack:PingScan; " + 
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      "                attack:hasTargetIP ?ipadd1; " + 
      "                attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " + 
      "                attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " + 
      "                attack:pcFrequency ?pcFreq . " + 
      "       ?ipadd1  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet3 0; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet4 0 . " + 
      "      { " + 
      "        SELECT DISTINCT ?nodeadd ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " + 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?nodeadd  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3b; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4b . " + 
      "         } " +          
      "      } " +  
      "     FILTER ( ( ?ipadd1 != ?nodeadd ) ) . " + 
      "     } " +  
      "   } " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
  
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false); 
     
     
    // Class C networks 
 System.out.println("\tAdding Ping Scans for nodes from network class C scan 
instances..."); 
 outputFile.println("Adding PingScan instances for nodes from network class C 
scans..."); 
 
 queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "PREFIX apf: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/property#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
  "{" + 
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      "   _:a rdf:type attack:PacketCollection; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
  "       attack:pcType attack:PingScanType; " + 
  "       attack:hasTargetIP ?nodeadd; " + 
  "       attack:pcFrequency ?pcFreq . " + 
  "} " + 
  "WHERE { { " + 
      "     SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?ipadd1 ?beginDateTime ?endDateTime " + 
      "                     ?pcFreq ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 ?IPoctet3 " + 
      "   { " + 
      "     SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?ipadd1 ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 " + 
      "                     ?IPoctet3 ?IPoctet4a ?nwadd ?dateTime" + 
      "     { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type attack:PingScan; " + 
      "                attack:hasTargetIP ?ipadd1; " + 
      "                attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " + 
      "                attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " + 
      "                attack:pcFrequency ?pcFreq . " + 
      "       ?ipadd1  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3; " + 
      "                traffic:IPoctet4 0 . " + 
      "      { " + 
      "        SELECT DISTINCT ?nodeadd ?IPoctet1 ?IPoctet2 ?IPoctet3 " + 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?nodeadd  rdf:type traffic:IPaddress; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet1 ?IPoctet1; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet2 ?IPoctet2; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet3 ?IPoctet3; " + 
      "                    traffic:IPoctet4 ?IPoctet4b . " + 
      "         } " +          
      "      } " +  
      "     FILTER ( ( ?ipadd1 != ?nodeadd ) ) . " + 
      "     } " +  
      "   } " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
  
    addCollectionsTime = addCollectionsTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false);   
   
 }  // end initial try 
 
 291 
 catch(Exception e) { 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
 }  // end catch 
 
  return addCollectionsTime; 
  }   // end function addNodePingScans 
   
   
}   // end class PacketCollections 
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C.2 Java File to Create Traffic Stream Instances 
 
/********************************************************************/ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/* Author: Lisa Frye                                                */ 
/* Date: January 2011                                               */ 
/* Filename: TrafficStreams.java                                    */ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/* Description: This file contains functions to execute SPARQL      */ 
/*              queries against the KB and add instances for        */ 
/*              traffic streams based on results from the queries   */ 
/*              to the KB.                                          */ 
/* API: this program uses the Jena ontology API.                    */ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/********************************************************************/ 
 
 
// imports for Jena API 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.GraphStore; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.GraphStoreFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateAction; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateProcessor; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateRequest; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateExecutionFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.util.iterator.ExtendedIterator; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.Query; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.Syntax; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryExecution; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryExecutionFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QuerySolution; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.ResultSet; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.ResultSetFormatter; 
 
// general imports 
import java.lang.*; 
import java.io.*; 
import java.util.*; 
import java.text.DecimalFormat; 
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public class TrafficStreams { 
 
 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****                 ADD TCP Stream Instances                       *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addTCPStreams(PrintStream outputFile, double addStreamsTime) { 
   
try { 
  
   // build a query string to insert all triples selected that are 
  // TCP packets with unique src and dest IP and src and dest port numbers. 
  String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " + 
      "PREFIX afn: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/function#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
      "{ " + 
      "   ?stream rdf:type traffic:TCPStream; " + 
      "           traffic:protocol \"TCP\"; " + 
      "           traffic:startTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "           traffic:endTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode1MAC ?srcMAC; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode2MAC ?destMAC; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode1IP ?srcIP; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode2IP ?destIP; " + 
      "           traffic:node1Port ?l4SrcPort; " + 
      "           traffic:node2Port ?l4DestPort . " + 
      "   ?srcIP  traffic:hasTCPStreamWith ?destIP; " + 
      "} " + 
      "WHERE  { { " + 
      "   SELECT DISTINCT ?packet ?dateTime ?srcMAC ?destMAC " +  
      "              ?srcIP ?destIP ?l4SrcPort ?l4DestPort { " + 
      "       ?packet rdf:type traffic:TCPPacket; " + 
      "               traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "             traffic:hasSrcMAC ?srcMAC; " + 
      "             traffic:hasDestMAC ?destMAC; " + 
      "             traffic:hasSrcIP ?srcIP; " +      
      "             traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "              traffic:l4SrcPort ?l4SrcPort; " + 
      "              traffic:l4DestPort ?l4DestPort . " + 
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      "    } " +  
      " } " + 
      "LET (?stream := ?packet) . " + 
      "}"; 
 
    outputFile.println("Adding TCP Streams..."); 
    addStreamsTime = addStreamsTime + KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, 
false);  
   
 }  // end initial try 
 
 catch(Exception e) { 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
 }  // end catch 
 
  return addStreamsTime; 
  }   // end function addTCPStreams 
  
   
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****                 ADD UDP Stream Instances                       *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addUDPStreams(PrintStream outputFile, double addStreamsTime) 
{ 
   
  try { 
  
   // build a query string to insert all triples selected that are 
   // UDP packets with unique src and dest IP and src and dest port numbers. 
   String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " + 
      "PREFIX afn: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/function#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
      "{ " + 
      "   ?stream rdf:type traffic:UDPStream; " + 
      "           traffic:protocol \"UDP\"; " + 
      "           traffic:startTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "           traffic:endTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode1MAC ?srcMAC; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode2MAC ?destMAC; " + 
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      "           traffic:hasNode1IP ?srcIP; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode2IP ?destIP; " + 
      "           traffic:node1Port ?l4SrcPort; " + 
      "           traffic:node2Port ?l4DestPort . " + 
      "} " + 
      "WHERE  { { " + 
      "   SELECT DISTINCT ?packet ?dateTime ?srcMAC ?destMAC " +  
      "              ?srcIP ?destIP ?l4SrcPort ?l4DestPort { " + 
      "       ?packet rdf:type traffic:UDPPacket; " + 
      "               traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "             traffic:hasSrcMAC ?srcMAC; " + 
      "             traffic:hasDestMAC ?destMAC; " + 
      "             traffic:hasSrcIP ?srcIP; " +      
      "             traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "              traffic:l4SrcPort ?l4SrcPort; " + 
      "              traffic:l4DestPort ?l4DestPort . " + 
      "    } " +  
      " } " + 
      "LET (?stream := ?packet) . " + 
      "}"; 
 
    outputFile.println("Adding UDP Streams..."); 
    addStreamsTime = addStreamsTime + KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, 
false);   
   
  }  // end initial try 
 
  catch(Exception e) { 
 e.printStackTrace(); 
  }  // end catch 
 
  return addStreamsTime; 
  }   // end function addUDPStreams 
    
 
   
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****                 ADD ICMP Stream Instances                      *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addICMPStreams(PrintStream outputFile, double addStreamsTime) 
{ 
 
  try { 
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   // build a query string to insert all triples selected that are 
   // ICMP packets with unique src and dest IP and src and dest port numbers. 
   String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " + 
      "PREFIX afn: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/function#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
      "{ " + 
      "   ?stream rdf:type traffic:ICMPStream; " + 
      "           traffic:protocol \"ICMP\"; " + 
      "           traffic:startTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "           traffic:endTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode1MAC ?srcMAC; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode2MAC ?destMAC; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode1IP ?srcIP; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode2IP ?destIP . " + 
      "} " + 
      "WHERE  { { " + 
      "   SELECT DISTINCT ?packet ?dateTime ?srcMAC ?destMAC ?srcIP ?destIP  { "+ 
      "       ?packet rdf:type traffic:ICMPPacket; " + 
      "               traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "             traffic:hasSrcMAC ?srcMAC; " + 
      "             traffic:hasDestMAC ?destMAC; " + 
      "             traffic:hasSrcIP ?srcIP; " +      
      "             traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP . " + 
      "    } " +  
      " } " + 
      "LET (?stream := ?packet) . " + 
      "}"; 
 
    outputFile.println("Adding ICMP Streams..."); 
    addStreamsTime = addStreamsTime + KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, 
false);  
   
 }  // end initial try 
 
 catch(Exception e) { 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
 }  // end catch 
 
 
  return addStreamsTime; 
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  }   // end function addICMPStreams 
    
 
   
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****                  ADD L3 Stream Instances                       *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addL3Streams(PrintStream outputFile, double addStreamsTime) { 
   
  try { 
   
   // build a query string to insert all triples selected that are 
   // L3 packets with unique src and dest IP. 
   String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " + 
      "PREFIX afn: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/function#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
      "{ " + 
      "   ?stream rdf:type traffic:L3Stream; " + 
      "           traffic:protocol \"IP\"; " + 
      "           traffic:startTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "           traffic:endTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode1MAC ?srcMAC; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode2MAC ?destMAC; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode1IP ?srcIP; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode2IP ?destIP . " + 
      "} " + 
      "WHERE  { { " + 
      "   SELECT DISTINCT ?packet ?dateTime ?srcMAC ?destMAC ?srcIP ?destIP  { "+ 
      "       ?packet rdf:type traffic:IPPacket; " + 
      "               traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "             traffic:hasSrcMAC ?srcMAC; " + 
      "             traffic:hasDestMAC ?destMAC; " + 
      "             traffic:hasSrcIP ?srcIP; " +      
      "             traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP . " + 
      "    } " +  
      " } " + 
      "LET (?stream := ?packet) . " + 
      "}"; 
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    outputFile.println("Adding L3 Streams..."); 
    addStreamsTime = addStreamsTime + KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, 
false);  
   
   }  // end initial try 
 
   catch(Exception e) { 
 e.printStackTrace(); 
   }  // end catch 
 
 
  return addStreamsTime; 
  }   // end function addL3Streams  
  
   
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****                 ADD ARP Stream Instances                       *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addARPStreams(PrintStream outputFile, double addStreamsTime) { 
 
  try { 
   
   // build a query string to insert all triples selected that are 
   // ICMP packets with unique src and dest IP and src and dest port  
   // numbers. 
   String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " + 
      "PREFIX afn: <http://jena.hpl.hp.com/ARQ/function#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
      "{ " + 
      "   ?stream rdf:type traffic:L2Stream; " + 
      "           traffic:protocol \"ARP\"; " + 
      "           traffic:startTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "           traffic:endTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode1MAC ?srcMAC; " + 
      "           traffic:hasNode2MAC ?destMAC . " + 
      "} " + 
      "WHERE  { { " + 
      "   SELECT DISTINCT ?packet ?dateTime ?srcMAC ?destMAC { " + 
      "       ?packet rdf:type traffic:L2Packet; " + 
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      "               traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "             traffic:srcMAC ?srcMAC; " +      
      "             traffic:destMAC ?destMAC . " + 
      "      FILTER NOT EXISTS { ?packet rdf:type traffic:TCPPacket . } " + 
      "      FILTER NOT EXISTS { ?packet rdf:type traffic:UDPPacket . } " + 
      "      FILTER NOT EXISTS { ?packet rdf:type traffic:ICMPPacket . } " +  
      "      FILTER NOT EXISTS { ?packet rdf:type traffic:IPPacket . } " +       
      "    } " +  
      " } " + 
      "LET (?stream := ?packet) . " + 
      "}"; 
 
    outputFile.println("Adding ICMP Streams..."); 
    addStreamsTime = addStreamsTime + KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, 
false); 
   
   }  // end initial try 
 
   catch(Exception e) { 
 e.printStackTrace(); 
   }  // end catch 
 
 
  return addStreamsTime; 
  }   // end function addARPStreams 
 
  
}   // end class TrafficStreams 
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C.3 Java File to Create Attack Instances from Alerts 
 
/*****************************************************************/ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/* Author: Lisa Frye                                                */ 
/* Date: March 2011                                                 */ 
/* Filename: AlertAttacks.java                                      */ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/* Description: This file contains functions to execute SPARQL      */ 
/*              queries against the KB and add instances for        */ 
/*              simple attacks based on results from the queries    */ 
/*              to the alert classes of the traffic ontology in     */ 
/*              in the KB.                                          */ 
/* API: this program uses the Jena ontology API.                    */ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/*****************************************************************/ 
 
 
// imports for Jena API 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.GraphStore; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.GraphStoreFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateAction; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateProcessor; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateRequest; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateExecutionFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.util.iterator.ExtendedIterator; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.Query; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.Syntax; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryExecution; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryExecutionFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QuerySolution; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.ResultSet; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.ResultSetFormatter; 
 
// general imports 
import java.lang.*; 
import java.io.*; 
import java.util.*; 
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public class AlertAttacks { 
 
 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****                Add All Alert Attack Instances                  *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addAllAlertAttacks(PrintStream outputFile,  
                                          double addAlertAttsTime) { 
 
  try { 
 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "DoS",  
                                 "aClassification", "Denial of Service",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "UnauthAccess",  
                                 "aClassification",  
                                 "Attempt to Login By a Default Username and Password",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "UnauthAccess",  
                                 "aClassification", "root login attempt",   
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "UnauthAccess",  
                                 "aClassification", 
                                 "Attempted Login Using a Suspicious Username was Detected",  
                                  addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "UserPG",  
                                 "aClassification", "User Privilege Gain",   
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "AdminPG",  
                                 "aClassification", "Administrator Privilege Gain",   
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "InfoLeak",  
                                 "Information Leak", "aClassification",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "InfoLeak",   
                                 "aClassification", 
                                 "Sensitive Data was Transmitted Across the Network",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "InfoLeak",  
                                 "aClassification", 
                                 "Inappropriate Content was Detected",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
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    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "NodeInfo",  
                                 "aDescription", "ICMP Address Mask Request",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "NodeInfo",  
                                 "aClassification",  
                                 "A Client was Using an Unusual Port",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "NodeInfo",  
                                 "aClassification",  
                                 "Detection of a Non-Standard Porotcol or Event",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "TCPInfo",  
                                 "aClassification",   
                                 "TCP Connection was Detected",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "RPC",  
                                 "aClassification",  "Decode of an RPC Query",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "ExecCode",  
                                 "aClassification",  
                                 "Executable Code was Detected",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "ExecCode",  
                                 "aClassification",  
                                 "A Suspicious String was Detected",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "WebServer",  
                                 "aClassification",  
                                 "Access to a Potentially Vulnerable Web Application",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "WebServer",  
                                 "aClassification", "Web Application Attack",   
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "SystemCall",  
                                 "aClassification", "A System Call was Detected",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "SendFile",  
                                 "aClassification",  
                                 "A Suspicious Filename was Detected",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
    addAlertAttsTime = AlertAttacks.addAlertAttacks(outputFile, "SendFile",  
                                 "aClassification",  
                                 "A Network Trojan was Detected",  
                                 addAlertAttsTime); 
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    }  // end initial try 
 
   catch(Exception e) { 
 e.printStackTrace(); 
   }  // end catch 
 
  return addAlertAttsTime; 
  }   // end function addAllAlertAttacks  
   
   
   
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****                  Add Alert Attack Instances                    *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /* className - the name of the class in the ontology to add the instances */ 
  /* field - the name of the field in the class to perform the regExp match */ 
  /* regExp - the string to search for in the regular expression in query   */ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addAlertAttacks(PrintStream outputFile, String className,  
                                       String field, String regExp,  
                                       double addAlertAttsTime) { 
 
  try { 
        
     outputFile.println("Adding Attacks from Alerts to " + className +  
                       " for regexp - " + regExp + "!"); 
                        
   // Build the query string  
   String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
      "{ " + 
      "   ?attack rdf:type attack:" + className + "; " + 
      "           attack:attBeginDate ?aDateTime; " + 
      "           attack:attEndDate ?aDateTime; " + 
      "           attack:description ?aDesc; " + 
      "           attack:targetAddress ?aDestIP . " + 
      "} " + 
      "WHERE  { { " + 
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      "   SELECT ?alert ?aDateTime ?aDesc ?aDestIP " + 
      "   { " + 
      "       ?alert rdf:type traffic:Alert; " + 
      "               traffic:aDateTime ?aDateTime; " + 
      "               traffic:aDescription ?aDesc; " + 
      "             traffic:aClassification ?aClassification . " +  
      "     OPTIONAL { ?alert traffic:aDestIP ?aDestIP . } . " +  
      "     FILTER REGEX(\"" + field + "\"," +" \"" + regExp + "\", \"i\") . " + 
      "   } " + 
      " } " + 
      "LET (?attack := ?alert) . " + 
      "}"; 
 
    addAlertAttsTime = addAlertAttsTime + KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, 
outputFile, false);         
   
  }  // end initial try 
 
   catch(Exception e) { 
 e.printStackTrace(); 
   }  // end catch 
 
  return addAlertAttsTime; 
  }   // end function addAlertAttacks   
     
   
}   // end class AlertAttacks 
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C.4 Java File to Create Some Simple Attack Instances 
 
/*****************************************************************/ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/* Author: Lisa Frye                                                */ 
/* Date: March 2011                                                 */ 
/* Filename: SimpleAttacks.java                                     */ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/* Description: This file contains functions to execute SPARQL      */ 
/*              queries against the KB and add instances for        */ 
/*              simple attacks based on results from the queries    */ 
/*              to the attacks ontology in the KB.                  */ 
/* API: this program uses the Jena ontology API.                    */ 
/*                                                                  */ 
/*****************************************************************/ 
 
 
// imports for Jena API 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.GraphStore; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.GraphStoreFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateAction; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateProcessor; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateRequest; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.update.UpdateExecutionFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.util.iterator.ExtendedIterator; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.Query; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.Syntax; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryExecution; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QueryExecutionFactory; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.QuerySolution; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.ResultSet; 
import com.hp.hpl.jena.query.ResultSetFormatter; 
 
// general imports 
import java.lang.*; 
import java.io.*; 
import java.util.*; 
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public class SimpleAttacks { 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****                    Add Land Instances                          *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addLandAttacks(PrintStream outputFile,  
                                    double addAttacksTime) { 
   
   try { 
  
      System.out.println("\tAdding Land instances..."); 
 
      // insert triples for Land attacks (TCPPacket with DIP=SIP and  
      // Dest port = Src port). 
     String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " + 
      "INSERT " + 
      "{ " + 
      "   ?attack rdf:type attack:Land; " + 
      "           attack:beginDate ?dateTime; " + 
      "           attack:endDate ?dateTime; " + 
      "           attack:description \"Land attack\"; " + 
      "           attack:hasTargetIP ?destIP .  " + 
      "} " + 
      "WHERE  { { " + 
      "   SELECT ?packet ?dateTime ?destIP " + 
      "   { " + 
      "       ?packet rdf:type traffic:TCPPacket; " + 
      "               traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "             traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "             traffic:hasSrcIP ?srcIP; " + 
      "             traffic:l4DestPort ?l4DestPort; " + 
      "             traffic:l4SrcPort ?l4SrcPort . " +  
      "      FILTER ( ( ?destIP = ?srcIP ) && " + 
      "               ( ?l4DestPort = ?l4SrcPort ) ) . " + 
      "   } " + 
      " } " + 
      "LET (?attack := ?packet) . " + 
      "}"; 
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       addAttacksTime = addAttacksTime + KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, 
false);        
 
      outputFile.println("Added Land Attacks!"); 
      outputFile.println(); 
   
   }  // end initial try 
 
   catch(Exception e) { 
 e.printStackTrace(); 
   }  // end catch 
 
  return addAttacksTime; 
  }   // end function addLandAttacks  
 
 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****                  Add ARP Spoof Instances                       *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
 
  public static double addARPSpoofAttacks(PrintStream outputFile, 
                                        double addAttacksTime) { 
  
  try { 
  
   System.out.println("\tAdding ARP Spoof instances..."); 
 
   // same MAC, two different IP addresses 
   String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " + 
      "INSERT " +       
      "{ " +                
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:ARPSpoof; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?startDateTime; " + 
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " + 
      "       attack:description \"ARP Spoof attack\"; " + 
      "       attack:hasTargetMAC ?targetMAC . " + 
      "} " + 
      "WHERE { { " + 
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      "   SELECT ?targetMAC " +  
      "          (MIN(?startTime) as ?startDateTime) " + 
      "          (MAX (?endTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "          (count(?targetMAC) as ?cnt) " + 
      "   { " + 
      "     SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?startTime ?endTime ?targetIP ?targetMAC " + 
      "     { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:L3Stream; " + 
      "                traffic:startTime ?startTime; " + 
      "                traffic:endTime ?endTime; " + 
      "                traffic:hasNode1MAC ?targetMAC; " + 
      "                traffic:hasNode1IP ?targetIP . " + 
      "      { " + 
      "    SELECT DISTINCT ?packet2 ?startTime2 ?endTime2 ?targetIP2 ?targetMAC "+ 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?packet2 rdf:type traffic:L3Stream; " + 
      "                    traffic:startTime ?startTime2; " + 
      "                    traffic:endTime ?endTime2; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasNode1MAC ?targetMAC; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasNode1IP ?targetIP2 . " + 
      "         } " +          
      "      } " +  
      "     FILTER ( ( ?packet1 != ?packet2 ) &&  " + 
      "              ( ?targetIP != ?targetIP2 ) ) . " + 
      "     } " +  
      "   } " + 
      "   GROUP BY ?targetMAC " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
  
    addAttacksTime = addAttacksTime + KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, 
false);  
     
   // same IP, two different MAC addresses 
   queryStr =  
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " + 
      "INSERT " +       
      "{ " + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:ARPSpoof; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?startDateTime; " + 
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " + 
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      "       attack:description \"ARP Spoof attack\"; " + 
      "       attack:hasTargetIP ?targetIP . " + 
      "} " + 
      "WHERE { { " + 
      "   SELECT ?targetIP " +  
      "          (MIN(?startTime) as ?startDateTime) " + 
      "          (MAX (?endTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "          (count(?targetIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "   { " + 
      "     SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?startTime ?endTime ?targetIP ?targetMAC " + 
      "     { " + 
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:L3Stream; " + 
      "                traffic:startTime ?startTime; " + 
      "                traffic:endTime ?endTime; " + 
      "                traffic:hasNode1MAC ?targetMAC; " + 
      "                traffic:hasNode1IP ?targetIP . " + 
      "      { " + 
      "    SELECT DISTINCT ?packet2 ?startTime2 ?endTime2 ?targetIP ?targetMAC2 "+ 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?packet2 rdf:type traffic:L3Stream; " + 
      "                    traffic:startTime ?startTime2; " + 
      "                    traffic:endTime ?endTime2; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasNode1MAC ?targetMAC2; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasNode1IP ?targetIP . " + 
      "         } " +          
      "      } " +  
      "     FILTER ( ( ?packet1 != ?packet2 ) &&  " + 
      "              ( ?targetMAC != ?targetMAC2 ) ) . " + 
      "     } " +  
      "   } " + 
      "   GROUP BY ?targetIP " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
  
    addAttacksTime = addAttacksTime + KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, 
false);  
 
 
     outputFile.println("Added ARP Spoof Attacks!"); 
     outputFile.println(); 
   
   }  // end initial try 
 
   catch(Exception e) { 
 e.printStackTrace(); 
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   }  // end catch 
 
  return addAttacksTime; 
  }   // end function addARPSpoofAttacks  
 
   
 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /*****        Add addTCPConnect PacketColletion Instances             *****/ 
  /*****                                                                *****/ 
  /******************************************************************/ 
  public static double addTCPConnect(PrintStream outputFile, 
                                     double addAttacksTime) { 
 
  try { 
   
 System.out.println("\tAdding TCP Connect instances..."); 
 outputFile.println("Adding TCPConnect instances from TCPPacket..."); 
 
 // Retrieve all TCP Packet instances to same destIP and tcpRstFlag is true 
 // It is important to note that the TCP connect attack source and  
 //    destination addresses are reversed from the TCPPacket instance 
 //    to the TCPConnect attack instance. This is due to the fact that  
 //    the TCP connect attack is identified with the RST flag set in 
 //    the TCP packet, which is actually done in the response to the  
 //    SYN packet, which is sent from the attacker. So, the destination 
 //    address in the RST packet is actually the attacker (source of 
 //    the attack). 
   String queryStr =  
      "PREFIX traffic: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "traffic.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX attack: " + 
      "<" + KButility.URL_PREFIX + "attack.owl#> " + 
      "PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> " + 
      "PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> " +  
      "INSERT  { " + 
      "   _:a rdf:type attack:TCPConnect; " + 
      "       attack:beginDate ?beginDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:endDate ?endDateTime; " +  
      "       attack:description \"TCP Connect attack, predict TCP Sequence Number\"; " + 
    "       attack:hasTargetIP ?srcIP; " + 
    "       attack:scanFrequency ?cnt . " + 
    "} " +  
      "WHERE { { " + 
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      "   SELECT ?srcIP " +  
      "          (MIN(?dateTime) as ?beginDateTime) " + 
      "          (MAX(?dateTime) as ?endDateTime) " + 
      "          (count(?srcIP) as ?cnt) " + 
      "   { " + 
      "    SELECT DISTINCT ?packet1 ?destIP ?srcIP ?dateTime " + 
      "     { " +  
      "       ?packet1 rdf:type traffic:TCPPacket; " + 
      "                traffic:dateTime ?dateTime; " + 
      "                traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "                traffic:hasSrcIP ?srcIP; " + 
      "              traffic:tcpRstFlag true . " +  
      "      { " + 
      "         SELECT DISTINCT ?packet2 ?destIP ?srcIP ?dateTime2 " + 
      "         { " + 
      "           ?packet2 rdf:type traffic:TCPPacket; " + 
      "                    traffic:dateTime ?dateTime2; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasDestIP ?destIP; " + 
      "                    traffic:hasSrcIP ?srcIP; " + 
      "                  traffic:tcpRstFlag true . " +   
      "         } " + 
      "      } " + 
      "      FILTER ( ?packet1 != ?packet2 ) . " + 
      "   } } " + 
      "  GROUP BY ?srcIP " + 
      "  HAVING (count(?srcIP) > 0) " + 
      " } " + 
      "}"; 
  
    addAttacksTime = addAttacksTime +  
                          KButility.execUpdQuery(queryStr, outputFile, false);   
   
   }  // end initial try 
 
   catch(Exception e) { 
 e.printStackTrace(); 
   }  // end catch 
 
  return addAttacksTime; 
  }   // end function addTCPConnect 
   
 
}   // end class SimpleAttacks 
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